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ABSTRACT 
Observing the actions of other people has a strong impact on how we process further information. For 
instance, when we watch other people gazing at a distinct location in space, we rapidly attend to the 
same location by following their gaze direction (Emery, 2000; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Frischen, 
Bayliss & Tipper, 2007). Gaze direction is an important social signal as it indicates the current object of 
interest that might be the target of subsequent actions. The ability to share attention based on gaze fol-
lowing develops early in life (Moore & Corkum, 1995; Striano & Reid, 2005) and seems to be influ-
enced by context factors (Frith & Frith, 2006; for review), such as information about emotional (Gra-
ham & LaBar, 2007; cf. Hietanen & Leppänen, 2003) and mental states (Teufel et al., 2009, 2010). 
 Behavioral studies have shown that watching another person gaze at a distinct location causes 
shifts of the observer’s attention to the same locati n (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) – 
a mechanism that is commonly referred to as g ze cueing. Attending to gaze direction has traditionally 
been assumed to be a bottom-up process used by the brain to make inferences about intentions, beliefs 
or action goals of other people (e.g., Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009). However, this assumption has been 
questioned recently by proposals that even the mostbasic perceptual processing of social stimuli is top-
down modulated by the context in which the social scene takes place (Frith & Frith, 2006; Teufel et al., 
2010). The authors argued that in order to cope with perceptually ambiguous scenes, the human brain 
relies on a prioritization mechanism that structures p rceptual information according to its social rele-
vance based on context information.  
 This PhD-work systematically investigated the influence of context information on social atten-
tion mechanisms. In four studies, the interaction of bottom-up and top-down mechanisms during the 
process of attentional orienting to gaze direction was examined. Top-down processes were triggered by 
providing context information about a) the presence of objects in the periphery to which gaze direction 
could refer (Study 1), b) the probability with which gaze direction indcates a target position (Study 2), 
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and c) the likelihood that mental states can be attribu ed to the gazer (Study 3 & 4). In all experiments, 
gaze-cueing effects were modulated by context information: Study 1 showed general cueing effects for 
the whole gaze-cued hemifield when no context was provided, while the presence of reference objects 
in the periphery induced an additional gaze-cueing ffect specific to the exact gazed-at position. Study 
2 provided evidence that specific cueing effects were observed when participants believed that nonpre-
dictive gaze cues were predictive, while specific cueing effects were attenuated when predictive cues 
were believed to be nonpredictive. Study 3 and 4 showed that the size of the cueing effects is remaka-
bly modulated by beliefs about the mental states of the gazer. In particular, in Study 3, cueing effects 
were larger in conditions in which participants were made to believe that they were observing human 
behavior relative to mechanistic behavior. Most importantly, this effect was independent of the physical 
characteristics of the stimuli, but depended only on whether intentionality could be attributed to the
gazer. Study 4 showed that the observed modulation of cueing effects by mental state attribution takes 
place at early stages of perceptual processing, as ERP-components reflecting sensory gain mechanisms 
(i.e., P1) were affected by beliefs about the intentionality of gaze behavior.  
 In sum, the findings reported in this PhD-work consistently show that the allocation of attention 
following changes in gaze direction is top-down modulated by context information which allows gaze-
triggered attention mechanisms to be sensitive to the social relevance of objects/events in the enviro-
ment: while the bottom-up mechanism assures a general preparedness to social signals transmitted by 
other people, the top-down mechanism allows a flexib  adaptation to the context of the scene. These 
findings led to the postulation of a theoretical model that integrates the effects of bottom-up and top-
down components on gaze cueing: the bottom-up component causes a general directional bias to the 
cued hemifield, while the top-down component specifically guides attention to objects of high social 
relevance.  
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1.1. The Social Brain – How we manage to understand others 
For engaging in social interactions with other peopl  we need to know who we are interacting with, and
what others are going to do next (Frith & Frith, 2006). Based on this knowledge, which can be acquired 
directly through interacting with other people or indirectly by either observing others or by being told 
about them, we draw inferences about their internal states (i.e., intentions, beliefs, feelings). This men-
talizing process (Frith & Frith, 2003) allows us to make predictions about others’ behavior by combin-
ing information we deduce from the current state of the world with assumptions we have about possible 
internal states. Accordingly, the interpretation of s cial interactions is thought to involve a bottom-up 
mechanism that is activated by perceptual information in the environment, and a top-down mechanism 
that is based on background knowledge we have about others or infer from perceived information (e.g., 
Frith & Frith, 2006; Teufel, Alexis, Todd, Lawrence-Owen, Clayton et al., 2009; Teufel, Alexis, Clay-
ton & Davis, 2010a; Teufel, Fletcher & Davis, 2010b). The top-down mechanism helps to determine 
the social relevance of observed content and regulates reflexive bottom-up responses accordingly.  
 It has traditionally been assumed that general cognitive processes involved in perception, atten-
tion, and memory are sufficient for interacting with others and for understanding behavior (Blakemore, 
Winston & Frith, 2004; for a discussion). In contrast to this assumption, however, recent neuroscientific 
evidence suggests that in order to support adequate behavior in social interactions, the human brain is 
equipped with a system specialized for the processing of social information (Adolphs, 1999; Brothers, 
1990). The so-called Social Brain (Adolphs, 1999; Dunbar, 1998) acts over and above the general cog-
nitive processes, has been shown to be unique to humans and some non-human primates (Emery, 2000) 
and has most probably evolved from environmental chnges that made it necessary to live together in 
groups (Adolphs, 1999; Emery, 2000). The following paragraph discusses the important milestones in 
evolution that have led to the development of a social brain in primates and describes the neural struc-
tures in the brain that are exclusively dealing with the processing of social information. 
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1.1.1. Evolution of the Social Brain  
Social living is associated with plenty of benefits, a  groups provide greater opportunities for mating, 
together with an increased genetic diversity and a reduced risk for potential inbreeding (Emery, 2000). 
Social groups assure protection from predators, and provide opportunities for learning from conspecif-
ics about how to cope with environmental challenges. Living in groups, however, can also be challeng-
ing when conspecifics constitute potential competitors for limited resources like food or mates (Emery, 
2000): To deal with these challenges, it is important o have access to information about the other con-
specifics in order to predict their behavior and emotional dispositions. This is particularly importan for 
animals living in hierarchical systems, as they need to know about their own position and the position 
of others within the hierarchy in order to predict the outcome of social interactions and to determine 
when to challenge others in order to climb to a more powerful position.  
 Consequently, to coordinate social behavior within a group, information about both the external 
environment and the internal states of others needs to be communicated among group members. Group 
communication is thereby monitored through social cues, that is: signals that have acquired a special 
social meaning in the course of evolution and can be interpreted by all group members. Information 
transmitted by these cues can be spatial, that is: inform about the location of a potential danger in the
environment (e.g., predator), but also about sources for food and water (Emery, 2000; Nummenmaa & 
Calder, 2009, for reviews). At the same time, social ues are used to transmit information about emo-
tional states such as anger, fear or love (Adams & Kleck, 2005; Blakemore, Winston & Frith, 2004). In 
more evolved species, like humans and non-human primates, social cues can also be used to make in-
ferences about the mental states of others, such as action goals, beliefs or intentions (Baron-Cohen, 
1995).  
 The specificity of social cues is thereby determined by the sensitivity of the sensory channel 
that is used for communicating information (Emery, 2000): Olfactory social signals (e.g., pheromones, 
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sweating), for instance, are spatially ambiguous and nonspecific – a characteristic making it impossible 
to use them to communicate the location of potential threat or objects of interest to others. However, 
these cues are particularly important for indicating the sexual status or the readiness to mate (Emery, 
2000). Visual social signals (gaze direction, head orientation, gestures), on the other hand, are spatially 
more informative, less ambiguous and suitable to convey more complex information. They can be di-
rected towards others to signal emotional states (e.g., anger, happiness) or towards the periphery to in-
dicate the location of interesting objects (e.g., food) or events (e.g., presence of a predator). As visual 
social cues are superior to other cues with regard to their communicative power, it is not surprising that 
not only humans, but also a large number of other vertebrates (e.g., non-human primates, reptiles, birds) 
are capable of processing social information conveyed by visual signals (Emery, 2000, Table 2). 
 In the human species, the face is the most important source for social information, as it provides 
a wealth of information about gender, age, familiarity, emotional expression, intentions and mental 
states (Emery, 2000). Of particular interest for conveying information about another’s internal states is 
eye gaze. Information from the eye region is used for evaluating the others’ interest in specific ob-
jects/events in the environment, for inferring their emotional states and for communicating hierarchical 
information within a group. The use of gaze direction as social cue evolved from morphological, envi-
ronmental and behavioral changes throughout the primate evolution and supplemented and/or replaced 
more ambiguous auditory and olfactory signals (e.g., Emery, 2000; Kobayashi & Kohshima, 1997). To 
avoid that information deduced from gaze direction nterferes with directional information derived 
from other social cues like head orientation or pointing gestures, social information is weighted accord-
ing to its social relevance, where eye gaze provides th  most important social information, followed by 
head/body orientation and pointing gestures (Perrett, Hietanen, Oram & Benson, 1992). 
 Although information conveyed by the eyes is an important signal in many species, humans are 
unique in their ability to use gaze direction as an indicator for the locus of interesting objects/events 
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(Emery, 2000). The most important change throughout primate evolution that allowed gaze direction to 
be used as a social signal in humans stems from the hig  contrast between white sclera and black pupil 
in the eye: while a high iris-to-sclera ratio is reported in non-human primates (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 
1997), the iris-to-sclera ratio is low in humans: that is, human eyes contain a large extent of white scl -
ra on either side of the dark iris (Perrett & Mistlin, 1991), making it easy to determine where gaze is 
directed by comparing the position of the dark iris relative to the white sclera. If the dark region is in 
the middle of the eye, someone is looking at you, whereas when the dark part is positioned in the 
left/right half of the eye, someone is looking away from you to the left or to the right side. Being able 
to apply this simple algorithm is considered to be on  of the crucial factors allowing humans to use 
directional information derived from the eyes to learn about objects/events by associating verbal infor-
mation provided by others with visual information in the environment (Kobayashi & Kohshima, 1997).  
 
1.1.2. Neural correlates of the Social Brain 
The challenges accompanying group living, however, n cessitated both neural and structural changes in 
the brain to account for the increased cognitive requir ments for communication and social interaction. 
For that purpose, specific neural networks have evolv d in the primate brain, which are specialized on 
understanding the actions, intentions and emotional states of others.  
 
Understanding the actions of others 
For understanding observed actions (i.e., hand moveent), it is essential to infer the potential goals (i.e., 
grasping a bottle) associated with these actions (Blakemore et al., 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2002). 
To accomplish this, we need to simulate observed actions ourselves, as a basis for anticipating possible 
outcomes and underlying action goals (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2002). For that purpose, the primate 
brain is equipped with a certain type of neurons, which simulate observed actions as if the observer was 
performing them him-/herself: the mirror-neurons (Di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese & Rizzolatti, 
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1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi & Gallese, 1996). Stud-
ies on macaque monkeys have shown that mirror-neuros are located in the premotor cortex (i.e., the 
F5-area) and are activated both when an action is observed and when it is executed (e.g., Gallese, Fadi-
ga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti, 1996): that is, every time an action performed by others is observed, the mo-
tor representation of this action is activated in the observer, which helps understanding the intentions 
behind this action together with its potential outcmes (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2002). That way, the 
mirror-neuron system transforms observed actions into internal representations of these actions (Gazzo-
la, Rizzolatti, Wicker & Keysers, 2007) and allows inferring intentions and action goals of others based 
on observation (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2002).  
 Comparable to what has been found in macaque monkeys, the premotor cortex is also activated 
in humans when observing the actions of others (e.g., Buccino, Binkoffski, Fink, Fadiga, Fogassi et al.,
2001; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Matelli, Bettinardi, Paulesu et al., 1996). The mirror-neuron system seems to 
be a fundamental prerequisite for various social-cognitive skills, as it interprets the actions of others in 
relation to one’s own actions (Blakemore et al., 2004). Mirror-neurons have been thought to exclusive-
ly respond to biological (i.e., pointing) compared to non-biological movements (i.e., actions performed 
by machines/robots), based on the assumption that they are specialized on the interpretation of actions 
of conspecifics (Rizzolatti, Fogassi & Gallese, 2001). However, more recent studies have found mirror-
neuron activity also for mechanistic robot movements (Gazzola et al., 2007; Oberman, McCleery, Ra-
machandran, & Pineda, 2007), pointing to the conclusion that the goal-directedness of observed actions 
seems to be more important for triggering mirror-neuron activity than the exact way of how observed 
movements are performed. In any case, the mirror-neu o  system seems to prepare the observer to per-
form adequate action-responses to the observed behavior of others. In support of this notion, Fadiga 
and colleagues (1995) have shown that even when only observing actions, the same muscles in the pe-
ripheral motor system are activated that would be necessary to perform the observed action.  
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 Importantly, the link between observed actions and our own actions is not only reflected in neu-
ronal activation, but also translates to behavioral responses (Sebanz, Knoblich & Prinz, 2003): for in-
stance, when a participant is performing a task together with a partner (with subtask A being performed 
by the participant and subtask B being performed by the partner), the other’s presence alters the partic-
ipants’ actions in a comparable way, as if the participant was simultaneously performing task A and B 
without the partner. Furthermore, the observation of the others’ actions interferes with the execution of 
our own actions, which leads to a reduced performance i  the executed task (Brass, Bekkering & Prinz, 
2001; Craighero, Bello, Fadiga & Rizzolatti, 2002; Kilner, Paulignan & Blakemore, 2003). The pres-
ence of interference effects has been shown to be specific to the observation of human behavior, 
whereas the observation of robot movements seemed not to interfere with executed movements (Kilner 
et al., 2003). However, more recent studies provide evidence that interference effects occur even when 
observed actions are performed by an anthropomorphic obot (Oztop, Franklin, Chaminade & Cheng, 
2005). 
 
Understanding the minds of others 
In addition to the mirror neuron system, humans are also equipped with a unique cognitive system that 
is specialized on mindreading and allows for interpreting observed behavior in mentalistic terms (Bar-
on-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2006; for review). On a neuronal level, when we try to understand other 
people, a network consisting of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), fusi-
form gyrus (FG), amygdala and intraparietal sulcus (IPS) is activated (e.g., Adolphs, 1999; Brothers, 
1990; Frith & Frith, 2006). In this network (see Figure I1), the STS codes for biological movements, 
such as head direction, pointing gestures and in particular gaze direction, with eye gaze being the most 
important source for inferring the mental states of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Frith & Frith, 2006, for 
review). Accordingly, the STS is more responsive to meaningful compared to random eye movements, 
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resulting in stronger activation of the STS when gaze is directed towards an object rather than an empty 
space (Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison & McCarthy, 2003). The STS is also involved in face perception 
via its connections with the FG (Haxby, Hoffman & Gobbini, 2000, 2002; Hoffman & Haxby, 2000): 
while the FG is responsible for coding invariant aspects of the face (i.e., face identity), the STS detects 
changeable properties of the face (i.e., gaze direction). Reciprocal projections have also been found 
between the STS and the amygdala, a structure of the limbic system involved in the processing of facial 
expressions and emotional content of perceived information (Aggleton, Burton, & Passingham, 1980; 
Aggleton, 1993; Thomas, Drevets, Whalen, Eccard, Dahl et al., 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure I1. The mindreading system is represented by a network consisting of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), 
amygdala, superior temporal sulcus (STS), fusiform gyrus (FG) and intraparietal sulcus (IPS). While thSTS is 
coding for biological movements (such as changes in gaze direction), the FG is sensitive to facial identity. Shifts 
of attention that are performed by the IPS can be top-down modulated by information about internal states of 
others, such as intentions (mPFC, mentalizing), or emotional states (amygdala, facial expressions).  
 
 
 Furthermore, the STS is involved in the orientation of attentional resources via its connections 
with the parietal cortex, and in particular with the IPS (Corbetta, Miezin, Shulman, & Petersen, 1993; 
Nobre, Sebestyen, Gitelman, Mesulam, Frackowiak et al., 1997). The perceived direction of biological 
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movements (processed by the STS) can therefore be linked to the spatial attention system (processed by 
the IPS), in order to initiate reorienting of attenio  in direction of observed biological movements (e.g., 
gaze direction; George, Driver, & Dolan, 2001; Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison & McCarthy, 2003). The 
attribution of intentionality to observed behavior is exerted by the mPFC via a top-down modulation of 
the signals from the STS (Grezes, Frith & Passingham, 2004 a,b; Saxe & Wexler, 2005): while the STS 
is sensitive to the perceived movements of others, the mPFC is more responsive to judgments about the 
intentions behind the observed movements. Furthermore, activity in the mPFC seems to be positively 
correlated with the degree of background knowledge on has about an observed person (Saxe & 
Wechsler, 2005) and is thought to be responsible for the adaptation of perceived information to the so-
cial meaning of the observed scene.  
 
Understanding the emotional states of others 
Information about the emotional states of others is usually transmitted by facial expressions which are 
processed by the amygdala (Breiter, Etcoff, Whalen, Kennedy, Rauch et al., 1996), read off the face 
very quickly (Adolphs, 2003; Eimer, Holmes & McGlone, 2003; Sugase, Yamane, Ueno & Kawano, 
1999), and processed without awareness or attentional engagement (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver & 
Dolan, 2001; Whalen, Rauch, Etcoff, McIlerney, Lee et al., 1998). However, this is true only for basic 
emotions, such as anger, fear or happiness. In contrast, more complex emotions, such as jealousy, em-
barrassment or guilt, cannot simply be deduced from facial expressions, but require awareness about 
one’s own relation to the other person and are therefore assumed to involve the mentalizing system 
(e.g., Berthoz, Armony, Blair & Dolan, 2002; Farrow, Zheng, Wilkinson, Spence, Deakin et al., 2001). 
In addition to the processing of emotional content, humans are also able to anticipate emotional states 
of others and empathize with them: that is, expecting an emotional reaction from others activates the 
same brain areas (i.e., anterior insula, cingulate) s would be activated when the respective emotion is 
experienced by the person him-/herself (Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan et al., 2004).    
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 However, facial expressions do not only tell us about the internal states of a person, but can also 
provide information about the attitude of a person t wards objects in the environment (Becchio, Ber-
tone & Castiello, 2008, for review): that is, while gaze direction indicates the location of potentially 
interesting objects (via the STS and IPS), facial expr ssion (via the amygdala) is informing about the 
emotional reaction a gazer has towards the objects (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon & Tipper, 2006a). This 
mechanism is of particular importance for understanding other people, as it indicates not only how oth-
ers are feeling, but also which object/event has cau ed that specific emotional state.  
 
1.2. The role of gaze direction in social interactions 
Gaze direction is the most important means in human development to communicate social information 
between interaction partners: it is used to learn about the environment, and about what others consider 
to be interesting. Humans employ gaze direction to signal internal states and to guide the others’ atten-
tion (Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 2007; for a review). The following chapter describes the mechanisms 
that underlie the processing of gaze direction: First, t is discussed how gaze following develops in hu-
man infants. Second, it is reported how attentional orienting mechanisms are triggered by changes in 
observed gaze direction and what distinguishes gazedirection from other, non-social directional cues 
(i.e., arrows). Third, it is discussed whether or nt gaze direction can be modulated by social context 
information.  
 
1.2.1. Development of gaze following in human infants 
Sensitivity to eye gaze can be observed from birth onwards (Striano & Reid, 2006) and even neonates 
prefer to look at faces with direct relative to averted gaze (Farroni, Csibra, Simion & Johnson, 2002). 
In the first months of life, infants preferably engage in dyadic (i.e., face-to-face) interactions in order to 
reciprocally share affect and emotions with others (see Striano & Reid, 2006; for review). With three 
months, infants start engaging in social interactions (Lavelli & Fogel, 2005), and begin to focus more 
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on the others’ eyes (Jaffe, Beebe, Feldstein, Crow, Jasnow et al., 2001; Johnson & Morton, 1991). They 
show signs of stress when others are reducing their engagement in social interactions with them and try 
to gain interest back by reducing smiling and gazing behavior (Adamson & Frick, 2003; Striano & Ber-
tin, 2005a). Infants are also able to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant signals in social interac-
tions by determining whether feedback (i.e., smiling) is contingent with their actions or not (Striano & 
Reid, 2006; for review). The ability to participate in dyadic interactions is an important pre-requisite 
for mentalizing about the internal states of others (Baron-Cohen, 1995; Iacoboni, Molnar-Szakacs, 
Gallese, Buccino, Mazziotta et al., 2005) and has been shown to be dysfunctional in infants with autism 
spectrum disorder (Osterling & Dawson, 1994).  
 Major transitions in social-cognitive development take place when infants start engaging in tri-
adic interactions involving two people and an object that is conjointly attended by both partners (Stri-
ano & Reid, 2006). Triadic interactions are essential for language acquisition and imitation as they al-
low the infant to determine when important information is communicated and what it refers to (Bald-
win & Moses, 2001; Brooks & Meltzoff, 2005): mutual gaze (i.e., gaze directed at one another) signals 
the fact that an important issue will be shared, whereas averted gaze (i.e., gaze directed to the side) in-
dicates the spatial location of the object to which the information refers. With three months, infants 
start following the gaze direction of others to peri heral locations, but are not yet attending to gazed-at 
objects in the periphery (Hood, Willen, & Driver, 1998). At the age of nine months, they are able to 
conjointly attend to the same object as their social partners (Carpenter, Nagell, Tomasello, Butterworth 
& Moore, 1998; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005) and use gaze direction for coordina-
tion of attentional processes between people and objects (Flom & Pick, 2005; Striano & Bertin, 2005b). 
 While attending to others’ gaze direction is based on rather low-level factors in the first year of 
life (i.e., triggered by moving eyes), infants at the age of 12 to 18 months begin to pay more attention to 
the context in which eye movements are observed and engage attentional resources more flexibly when 
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following gaze (e.g., Brooks & Meltzhoff, 2002, 2005; Flom & Pick, 2005). Around the same age, oth-
er important social skills, such as the recognition of facial identity, face processing and identificat on of 
emotional expressions become more sophisticated (Frischen, Bayliss & Tipper, 2007; Nelson, 2001, for 
reviews). Based on this increased understanding of the social environment, young infants start allocat-
ing their attentional resources more efficiently depending on the social relevance of gazed-at events or 
objects (Baron-Cohen, 1995). They understand that people usually attend to their own actions and can 
infer motor intentions of others by monitoring their gaze (Castiello, 2003; Frischen et al., 2007; Jellema, 
Baker, Wicker & Perrett, 2000; Pierno, Becchio, Wall, Smith, Turella et al., 2006).  
 Around the age of 3-4 years, children start using the gaze behavior of others to make inferences 
about their internal states and thus acquire a theory-of-mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995). With a functioning 
theory-of-mind, children can mentalize about the intentions of others and determine that someone is 
looking at a particular object because he/she intends to perform an action on it or has certain beliefs 
about that object.  
 
1.2.2. Gaze direction as a cue for attentional orienting 
Gaze direction is not only important in childhood t communicate with others, but has also been shown 
to influence attentional orienting in adults by causing shifts of attention to gazed-at locations (Drive , 
Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; see Frischen et al., 2007, 
for review). In experimental psychology, shifts of attention to particular locations have traditionally 
been investigated using a cueing paradigm (Posner, 1980), in which the observer’s attention is cued to 
peripheral locations either by abrupt onsets of a visual stimulus in the periphery (transient luminance 
increments: Posner, 1980; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989) or by the presentation of central symbolic cues that
can carry non-social (arrows: Posner, 1980; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006; words: 
Hommel, Pratt, Colzato & Godijn, 2001; digits: Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola & Umilta, 1987; Sheliga, 
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Riggio & Rizzolatti, 1994) or social information (gaze: Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; pointing gestures: 
Langton & Bruce, 2000; tongues: Downing, Dodds & Bray, 2004). In response to spatial cues, attention 
can be allocated overtly by performing saccades to the cued locations (Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995; 
Posner, 1980; Shepherd, Findlay, & Hockey, 1986) or covertly by shifting attention without moving the 
eyes (Posner, 1980). These shifts of attention can be triggered either in a bottom-up manner by stimulus 
properties, resulting in involuntary shifts of attention to the indicated location that are difficult to sup-
press (Posner, 1980), and/or in a top-down manner, resulting in voluntary shifts of attention to the indi-
cated location (e.g., Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). Top-down controlled shifts of attention are 
usually evoked by symbolic cues (e.g., arrows) that require interpretation, are presented centrally on the 
screen, and indicate target position with a high likelihood (Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989). In 
contrast, cues triggering shifts of attention in a bottom-up fashion are usually more salient than the sur-
rounding (e.g., flashes), appear at peripheral locati ns, and induce shifts of attention even when being 
nonpredictive for the location of subsequent targets (Posner, 1980). 
 In gaze-cueing paradigms (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Frischen et al., 2007, for review), a 
face is presented centrally on the screen that gazes either straight ahead or to the left or right side of the 
screen. Gaze direction has been shown to shift the at entional focus of the observer towards the gazed-
at location, resulting in faster responses to targes that appear in the gaze-cued hemifield compared to 
targets in the uncued hemifield. Gaze-cueing effects represent basic social attention mechanisms, which 
emerge already 150 ms after cue onset, and decay relatively quickly (about 1000 ms after cue onset). 
The effect of gaze direction on spatial attention is ot limited to realistic faces (Hietanen & Leppänen, 
2003; Langton & Bruce, 1999), but can also be induce  by schematic faces (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998), as well as by various kinds of objects that carry eye-like information (Quadflieg, Mason & 
Macrae, 2004). 
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1.2.3. Is gaze direction special in cueing the attention of others?  
Gaze direction has traditionally been thought to be sp cial with regard to guiding attention, for several 
reasons: In contrast to other central cues (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980; Ristic & Kingstone, 
2006), gaze triggers attention shifts to peripheral locations when being nonpredictive (Friesen & King-
stone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999; cf. Vecera & Rizzo, 2006) or even counterpredictive with respect 
to the target location (Friesen, Ristic & Kingstone, 2004) – a pattern that is consistent with a reflexive, 
bottom-up mechanism. This reflexive orientation mechanism was thought to be exclusive to gaze direc-
tion, given that adults can voluntarily orient away from other central cues, such as counterpredictive 
arrows (Friesen et al., 2004) or extended tongues (Downing et al., 2004). However, the view that gaze 
direction provides a particularly powerful orientation signal (due to its social relevance) has been chal-
lenged recently by evidence showing that not only gaze direction, but also other overlearned symbolic 
cues (e.g., arrows, words) are capable of inducing shifts of attention when being nonpredictive for the
target location (e.g., Hommel et al., 2001; Ristic, Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002; Tipples, 2002; cf. Frie-
sen et al., 2004).  
 However, although behavioral effects caused by gazeand arrow cues partially overlap, there are 
still substantial differences between these cues with regard to their underlying mechanisms (Num-
menmaa & Hietanen, 2009): First, while both nonpredictive and counterpredictive gaze cues cause re-
flexive shifts of attention to the gazed-at location, reflexive shifts of attention are only induced by non-
predictive, but not counterpredictive arrow cues (Friesen et al., 2004; cf. Hommel et al., 2001). Based 
on these findings, Friesen et al., (2004) concluded that orienting attention to gaze is more reflexive (i.e., 
less vulnerable to top-down control) than orienting to arrows. Second, gaze cues have been shown to 
induce both facilitation and inhibition effects (after 2000 ms; Frischen, Smilek, Eastwood, & Tipper, 
2007), whereas cueing effects induced by arrows seem to trigger facilitatory effects only (Posner, Nis-
sen, & Odgen, 1978). Third, there is evidence from neuroimaging studies that gaze and arrow cueing 
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are subserved by different neural networks (Hietanen, Nummenmaa, Nyman, Parkkola, & Hämälainen, 
2006): that is, arrow cues cause stronger activation in the voluntary attention network than gaze direc-
tion emphasizing the fact that attentional orienting to arrow cues might be less reflexive, but more vol-
untarily controlled than gaze cueing.  
 
1.2.4. The influence of context information on gaze-cueing effects 
Although gaze cues have been shown to trigger reflexive shifts of attention (Frischen et al., for review), 
there is also evidence that orienting to gaze direction is not purely reflexive but can rather be top-down 
controlled by higher-level cognitive processes (Kawai, 2011; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005; Teufel et al., 
2009, 2010 a,b). The operation of top-down processes, however, has been shown to critically depend 
on the availability of context information (Frith &Frith, 2003; Teufel et al., 2009, 2010 a,b). In particu-
lar, preexisting assumptions concerning the observed person have been shown to influence the readi-
ness to process and/or attend to gaze direction (Deaner, Shepherd, & Platt, 2007; Kawai, 2011; Liuzza, 
Cazzato, Vecchione, Crostella et al., 2011; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005; Teufel et al., 2009, 2010 a,b; cf. 
Bayliss & Tipper, 2006b): Teufel and colleagues (2009), for instance, reported that adaptation to gaze 
direction depended on whether participants believed that an observed person could actually see through 
a pair of goggles. Furthermore, in a study by Ristic and Kingstone (2005), participants were presented 
with an ambiguous stimulus that could be perceived either as a car with wheels or a face with a hat. 
The stimulus cued participants’ attention only in conditions when they believed that they were looking 
at a face rather than a car. Similarly, Kawai (2011) found schematic faces to cue the participants’ atten-
tion only when they believed that the target was visible to the gazer, but not when it was believed to be 
occluded. Furthermore, it has been shown that when the gazer is r presenting a stereotypical member 
of a group that the observer belongs to (e.g., leader of a political party), the observer is more likely to 
follow his/her gaze direction, resulting in increasd cueing effects (Liuzza et al., 2011). 
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 Interestingly, however, not every type of context information has been proven to influence gaze 
cueing. In particular, facial identity does not interact with orienting to gaze direction (Bayliss et al., 
2006a,b; Quadflieg et al., 2004), whereas facial expression does (Peccinenda, Pes, Ferlazzo & Zocco-
lotti, 2008). With regard to facial identity, Bayliss and Tipper (2006b) showed that the identity of a gaz-
ing stimulus does not influence gaze cueing when th different faces indicate target location with dif-
ferent likelihoods; and Quadflieg and colleagues (2004) showed that gaze-cueing effects are not exclu-
sive to realistic human faces, but can also be induce  by all sorts of inanimate objects containing eye-
like stimuli. With regard to facial expression, on the other hand, Graham and colleagues (2010) found 
that the size of gaze-cueing effects is modulated when gaze direction is changed with a fearful com-
pared to a happy or neutral face. One likely explanatio  for the differential effects of facial expression 
and facial identity on gaze cueing is that the integration of information from different channels takes 
place at different time points in the processing stream: that is, information from brain areas that process 
facial identity (via FG) and signals originating from STS and IPS are integrated later in time, whereas 
information about facial expression (via the amygdala) is directly fed forward to the STS and therefor 
integrated earlier in order to exert a combined influence on gaze cueing (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000).  
 
1.2.5. Acuity of gaze direction estimation 
Utilizing gaze direction to learn about intentions and action goals requires us to identify where others 
are looking and to shift our own attentional focus to the corresponding object/location (for a review: 
Frischen et al., 2007). While it is easy to determine where an arrow cue is pointing to by following its 
head, it appears to be more difficult to interpret gaze direction, where directional information has to be 
derived from geometrical information displayed by the gazer’s eyes. However, previous studies have 
shown that humans are extremely precise in estimating gaze direction. This high level of precision has
been found for dyadic interactions, where people have to discern direct and averted gaze of an interac-
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tion partner (e.g., Ando, 2002; Anstis, Mayhew & Morley, 1969; Cline, 1967; Gamer & Hecht, 2007; 
Gibson & Pick, 1963), as well as for triadic interactions, where observers have to judge gaze direction 
of an interaction partner towards objects in the periph ry (Bock, Dicke & Thier, 2008; Gale & Monk, 
2000; Schwaninger, Lobmaier & Fischer, 2005; Symons, Lee, Cedrone & Nishimura, 2004). The esti-
mation errors ranged from 0.5° to 4° visual angle, depending on specific factors that have been varied 
experimentally: Besides factors directly associated with the physiological composition of the eyes, such 
as the iris-sclera ratio (Ando, 2002; Anstis et al., 1969; Langton, Watt & Bruce, 2000) or the luminance 
contrast between iris and sclera (Ando, 2002), there are also contextual factors such as head and body 
orientation (Gamer & Hecht, 2007; Todorović, 2006), number of visible eyes (Gamer & Hecht, 2007; 
Symons et al., 2004), looker-observer distance (Gamer & Hecht, 2007; Symons et al., 2004), or the 
presence of objects in the attended space (Lobmaier, Fischer & Schwaninger, 2006) that influence the 
accuracy of gaze direction estimation. 
 
1.2.6. Spatial specificity of attentional orienting to spatial cues 
Given the number of studies that have examined the precision with which gaze direction of others can 
be determined, it is quite surprising that the investigation of how precisely attention is shifted to gazed-
at locations has so far been neglected in the literature. However, this is an important question in partic-
ular with regard to complex environments where it is difficult to determine the attentional focus of oth-
ers when multiple objects are located close to each other that are of interest for the observed person. 
Specific-location theories of attention, such as the zoom-lens model (Eriksen & St. James, 1986; 
Eriksen & Webb, 1989; Eriksen & Yeh, 1985) or the gradient model (Downing, 1988; Downing & 
Pinker, 1985; Henderson, 1991; LaBerge & Brown, 1989; Shulman, Wilson & Sheehy, 1985), conceive 
visual attention as a limited resource that can only be directed to restricted regions of the visual field. 
However, the zoom-lens and gradient models differ in their assumptions as to how attention levels off 
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around cued locations. According to the zoom-lens model, attention initially covers a large area of the
visual field (stimulus onset asynchrony, SOA < 100 ms), though with a low resolution. Following cue 
presentation, the attentional focus is gradually narrowed and the attended region becomes spatially 
more and more specific to the cued location. Behavior lly, this effect is indicated by fast responses to 
targets at the cued location and equally slowed responses to targets at uncued locations. According to 
the gradient model, attentional resolution diminishes in a graded fashion with increasing distance of the 
target from the cued location. By contrast, general-region theories of attention, such as the m ridian-
boundary model (Hughes & Zimba, 1985, 1987), propose that attention cannot be allocated to specific 
locations, but only to larger regions of the visual field, such as hemifields (Hughes & Zimba, 1985) or 
field quadrants (Hughes & Zimba, 1987). 
While specific-location predictions have been shown to hold for attention shifts produced by the 
endogenous, voluntary attention system (e.g., Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Shepherd & Müller, 1989, for long 
SOAs), there are only a few studies that have investigated how attention is allocated when the exoge-
nous, reflexive attention system is involved (Henderson & Macquistan, 1993; Shepherd & Müller, 
1989). Exogenous attention shifts, which cannot be readily controlled voluntarily, are attracted by ab-
rupt visual onsets in the periphery (Jonides, 1981; Müller & Rabbit, 1989; Yantis & Jonides, 1984), as 
well as by centrally presented changes in gaze direction (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; 
Hietanen, 1999; Hietanen & Leppänen, 2003; Langton & Bruce, 1999). However, although gaze direc-
tion has been shown to trigger quasi-automatic shifts of attention to the cued position, this mechanism 
is not purely reflexive, but at least partially controllable by the voluntary system (Driver et al., 1999; 
Downing et al., 2004; Friesen et al., 2004), leaving the question open of how attentional resources ar 
deployed following this sort of cues.  
So far, only one study has examined in detail the spatial distribution of attention following gaze 
cues (Vuilleumier, 2002). The main objective of this study was to examine whether gaze induced shifts 
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of attention would still be observed in patients with right parietal damage and left visual field neglect 
whose ability to attend to contralesional space was impaired. In patient samples, the author could show 
that in the intact, ipsilesional hemifield, attentio  was selectively directed to the specifically cued loca-
tion; in the contralesional hemifield, however, atten ional orienting was specific only to the quadrant 
that was gaze-cued. In healthy control samples, gaze direction led to a shift of attention to the specifi-
cally cued position whereas the other position in the cued hemifield did not receive facilitation.  
 
1.3. Rationale of the project 
Research presented in this PhD-work systematically investigates the influence of context information 
on the spatial distribution of attention following gaze cues. With regard to context influences on social 
attention mechanisms, previous studies have shown that pre-assumptions about the gazing person mod-
ulate the size of gaze-induced cueing effects (Frith & Frith, 2006, for review). For instance, there is 
evidence that humans are more willing to engage attentional resources in social interactions when they
believe that observed behavior is originating from a social agent (i.e., a face with hat) compared to non-
social stimuli (i.e., a car with wheels, Ristic & Kingstone, 2005). Stronger gaze-cueing effects are also 
found, when participants believe that the observed agent can actually see an aspired target object com-
pared to when it is not visible (Kawai, 2011; Teufel et al., 2009). Furthermore, it has been shown that 
information about emotional states of others (transmitted via facial expression) modulates the size of 
gaze-cueing effects in a way that fearful faces induce stronger gaze-cueing effects than happy or neu-
tral faces (Peccinenda et al., 2008, c.f. Hietanen et al., 2003). These findings provide strong evidence 
that gaze following is not a pure bottom-up process that is executed on all kinds of eye-like stimuli, but 
can rather be top-down controlled by context information about the social content of the scene. 
 However, context information about the social relevance of changes in gaze direction does not 
necessarily modulate attentional orienting to gaze. Rather, as has been pointed out above, it has been 
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shown that even socially important context information, such as the identity of the gazer does not have 
a modulatory effect on gaze cueing (Bayliss & Tipper, 2006b). Hence, it seems that spatial information 
gained from the eye region and context information about the environment and/or the gazing individual 
have a combined influence on gaze cueing only under certain circumstances, namely, when processing 
of gaze direction and context information is executd by the same neural network or at least in the same 
time window (Hoffman & Haxby, 2000).  
 Thus, based on the current literature, the exact me hanisms underlying top-down modulation of 
gaze-cueing effects cannot be specified, leading to the following empirical questions: 1) What types of 
social context information (e.g., visual, verbal, empirical) have a modulatory influence on social atten-
tion mechanisms (as measured in gaze-cueing effects)? 2) How is the modulation-effect of context in-
formation on gaze-cueing effects actually caused (i. ., via which mechanism)? In order to answer these 
questions, the aim of the research outlined in this P D-thesis is to systematically examine the influence 
of different context variables on the size and spatial distribution of gaze-cueing effects. Furthermore, it 
is investigated how conflicting context information is integrated when attending to gaze cues. Given 
that attentional orienting to gaze cues is an early process (i.e., present already 150 ms after cue presen-
tation) and sustained for only 1000 ms (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), we hypothesized that context in-
formation that could potentially influence orienting to gaze direction must be pre-existing or processed 
very rapidly. We further assumed that the modulation of gaze-cueing effects through context infor-
mation is actually exerted by a change in the allocti n of attentional resources within the cued hemi-
field (i.e., facilitation for the exactly cued position and/or suppression for the uncued positions). 
In order to investigate these hypotheses, three diff rent sources of context information are used 
as potential candidates for modulating the spatial distribution of gaze-cueing effects: visual information 
in the observed scene (Study 1), empirical information that can be deduced based on experienc with 
the observed scene (Study 2) and verbal information provided by instruction (Study 2-4). In particular, 
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context information was either present in form of refe ence objects in the periphery (Study 1) or could 
refer to the reliability with which gaze behavior ind cated target position (either provided by instruction 
or inferred from experience with the observed gaze behavior, Study 2). Context information could also 
be given as background knowledge about the likelihood that an observed interaction partner is capable 
of having mental states (Study 3-4).  
 
Hypotheses 
For investigating the influence of context information on gaze cueing, we used two different paradigms: 
With the first paradigm, we investigated whether context information does modulate the spatial alloca-
tion of attention (Study 1-2); with the second paradigm, we examined whether beliefs about the internal 
states of others influence the size of gaze-cueing ffects (Study 3-4).  
 
Study 1 and 2 
Study 1 and 2 investigated whether the modulation of gaze cueing by context information was caused 
by changes in the spatial distribution of attentional resources to gazed-at compared to other position in 
the cued hemifield. The idea was to measure the spatial distribution of attention as psychometric func-
tion of the distance between cued and target position. In order to investigate this question, targets could 
appear at different target positions while only one position was directly cued; the other positions were 
not directly cued but located in different angular distances from the cued position in the cued hemifild. 
In conditions where context information was provided, stronger gaze-cueing effects for the gazed-at 
position compared to other locations were expected (in line with the specific-location theories of atten-
tion), whereas for conditions without context information, we expected equally strong gaze-cueing ef-
fects for all target positions in the cued hemifield (in line with the general-region theories of attention).  
In Study 1, context information was provided visually, that is, in form of reference objects in the 
periphery. We assumed that gaze direction would cause gaze-cueing effects specific to the exact gazed-
Introduction  22 
 
 
 
at position only when it could refer to possible refe nce objects in the periphery; in contrast, equally 
strong gaze-cueing effects for the whole cued hemifi ld were expected when no reference objects were 
presented to which gaze direction could be linked. In Study 2, context was provided in form of infor-
mation about the reliability of observed gaze behavior (i.e., the likelihood with which gaze direction 
indicated target position). We hypothesized that attention would be directed to the exact gazed-at posi-
tion only when gaze cues indicated target position with a high likelihood compared to with a low like-
lihood. Information about the reliability of gaze cues was either given by instruction or could be de-
duced from experience with the observed gaze behavior.  
 
Study 3 and 4 
The aim of Study 3 and 4 was to examine whether context information about the likelihood that an ob-
served agent has a mind modulates the readiness to ngage in social interactions with that agent (i.e., as 
is reflected in the size of the gaze-cueing effects). In particular, we used a human and a robot stimulus 
and manipulated participants’ beliefs about the intntionality of the displayed behavior by instructions. 
We expected gaze-cueing effects to be larger when participants believed to observe human-like behav-
ior compared to when they believed that they were observing mechanistic, pre-programmed behavior. 
Most importantly, we expected this effect to be independent of the physical appearance of the gazer, but 
only dependent on the degree to which intentionality could be attributed to the displayed behavior.  
Behavioral effects of the instruction manipulation were investigated in Study 3. However, be-
havioral measures alone are not suited to address th  issue of whether or not instruction manipulation 
affected attentional mechanisms (compared to other, lat r mechanisms related to response preparation), 
as performance data represent only the end effects of the processing chain. Study 4 therefore combined 
behavioral measures with the EEG/ERP-methodology in order to identify the neural correlates that are 
underlying the top-down influences on gaze-cueing effects. We expected to find a modulation of early 
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sensory gain control mechanisms (reflected in the ERP-components P1 and/or N1), if instruction ma-
nipulation had an effect on attentional orienting mechanisms rather than on later processes related to 
response preparation and execution.  
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2.1.1. Abstract 
In three experiments, we investigated the spatial alloc tion of attention in response to central gaze cu s. 
In particular, we examined whether the allocation of attentional resources is influenced by context in-
formation, that is, the presence or absence of referenc  objects (i.e., placeholders) in the periphery. On 
each trial, gaze cues were followed by a target stimulus to which participants had to respond by key 
press or by performing a target-directed saccade. Targets were presented either in an empty visual field
(Experiments 1 and 2) or in previewed location placeholders (Experiment 3) and appeared at one of 18 
(Experiment 1) or, respectively, six (Experiments 2 and 3) possible positions. The spatial distribution of 
attention was determined by comparing reaction times (RTs) as a function of the distance between the 
cued and the target position. Gaze cueing was not specific to the exact cued position, but instead gener-
alized equally to all positions in the cued hemifield, when no context information was provided. How-
ever, gaze direction induced an additional facilitat on effect specific to the exact gazed-at position when 
reference objects were presented. We conclude that the presence of possible objects in the periphery to 
which gaze cues could refer is a prerequisite for attention shifts specific to the gazed-at position. 
 
Keywords 
Gaze cueing, top-down control, eye movements, spatial allocation of attention, psychophysics  
 
2.1.2. Introduction 
Interacting with other people in a crowded environme t is a difficult task that requires complex cogni-
tive skills. Even simple interactions, like shaking hands or passing an object from one person to another, 
are challenging in that two individuals must coordinate their actions. A prerequisite for successful in-
teraction is the anticipation of action goals (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006) – which can be in-
ferred from the other’s focus of attention, as locations or objects attended by the other are likely targets 
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for upcoming actions. For identifying where or what others are paying attention to, we rely on direc-
tional information provided by social cues, including gestures, body and head orientation, and, in par-
ticular, gaze direction (Emery, 2000; Langton, Watt, & Bruce, 2000; Kingstone, Smilek, Ristic, Friesen 
& Eastwood, 2003).  
Utilizing gaze direction to infer action goals requires us to identify where the other is looking at 
and to shift our own attentional focus to the corresponding location/object (for a review, see Frischen, 
Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Previous studies have shown that humans are quite precise in estimating gaze
direction, with estimation errors ranging from 0.5° to 4° of visual angle. This high level of precision 
has been found for dyadic interactions, where observers had to discern direct and averted gaze of an 
interaction partner (Ando, 2002; Anstis, Mayhew & Morley, 1969; Cline, 1967; Gamer & Hecht, 2007; 
Gibson & Pick, 1963), as well as for triadic interactions, where observers had to judge to which object 
in space an interaction partner’s gaze was directed (Bock, Dicke & Their, 2008; Gale & Monk, 2000; 
Schwaninger, Lobmaier & Fischer, 2005; Symons, Lee, C drone, & Nishimura, 2004; Wiese, 
Kohlbecher, & Müller, 2012). Besides factors that are directly associated with the physical appearance 
of the eyes, such as the iris-sclera ratio (Ando, 2002; Anstis et al., 1969; Langton, Watt & Bruce, 2000) 
or the luminance contrast between the iris and the scl ra (Ando, 2002), various context factors such as 
body and head orientation (e.g., Gamer & Hecht, 2007; Todorović, 2006), number of visible eyes 
(Gamer & Hecht, 2007; Symons et al., 2004), looker-observer distance (e.g., Gamer & Hecht, 2007; 
Symons et al., 2004), and presence of objects in the attended space (Lobmaier, Fischer, & Schwaninger, 
2006) have been shown to influence the accuracy of gaze direction estimation. 
Interestingly, when watching another person gazing at a distinct location in space, the attention-
al focus of the observer is quasi-reflexively shifted to the gazed-at location (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen 
& Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999; Hietanen & Leppänen, 2003; Langton & Bruce, 1999; cf. Down-
ing, Dodds, & Bray, 2004; Driver, Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell et al., 1999; Friesen, Ristic, & 
Studies on individual research questions                                                                          40 
 
 
 
Kingstone, 2004), so as to permit flexible responding to upcoming actions of the gazer. Gaze-induced 
shifts of attention have traditionally been investiga ed by using a cueing paradigm (Friesen & King-
stone, 1998) in which a schematic face is presented centrally on the screen, gazing either straight ahead 
or to the left or the right side of the screen. Targets appearing in the cued direction are detected, located, 
and discriminated faster than targets in the other, non-cued direction (for a review: Frischen, Bayliss & 
Tipper, 2007). Cueing effects emerge already 150 ms after cue onset, decay relatively quickly (within 
1000 ms after cue presentation), and are obtained in cases when gaze direction is nonpredictive (Frie-
sen & Kingstone, 1998) or even counterpredictive with regard to upcoming target positions (Friesen, 
Ristic & Kingstone, 2004). Moreover, gaze cueing effects can be induced by realistic faces (Hietanen & 
Leppänen, 2003; Langton & Bruce, 1999), as well as by various kinds of non-face objects that convey 
eye-like information (Quadflieg, Mason & Macrae, 2004). 
Given the number of studies that have examined how precise observers are in determining the   
gaze direction of others, it is surprising that the qu stion of how accurately they deploy their own atten-
tion to the gazed-at locations has been neglected in the literature. Arguably though, this is an important 
question, in particular with regard to complex environments in which multiple objects of potential in-
terest to the observed person may be located close to each other, making it difficult for the observer to 
determine the other’s attentional focus precisely. For this situation, specific-location theories of spatial 
attention, such as the zoom-lens model (e.g., Eriksen & Yeh, 1985) or the gradient model (e.g., Down-
ing & Pinker, 1985; Henderson, 1991; LaBerge & Brown, 1989; Shulman, Wilson, & Sheehy, 1985) 
would predict that attention is directed to the exact gaze-cued location, selectively enhancing attention-
al processing for a narrow region of the visual field. In contrast, general-region theories, such as the 
meridian-boundary model (Hughes & Zimba, 1985, 1987), would predict that gze-cueing effects gen-
eralize to the whole cued hemifield/quadrant, as attentional allocation is constrained by neural machin-
ery that can demarcate only broader regions of the visual field.  
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To our knowledge, only one, neuropsychological study (Vuilleumier, 2002, Experiments 4-5) 
has looked at the spatial specificity of attentional orienting in response to gaze cues (and this more as a 
side effect). The main objective of this study was to examine whether gaze-induced shifts of attention 
would still be observed in patients with right parietal damage and left visual field neglect, whose ability 
to attend to contralesional space was impaired. Targets appeared at one of four predefined positions 
inside a placeholder, while a centrally presented schematic face looked either towards the target loca-
tion, another location on the same side, a location on the opposite side, or straight ahead. Gaze direc-
tion was neither relevant for the task nor predictive of the target location. In patients, Vuilleumier (2002) 
could show that in the intact, ipsilesional hemifield, attention was selectively directed to the exact cued 
location; in the contralesional hemifield, by contrast, attentional orienting was specific only to the cu d 
quadrant. In healthy controls, gaze direction always led to a shift of attention to the exact cued position, 
whereas the other position in the cued hemifield did not receive any facilitation.  
Although these findings provide an important first attempt at assessing the spatial specificity of 
gaze-cueing effects, it is difficult to generalize th m for several reasons. First, while Vuilleumier (2002) 
showed that gaze direction can produce specific cueing effects under certain conditions, his findings do 
not specify how cueing effects change as a function of the distance of the target from the cued positin. 
Second, the study is not conclusive as to how the modulation of spatial-attentional allocation by context 
information actually works, in particular: were specific cueing effects triggered by the gaze cues per se, 
or rather by the combination of directional information provided by the cue and the presence of context 
information in the periphery (i.e., predefined placeholders)?  
These are important issues, given that context information may impact the spatial specificity of 
gaze cueing via two different mechanisms: On the on hand, presenting placeholders might cause spe-
cific gaze-cueing effects by restricting processing to only a few regions of the visual field where task-
relevant events may happen. In this context, cueing ffects caused by non-social central cues (e.g., ar-
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rows) have been shown to be widely distributed when targets were presented in an uncluttered visual 
field, in which case transitions in performance were vident only for the horizontal and vertical field 
meridians (Hughes & Zimba, 1985, 1987). Interestingly, however, when targets were presented in pre-
defined placeholders, cueing effects were specific to the exact cued position (e.g., Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; 
Henderson & Macquistan, 1993; Shepherd & Müller, 1989). On the other hand, humans might expect 
that changes in gaze direction are related to the app arance of objects or events at the gazed-at location 
and would, accordingly, shift their attentional focus only under these conditions to the exact gazed-at 
position. Evidence for this assumption comes from developmental studies which have shown that shar-
ing attention between two partners is only facilitated when objects are placed in the visual field, there-
by providing information about what the other’s gaze is referring to (Striano & Stahl, 2005). 
The present study, with adult participants, was design d to investigate whether the allocation of 
spatial attention in response to social gaze cues is modulated by visual context information, in particu-
lar, whether spatially specific cueing effects are inherently induced by gaze cues per se, rather than be-
ing due to the interplay of gaze direction a d context information (i.e., placeholder). Spatial-attentional 
allocation was determined by comparing RTs as a functio  of the distance between cued and target po-
sition. Based on the findings for non-social cues (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Hughes & Zimba, 1985, 1987; 
Shepherd & Müller, 1989), we hypothesized that the cu ing effects for social gaze cues would be spa-
tially specific only when objects are presented as reference frames in the periphery with which the ob-
server’s, as well as the gazer’s, attentional focus could be aligned. If gaze cueing was spatially specific, 
facilitation would be the strongest for the exact cued position, whereas other positions in the cued hem-
ifield would exhibit only weaker facilitation, if any. By contrast, if gaze-cueing effects were not posi-
tion-specific but hemifield-specific, all positions in the cued hemifield would show equal facilitation.  
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2.1.3. Experiments 
Experiment 1 
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to determine how spatial attention is allocated in response to cen-
trally presented gaze cues when no context information is provided in the periphery, that is: would at-
tention, in this situation, be allocated to the exact cued location or to a more global region of the field? 
An answer to this question would be provided by analyzing the cueing effects as a function of the dis-
tance of the target from the cued location. 
A secondary goal was to examine whether the allocati n of attention following gaze cues would 
be modulated by the type of task to be performed, as previous studies have shown the size of the at-
tended region to vary considerably depending on perceptual task demands (Downing, 1988; LaBerge, 
1983; Müller & Findlay, 1987). To this end, two different types of tasks were introduced in Experiment 
1, which differed in their demands on perceptual resolution: target localization (Experiment 1a), which 
makes low demands, and target discrimination (Experiment 1b), which requires greater resolution. Ac-
cording to Downing (1988) tasks that are more difficult to solve require narrower attentional foci, 
whereas less demanding tasks may still be performed eff ctively with a broader distribution of attention. 
Thus, for roughly localizing a salient target in the visual field (left vs. right hemifield decision) it may 
not be necessary to precisely focus attention on the exact target position. Consequently, spatially specif-
ic cueing effects might be best, or only, demonstrable in tasks in which higher perceptual resolution is 
required for successful performance. 
Another reason why we used a target discrimination, in addition to the – ubiquitously used (e.g., 
Friesen & Kingstone 1998) – left-right target localiz tion task in Experiment 1 is that localization per-
formance is prone to spatial stimulus-response (S-R) compatibility effects. With left-right target locali-
zation (as required in Experiment 1a), such effects may be induced, in the valid-cue condition, by the 
central gaze cue pointing to the side on which the target-congruent manual response has to be given. 
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That is, the cue might directly facilitate (or pre-activate) the response, rather than solely attentionally 
enhancing the processing of the target. In other words, RT facilitation might not solely arise from gaze-
induced orienting of attention, but also from Simon-like modulations (Simon, 1969) acting at the stages 
of response preparation and execution (Nummenmaa & Hietanen, 2009). Given that the cue might in-
duce a global response bias towards the cued side this bias might obscure any spatially specific atten-
tional effect deriving from the gaze cueing. Given this, on this account too, the discrimination task used 
in Experiment 1b (in which the cue cannot logically bias the response) would hold a greater potential to 
reveal the true distribution of attention in response to gaze cues. 
The questions outlined above were investigated by using a modified version of the gaze-cueing 
paradigm (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Instead of one target position on each side, we used nine semi-
circularly arranged positions in each hemifield, with gaze cues always indicating only either the left or 
the right position on the horizontal meridian (=central position, Figure 1). Our design permitted record-
ing of RTs to targets positioned at different distances from the exact cued location, providing a measure 
of gaze-cueing effects as a function of the distance between cued position and target position. 
  
 
Figure 1. Possible target positions in (A) Experiment 1, and in (B) Experiments 2 and 3 
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Method 
Participants 
36 volunteers participated in Experiment 1, either for course credit or payment (8 €/hour): Eighteen 
participants were tested on the localization task (Experiment 1a; 13 women; age: M= 25.17, SD= 3.65, 
range: 20-32 years), the other eighteen on the discrimination task (Experiment 1b; 11 women; age: M= 
22.94, SD= 3.21, range: 19-32 years). All participants were right-handed and reported normal or cor-
rected-to-normal visual acuity. Testing time was about 1 h for the localization task and about 2 h for the 
discrimination task (split into two testing session).  
 
Apparatus 
The experiment was controlled by a Dell Precision 390 computer, with stimuli presented on a 17-inch 
Graphics Series CRT G90fB monitor, with the refresh rate set at 85 Hz. RT measures were based on 
keyboard responses. Participants viewed the monitor from a distance of 57 cm, with their head position 
centered with respect to the screen and keyboard. The experiment was set up using Experiment Builder 
(SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). 
 
Stimuli 
Schematic faces, constructed following Friesen and Ki gstone (1998), were used as gaze-cue providers. 
Faces were drawn in black against a white background. The round face covered an area of 6.8° of visu-
al angle and contained two circles representing the eyes, a smaller circle symbolizing the nose, and a 
straight line representing the mouth. The eyes subtended 1.0°, were located 1.0° from the central verti-
cal axis and centered on the central horizontal axis of the display. The nose subtended 0.2°, was located 
0.9° below the eyes and served as fixation point. The mouth was 2.2° in length and centered 1.3° below 
the nose. Black filled circles appeared within the ey s representing the pupils. Pupils subtended 0.5°,
were centered vertically and horizontally in the eys (straight gaze) or shifted either leftwards (gaze to 
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the left) or rightwards (gaze to the right) until they touched the outline eye circles. 
In the localization task (Experiment 1a), the target stimulus was a gray dot of a diameter of 0.5°. 
In the discrimination task (Experiment 1b), targets were black capital letters, F or T, measuring 0.8° 
wide and 1.3° high. Targets could appear at eighteen positions (not marked by placeholders) that were 
equally distributed around an imaginary circle of a radius of 6.0° centered at the fixation point (Figure 
1A). The resulting radial distance between adjacent target positions was 20°. Gaze direction was ma-
nipulated orthogonal to target position, that is: in one third of the trials, gaze was directed to the sid  on 
which the target appeared (cued hemifield), and in another third to the other side (uncued hemifield); in 
the remaining third of the trials, the face was gazing straight ahead. Importantly, on trials with changes 
in gaze direction, only the central position on each side was directly gazed-at. Consequently, targets in 
the cued hemifield could appear at radial distances of 0°, 20°, 40°, 60°, or 80° from the specifically 
cued position. 
 
Design 
Experiment 1a (localization task) consisted of 884 trials; and Experiment 1b (discrimination task) of 
1768 trials split into two test sessions of 884 trials each. Experimental sessions started with a block of 
20 practice trials preceding eight experimental blocks of 108 trials each. In the localization task, partic-
ipants were asked to decide whether a target dot was shown on the left or the right side of the screen, 
and to press “D” with the left index finger for left and “K” with the right index finger for right. In the 
discrimination task, participants were asked to determine whether an F or a T was presented in the tar-
get display. To minimize any target-response associati ns, half of the participants responded to F by 
pressing “D” with the left index finger and to T by pressing “K” with the right index finger, and vice 
versa for the other half of the participants.  
Gaze direction (straight, left, right), target side (left, right), target position (1 to 9), and, in Ex-
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periment 1b, target identity (F, T) levels appeared pseudo-randomly and with equal frequency within 
each block. In the localization task, SOA (300 ms, 600 ms) was randomized throughout the experiment; 
in the discrimination task, SOA was blocked and counterbalanced across the two test sessions (i.e., half 
the participants started with the short and half with the long SOA). 
Cue validity was defined in terms of the combination of gaze direction and target side. Trials 
with straight-ahead gaze served as neutral condition. On valid trials, gaze direction and target side 
matched, whereas on i valid trials targets appeared opposite to the gaze-cued hemifield. 
 
Procedure 
Figure 2A illustrates the sequence of events on a trial. Trial start was signaled by the onset of a fix tion 
cross at the center of the screen. 400 ms later, a face with blank eyes appeared on the screen. After a 
random time interval of 700 to 1000 ms, pupils appeared within the eyes, looking left, right, or straight 
ahead. Following the gaze cue, a target dot appeared at one of eighteen target positions with an SOA of 
either 300 ms or 600 ms, measured from the onset of the pupils (i.e., the cue) to the onset of the target. 
Schematic face, pupils, and target remained on the scr en until a response was given or 1200 ms had 
elapsed. The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was 680 ms. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sequence of trials in (A) localization and discriminat on task, and (B) saccade task 
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 Prior to the test sessions, participants were instructed to fixate the central cross as long as it was
shown on the screen. They were told that following the fixation cross, a drawing of a face with blank 
eyes would appear at the center of the screen and that they now had to fixate their eyes on the nose of 
the face. Further, participants were advised that after the presentation of the face, pupils would appear 
in the eyes (looking left, right, or straight ahead), followed by a gray target dot/capital letter that could 
appear anywhere in the field. Participants were expressly informed that the direction in which the eyes 
looked was not predictive for the location of the target, and they were asked to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible to detecting the target.  
 
Analysis 
Statistical analyzes focused on the comparison of valid and invalid trials as a function of target positi n. 
Cueing effects were examined in terms of c sts-plus-benefits (invalid-valid), rather than benefits (neu-
tral-valid) and costs (invalid-neutral) with respect to the neutral condition – because neutral trials may 
not provide an adequate baseline for the separate assessment of cueing effects (Jonides & Mack, 1984). 
In fact, neutral trials were found to elicit longer RTs than valid or invalid trials, likely owing to straight-
ahead gaze having a holding effect on attention (George & Conty, 2008), making it difficult for the tar-
get onset to summon an orienting response (Senju & Hasegawa, 2011). 
The spatial specificity of gaze cueing was assessed in a three-way repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) of the RTs, with the factors cue validity (valid, invalid), target position (1 to 9), and 
SOA (300 ms, 600 ms). Spatially specific gaze-cueing effects would be evidenced by a significant in-
teraction between position and validity (over and above a main effect of validity), with enhanced cue-
ing effects for the exact cued position compared to other positions in the same hemifield. By contrast, 
spatially nonspecific gaze cueing would manifest in terms of a main effect of validity (not accompanied 
by a position x validity interaction), with equal fcilitation for all positions in the cued hemifield. 
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To more precisely determine whether and how gaze-cueing effects vary as function of the dis-
tance of the target from the cued position, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted on the  
gaze-cueing effects (∆RTinvalid-valid) with the factor cue-target distance (0°, 20°, 40°, 60°, 80°). Cueing 
effects were calculated as the RT difference for a given position (e.g., the position 40° in the upper left 
quadrant) between trials on which this position was v lidly cued (i.e., gaze directed to the left) com-
pared to when this position was invalidly cued (i.e., gaze directed to the right), with cueing effects col-
lapsed across the two hemifields.  
 
Results 
Misses (localization: 0.44%; discrimination: 0.29%) and incorrect responses (localization: 4.20%; dis-
crimination: 3.31%) as well as outliers (±2.5 SD from individual participants’ condition means) were 
excluded from analysis. Mean RTs and Standard Errors for valid, neutral, and invalid trials are present-
ed in Table 1 as a function of target position and SOA. As SOA did not have an influence on the spatial 
specificity of cueing [localization: F(16,272)= 1.054, p= .401; discrimination: F < 1], the data were 
collapsed across this factor and only validity and position effects were considered further. Results of 
statistical analyzes for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are summarized in Table 2. 
 
Experiment 1a: Localization task  
The ANOVA of the RTs, with the factors validity and position, revealed the following effects: Mean 
RTs were shorter on valid compared to invalid trials [validity: F(1,17)= 29.543, p< .001, η2= .635]. 
Furthermore, responses were slower to targets that appeared closer to, compared to targets located fur-
ther away from, the vertical midline of the display [position: F(8,136)= 64.030, p< .001, η2= .790]. 
Importantly, general RT benefits for valid compared to invalid trials appeared to be of equal magnitude 
for all target positions, indicating that gaze cueing was equally strong for all positions in the cued h mi-
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field [validity x position: F(8,136)= 1.497, p= .164, η2= .081, 1-β= .406]. In line with this, the gaze-
cueing effects were not modulated by the distance between the cue and the target [main effect of dis-
tance in ANOVA of cueing effects: F(4,68)= .282, p= .889, η2= .016, 1-β= .677]; see Figure 3A. 
 
Table 1: Mean Response Times (in ms), and Standard Errors (in ms) for localization and discrimination task 
  Localization    Discrimination  
Condition   valid neutral invalid    valid neutral invalid  
300-ms SOA            
     Pos 1   404 (12) 412 (16) 433 (15)    428 (11) 432 (11) 428 (12) 
     Pos 2   360 (11) 369 (11) 377 (11)    431 (11) 430 (11) 430 (12) 
     Pos 3   348  (9) 367 (11) 375 (11)    429 (11) 434 (12) 435 (12) 
     Pos 4   345  (9) 358  (8) 362  (9)    422 (11) 429 (11) 428 (10) 
     Pos 5   340  (8) 360  (9) 363  (9)    424 (11) 430 (11) 432 (12) 
     Pos 6   344  (8) 359  (9) 363  (9)    425 (12) 430 (10) 427 (11) 
     Pos 7   346  (8) 361  (9) 365  (8)    428 (11) 435 (11) 427 (11) 
     Pos 8   355  (9) 370 (11) 375 (11)    428 (11) 430 (13) 437 (12) 
     Pos 9   395 (13) 399 (12) 413 (15)    430 (11) 439 (12) 436 (13) 
            
600-ms SOA            
     Pos 1   376 (11) 387 (12) 399 (14)    413 (13) 417 (14) 419 (14) 
     Pos 2   343 (11) 351 (10) 358  (9)    416 (13) 411 (12) 415 (13) 
     Pos 3   333  (9) 344  (8) 341  (9)    411 (15) 413 (15) 420 (13) 
     Pos 4   317  (8) 327  (8) 340  (9)    411 (13) 418 (14) 414 (13) 
     Pos 5   318  (8) 334  (9) 335  (8)    412 (13) 414 (13) 411 (15) 
     Pos 6   322  (9) 329  (8) 338 (10)    410 (13) 418 (15) 419 (14) 
     Pos 7   327  (8) 331  (9) 341  (8)    416 (14) 417 (14) 416 (13) 
     Pos 8   339  (9) 342  (9) 352  (9)    413 (12) 419 (12) 422 (14) 
     Pos 9   381 (12) 387 (12) 379 (12)    415 (12) 425 (14) 416 (15) 
  
Experiment 1b: Discrimination task 
Similar to Experiment 1a, RTs were shorter on valid relative to invalid trials [validity: F(1,17)= 11.957, 
p= .003, η2= .413], indicating that gaze cues facilitated the discrimination of targets in the cued hemi-
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field. In contrast to Experiment 1a, RTs did not differ among the nine target positions in the cued hemi-
field [position: F(8,136)= 1.418, p= .194, η2= .077, 1-β= .406]; that is, in contrast to target localization, 
target discrimination was equally difficult however close a target was to the vertical midline. Im-
portantly, gaze-cueing effects were equivalent for all target positions [distance: F(4,68)= .088, p= .986, 
η2= .005, 1-β= .677], providing evidence that gaze facilitated target discrimination generally for the 
whole cued hemifield, rather than specifically for the exact gazed-at location [validity x position: 
F(8,136)= 1.166, p= .324, η2= .064, 1-β= .406], see Figure 3A. 
 
 
Figure 3. Gaze-cueing effects as function of the distance betwe n cued position and target position (uncluttered visual field). 
(A) shows results of Experiments 1a and b (18 targe positions), and (B) results of Experiments 2a andb (6 target positions). 
The solid line depicts results for the target localization, the dotted line for the target discriminaton, and the dashed line for 
the saccade task. 
 
 
Comparison between Experiments 1a and 1b 
In a follow-up ANOVA, the gaze-cueing effects were compared between the target localization (Exper-
iment 1a) and target discrimination (Experiment 1b)tasks. This ANOVA, with task type (localization, 
discrimination) as between-subjects factor and validity (valid, invalid) and position (1 to 9) as within-
subjects factors, revealed the essential pattern of cueing effects to be similar for both types of task: 
While the RTs were overall shorter, and the cueing ffects overall smaller for the discrimination versus 
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the localization task [task: F(1,34)= 18.900, p< .001, η2= .357; task x validity: F(1,34)= 16.324, 
p< .001, η2= .324], the spatial distribution of the cueing effects [validity x position: F(8,272)= 1.354, 
p= .238, η2= .038, 1-β= .903] was not influenced by the task to be performed [task x validity x position: 
F(8,272)= 1.389, p= .224, η2= .039, 1-β= .903]: the effects were of equivalent magnitude for all posi-
tions in the cued hemifield for both task types. The only other effect involving task was the task x posi-
tion interaction [F(8,272)= 43.793, p< .001, η2= .563], due to RTs varying as a function of the distance 
of the target from the vertical midline in the localiz tion task, but not in the discrimination task.  
 
Discussion  
The main goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate the distribution of attention following a central gaze 
cue (when no context information is available in the periphery). Our findings clearly showed equal RT 
benefits for all targets that appeared (at one of the nine positions) in the cued hemifield (relative to the 
corresponding positions in the uncued hemifield), indicating that changes in gaze direction caused cue-
ing effects that were not specific to the exact gazed-at location. In the localization task, RTs were th  
slower the closer the target was located to the vertical midline, likely owing to the fact that it is harder 
to make a left/right localization decision for targets appearing closer to, rather than further away from, 
the vertical axis. Consistent with this, a main effect of position was not found in the discrimination task; 
rather, the difficulty of discriminating between anF and a T was equivalent for all nine target positi ns, 
however close they were to the vertical midline. Importantly, the position effect in the localization task 
was not modulated by validity, that is: gaze cueing was not enhanced for the exact cued position rela-
tive to the other positions within the cued hemifield. Furthermore, at variance with the expectation that
specific cueing effects would more likely be observed in tasks requiring greater perceptual resolution, 
the cueing effects were equally distributed across the cued hemifield even in the discrimination task. 
Thus, taken together, the cueing effects were spatially nonspecific, with all positions in the cued hemi-
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field receiving equal facilitation, in both the localization and the discrimination task. Changes in RTs
occurred only when the vertical meridian was crossed from the cued to the uncued hemifield (∆RT= 17 
ms). Furthermore, the cueing effects were global for short (300 ms) as well as for long (600 ms) cue-
target SOAs. 
 
Table 2: Results of statistical analyzes for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid), for Experiments 1-3. 
 validity position task val x pos task x pos val x task val x pos x task 
Exp 1a F(2,34)= 25.7 F(8,136)= 74.4  F(16,272)= 1.3    
  p< .001  p< .001   p= .230    
 η2= .602 η2= .814  η2= .069    
a        
Exp 1b F(2,34)= 10.1 F(8,136)= 2.2  F(16,272)= 1.2    
  p< .001  p= .064   p= .317    
 η2= .372 η2= .113  η2= .065    
        
Exp 2a F(2,34)= 11.2 F(2,34)= 3.6 F(1,17)= 132.4 F(4,68)= .6 F(2,34)= 5.7 F(2,34)= 3.6 F(4,68)= 1.3 
  p< .001  p= .067  p< .001  p= .700  p= .009  p= .037  p= .291 
 η2= .397 η2= .174 η2= .886 η2= .031 η2= .252 η2= .177 η2= .070 
        
Exp 2b F(2,34)= 41.8 F(2,34)= 7.4  F(4,68)= .4    
  p< .001  p= .002   p= .842    
 η2= .723 η2= .315  η2= .022    
        
Exp 3 F(2,46)= 6.0 F(2,46)= 13.4 F(1,23)= 129.8 F(4,92)= 3.9 F(2,46)= 14.7 F(2,46)= 3.7 F(4,92)= 2.1 
  p= .005  p< .001  p< .001  p= .006  p< .001  p= .032  p= .095 
 η2= .208 η2= .369 η2= .850 η2= .145 η2= .390 η2= .139 η2= .081 
 
Although gaze-cueing effects were spatially nonspecific with both types of task, changing the 
task had a considerable influence on the overall size of cueing benefits: they were significantly reduced 
in the discrimination compared to the localization task. Given that the effect of gaze cueing decays with 
time (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), this reduction might, in part, be attributable to the extended 
processing time required to solve the discrimination ask. Another explanation is that gaze cueing not 
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only induces attentional orienting towards the cued h mifield, but also interacts with spatial S-R com-
patibility effects along the lines sketched above. Compared to the localization task in which the cue 
might induce a general bias to produce a directionally corresponding left/right response (in addition t  
inducing attentional orienting), the discrimination task measures cueing effects independent of spatial 
S-R compatibility. This additional response bias comp nent might explain why the cueing effect was 
larger in the localization task. Nevertheless, given that the cue-response compatibility effect is additive 
to that of the attentional effect of cueing, the localization task remains a valid alternative to the discrim-
ination task, for three reasons: (i) processing of the target and response preparation after cue presenta-
tion can be accomplished faster for localization (than for discrimination) tasks, thus making them more 
sensitive for examining cue-induced effects on attentional orienting at different SOAs; (ii) target locali-
zation is easier for participants to perform and (iii) requires only half as many trials as the discrimina-
tion task.  
 
Experiment 2 
Although the essential results were consistent in Experiments 1a and 1b, they are not directly compara-
ble with those of Vuilleumier (2002), who used a smaller number of possible target positions (two per 
hemifield). Importantly, differences in set size could account for differences in the spatial allocation of 
attention, as has been shown for the inhibition-of-return (IOR) effect (Birmingham, Visser, Snyder, & 
Kingstone, 2007). This is because increasing the number of target positions increases the proximity 
between cued and uncued locations, while at the same time decreasing the spatial predictivity of the 
cues. Thus, to reveal possible effects arising from the number of target positions, Experiment 2 exam-
ined the spatial specificity of gaze cueing using a reduced number of positions, that is: would spatially 
nonspecific gaze-cueing effects still be obtained when the number of potential target positions within a 
hemifield is reduced from nine (Experiment 1) to three? 
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There were two further objectives: The first was to test more directly for differences between 
target localization and target discrimination by manipulating task type within participants (Experiment 
2a), in contrast to the between-subjects manipulation in Experiment 1a and b. The other objective was 
to examine whether a pattern of spatially nonspecific gaze-cueing effects would also be observed with 
overt shifts of attention (involving eye movements to the arget), rather than the covert shifts required 
in Experiment 1. In the context of gaze-cueing effects, it has been shown that the mere observation and 
the actual execution of eye movements activate similar cortical regions (Grosbras et al., 2005), and that
even covert shifts of attention activate the motor system, triggering the preparation of an eye movement 
to the cued position (Friesen & Kingstone, 2003; Rizzolatti et al., 1987). However, based on the results 
of Experiment 1, it would appear that the mere programming of a saccade is not sufficient to induce 
specific cueing effects for the exact gaze-cued position. Rather, it might be that the requirement to ac-
tually execute eye movements to the target, together with the preparation of a saccade in response to 
gaze cues, is essential for inducing spatially specific cueing effects. If this were true, participants would 
be faster to make saccades to targets appearing at gazed-at positions, compared to targets at uncued 
locations in cued hemifield. This prediction was teted in Experiment 2b, in which participants were 
required to make a speeded saccadic response to the target. 
As cue-target SOA had no influence on the spatial specificity of gaze cueing in Experiment 1, it 
was kept constant at 500 ms in Experiment 2. In all other respects, Experiments 2a and 2b were similar 
to Experiment 1. 
 
Method 
Participants 
36 volunteers participated in Experiment 2: Eighteen participants (13 women, 5 men) performed locali-
zation and discrimination tasks (Experiment 2a: age: M= 25.11, SD= 4.03, range 19-34 years; one left-
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handed); the other eighteen participants (14 women, 4 men) performed a saccade task (Experiment 2b: 
age: M= 24.94, SD= 5.02, range 21-38; two left-handed). In Experiment 2b, the data of one participant 
had to be excluded from analysis because of eye tracking problems. Testing time was about 30 minutes 
for the localization and the saccade task, and 1 h for the discrimination task. None of the participants 
had taken part in Experiment 1. 
 
Stimuli  
In Experiment 2, targets could appear at only six positions, three within each hemifield – resulting i a 
radial distance of 60° between adjacent target position  (Figure 1B). As before, targets could appear at 
only one of these positions on a trial, and only the position on the horizontal meridian was cued. 
 
Experiment 2a: Apparatus, Design, Procedure, and Analysis 
The apparatus in Experiment 2a was the same as in Experiment 1. Experiment 2a was split into two 
sessions: participants performed the localization task in one session and the discrimination task in the 
other session. Half of the participants started with the localization task, and the other half with the dis-
crimination task. The localization task consisted of 380 trials, with a block of 20 practice trials preced-
ing the 20 test blocks of 18 trials each. The discrimination task consisted of 740 trials, with a block of 
20 practice trials and 20 test blocks of 36 trials each. Gaze direction (straight, left, right), target side 
(left, right), and target position (top, center, bottom) were selected pseudo-randomly and appeared with 
equal frequency within each block (with SOA between cue and target onset fixed at 500 ms). In the 
discrimination task, target identity (F, T) was also varied. 
 Data were analyzed by a three-way repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors task-type (lo-
calization, discrimination), validity (valid, invalid), and position (top, center, bottom). 
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Experiment 2b: Apparatus, Design, Procedure, and Analysis 
In Experiment 2b, stimuli were presented on a Dell CRT color monitor, with the refresh rate set at 100 
Hz. Monocular eye tracking of the left eye was performed using an Eyelink 1000 system in combina-
tion with a Tower Mount chin-and-head rest (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). Viewing distance 
was fixed at 55 cm, and eye data were sampled at 1000 Hz with a spatial resolution of 0.01°.  
Experiment 2b consisted of 380 trials, with a block f 20 practice trials preceding 5 test blocks 
of 72 trials each. Figure 2B provides an illustration of the sequence of events in the saccade task, in 
which participants were instructed to make, as quickly and accurately as possible, a saccade from the 
nose of the schematic face (starting position) to the location of the target. 
Prior to the experiment, the eye tracker was calibrted. Participants had to fixate the central fix-
ation cross for 400 ms to initiate a trial. Technically, this required the participant’s eye position t  re-
main for a 400-ms period within a tolerance region of 1° in diameter around the cross. Achieving suc-
cessful fixation triggered the appearance of a schematic face with blank eyes, while the fixation cross 
remained visible on the screen. After a further 400ms, the fixation cross was replaced by the nose of 
the schematic face, which participants were instructed to fixate. After a random time interval (700 to 
1000 ms), pupils appeared within the eyes, looking left, right, or straight ahead. Participants were told 
that the direction in which the eyes were looking was not predictive of target location. After a success-
ful fixation for a further 500 ms, the target appeared at one of six possible positions. If fixation was not 
maintained successfully, the instruction “Please fixate the nose to proceed” was displayed at fixation. 
Schematic face, pupils, and target remained on the screen until a successful saccade was made or 4000 
ms had elapsed, whichever came first. During the experiment, the Saccade Reaction Time (SRT) was 
measured, which was defined as the time interval between target onset and successful landing of the 
saccade in the region of interest (1° in diameter) around the target. The ITI between consecutive trials 
was 680 ms. Participants were instructed to take a short break after each test block. Before starting the 
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next block, the eye tracker was recalibrated. 
 
Results 
In the saccade task, the only error that could occur was a miss. Misses (localization: 0.15%, discrimina-
tion: 0.75%, saccade: 3.42 %), incorrect responses (localization: 1.85%, discrimination: 5.37%), as well 
as outliers (±2.5 SD from individual participants’ means) were excluded from analysis. Mean RTs (or 
SRTs) for valid, neutral, and invalid trials are presented in Table 3 as a function of target position. Re-
sults of statistical analyzes for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 3: Mean Response Times and Standard Errors (in ms) for manual localization, discrimination, and saccade tasks 
  Localization  Discrimination  Saccade task 
Condition  valid neutral invalid  valid neutral invalid  valid neutral invalid 
500-ms SOA             
     Pos 1  327  (9) 342 (10) 343 (10)  436 (12) 438 (12) 441 (12)  218  (9) 234 (10) 231  (8) 
     Pos 2  310  (9) 325  (9) 331 (13)  433 (12) 435 (12) 440 (12)  211  (8) 227  (6) 230 (10) 
     Pos 3  339 (13) 341 (15) 349 (13)  444 (12) 446 (12) 449 (12)  253 (14) 270 (13) 271 (14) 
 
Experiment 2a 
RTs were shorter for valid compared to invalid trials [validity: F(1,17)= 26.257, p< .001, η2= .607], but 
did not vary as a function of position [position: F(2,34)= 2.970, p= .096, η2= .149, 1-β= .627]. Overall, 
participants were faster in localizing than in discriminating targets [task: F(1,17)= 157.788, p< .001, 
η2= .903], and gaze-cueing effects were more marked in the former than in the latter [task x validity: 
F(1,17)= 4.996, p= .039, η2= .227]. Most importantly, the distance between cued position and target 
position did not modulate the size of gaze-cueing effects [distance: F(1,17)= .002, p= .967, η2< .001, 
1-β= .717], indicating that all positions in the cued hemifield were equally facilitated [validity x posi-
tion: F(2,34)= .563, p= .575, η2= .032, 1-β= .627]. This pattern of spatially nonspecific cueing effects 
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was evident for the localization and the discrimination task [task x validity x position: F(2,34)= .627, 
p= .490, η2= .051, 1-β= .627; task x distance: F(1,17)= .562, p= .464, η2= .032, 1-β= .717], see Figure 
3B. 
 
Comparison between Experiments 1 and 2a 
To examine whether the number of target positions influenced the size of gaze-cueing effects, we com-
pared the results of Experiment 2a (three positions per hemifield) with Experiment 1 (nine positions per 
hemifield) in a meta-analysis of the effect sizes (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). As the size of the cue-
ing effect is reflected in the main effect of validity, two separate meta-analyses were carried out on the 
estimated effect sizes for validity: one for the localization and one for the discrimination task. Estima -
ed effect sizes r were as follows: Experiment 1a: r1 = .797 (Loc, 18 pos), Experiment 1b: r2 = .643 
(Discr, 18 pos), Experiment 2a: r3 = .678 (Loc, 6 pos), and r4 = .543 (Discr, 6 pos). There was no signif-
icant difference in estimated effect sizes for either target localization (r1 vs. r3, z= .725, p= .154) or tar-
get discrimination (r2 vs. r4, z= .421, p= .183), indicating that the size of cueing effects was comparable 
between experiments and not systematically influenced by the number of possible target positions. 
 
Experiment 2b 
Comparable to Experiments 1 and 2a (covert attention), SRTs in the saccade task were shorter for valid 
relative to invalid trials [validity: F(1,16)= 63.562, p< .001, η2= .799], indicating that gaze cues expe-
dited saccadic reactions when the gaze was directed towards the hemifield in which the target was sub-
sequently presented. Furthermore, SRTs were generally shorter for targets presented on the horizontal 
meridian (center position), compared to targets in the upper and lower quadrants (top and bottom posi-
tion) [position: F(2,32)= 7.161, p= .003, η2= .309]. However, position did not modulate the size of the 
cueing effects [validity x position: F(2,32)= .323, p= .726, η2= .020, 1-β= .599], which were equivalent 
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for all positions in the cued hemifield, independent of the distance of the target from the cued position 
[distance: F(1,16)= .198, p= .662, η2= .012, 1-β= .819], see Figure 3B. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 2a 
Experiment 2a demonstrated that (i) spatially nonspecific cueing effects are also found when the num-
ber of target positions within a hemifield is reduced, while (ii) the size of the gaze-cueing effect itself is 
unaffected by this reduction. Thus, the spatially nonspecific cueing effects are more likely attributable 
to attention being distributed equally over the cued (but unstructured) hemifield, rather than to set-size 
effects. 
Note that the finding of spatially nonspecific cueing effects, even with the reduced number of 
target positions, is unlikely attributable to the use of schematic, instead of realistic, gaze stimuli. In a 
prior study with a human and a robot gazer, we found participants to be very precise in indicating the 
gaze direction of the robot’s schematic eyes; indeed, acuity did not differ between realistic human and 
schematic robot eyes (Wiese, Kohlbecher, & Müller, 2012). This strongly suggests that the schematic 
cues used in the present study were precise enough f r participants to perceive them as pointing into a 
specific direction, rather than just globally indicating a whole hemifield. 
Furthermore, the spatially nonspecific cueing effects are unlikely due to the fact that the sche-
matic face was consistently looking at the central position on the horizontal midline (and never at any
of the other potential target positions) in a hemifield, which might, for some reason, induce a global 
bias towards the cued side. This is effectively ruled out by a control experiment in which the (spatially 
non-predictive) gaze cue was equally likely directed to the position in the lower and, respectively, the
upper hemifield quadrant, as well as the central position on the horizontal midline. In all other respcts, 
the experiment was comparable to the localization task of Experiment 2a: The results obtained from ten 
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participants (6 female; age: M=25 years, range 20-30 years; all right-handed) mirrored the findings of 
Experiment 2a, as evidenced by a repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors validity (valid, invalid), 
gaze direction (top, center, bottom), and target position (top, center, bottom): RTs were shorter on valid 
compared to invalid trials [validity: F(1,9)=13.831, p= .005, η2= .606], whether the lower, the central, 
or the upper target position was cued. The RTs werealso longer for positions located closer to the verti-
cal midline [target position: F(2,18)=25.590, p< .001, η2= .740], as is typical for left-right localization. 
Importantly, the cueing effects did not differ betwen the exact gazed-at position and the respective 
other positions in the cued hemifield, whichever positi n has been cued [validity x gaze direction x tar-
get position: F(4,36)= .816, p= .523, η2= .083, 1-β= .494]. Thus, general gaze-cueing effects for the 
whole gaze cued hemifield are still found under conditions in which a central gaze cue is directed to 
one of all possible target positions (rather than just the central position) on one or the other side.  
 
Experiment 2b 
The goal of Experiment 2b was to examine the hypothesis that gaze-cueing effects would be spatially 
specific if the task requires participants to actually execute a saccade to the target (together with the 
implicit, covert preparation of an eye movement in response to the cue). However, at variance with this 
hypothesis, SRTs mirrored the previous findings of nonspecific cueing effects: facilitation was equiva-
lent for all target positions within the cued hemifield, with no extra enhancement for the exact gazed-at 
position. Most importantly, as shown in a meta-analysis of the effect sizes for the main effect of validity, 
overt orienting in response to gaze cues was not more robust compared to mere covert orienting (r1 
= .779 (Experiment 2a); r2 = .894 (Experiment 2b); r1 vs. r2, z= 1.07, p= .113), which is in line with 
Friesen and Kingstone (2003).  
Thus, going beyond previous findings, the results of Experiment 2b show that even for overt 
shifts of attention, gaze-cueing effects are not confined to the exact gazed-at position; rather, gaze cues 
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equally facilitate the programming of an eye movement to any position in the cued hemifield. This pat-
tern is consistent with Rizzolatti et al. (1987), who showed that the eye movement program induced by 
symbolic cues specifies only the left/right direction parameter of a saccade, resulting in a global benefit 
for the cued hemifield, but not for the exact cued position. This finding is very plausible given that 
oblique saccades are composed of a vertical and a horizontal component which are implemented by 
separate neuronal channels in the brain stem and are executed by distinct groups of motor neurons and 
eye muscles (Bahill & Stark, 1977; King, Lisberger, & Fuchs, 1986). Consequently, given that vertical 
and horizontal components of saccadic eye movements are planned and generated independently of 
each other and that oblique saccades are more difficult to generate in general (as they involve the coor-
dination of two separate components), it is possible that observing a lateral gaze shift also triggers the 
preparation of an eye movement in only one, dominant (i.e., horizontal), but not the other (i.e., vertical), 
channel. Thus, when being presented with horizontal gaze shifts, only the horizontal (but not the verti-
cal) component of an eye movement is prepared, resulting in SRT benefits for left/right, but not 
up/down saccadic eye movements. 
In sum, Experiments 1 and 2 indicate that when no visual context information is provided to 
which gaze cues could refer, (i) spatial attention is ot allocated to the exact cued position, but facili-
tates target localization and discrimination at all positions in the cued hemifield; (ii) nonspecific gaze-
cueing effects are independent of task demands; (iii) the size of gaze cueing is not influenced by the 
number of target positions; and (iv) nonspecific cueing effects are also found for overt attention shift . 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether the allocation of attention induced by gaze cues is 
sensitive to context information presented in the visual field. Assuming that gaze direction provides 
important information about other persons’ internal st tes, we hypothesized that gaze cues are only in-
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terpreted specifically in relation to external refence objects that represent the targets of the othrs’ 
attentional focus. If so, presenting targets inside predefined reference objects would be expected to turn 
spatially nonspecific gaze-cueing effects into specific effects, as a link between gaze direction and po-
tential objects of interest can already be established before the target appears. 
 
Method 
The methodological details were generally the same s in Experiment 2a, with the following exceptions: 
Twenty-four volunteers (17 women, 7 men) participated in Experiment 3 (age: M= 24.54, SD= 2.63, 
range 21-30 years; all right-handed); none of them ad taken part in the previous experiments. Targets 
were presented in predefined placeholder objects that consisted of a white rectangle surrounded by a 
black line (1.0° wide; 1.5° high); the peripheral placeholders appeared simultaneously with the blank-
eyed face in the display center. Next, pupils appeared inside the eyes, creating the impression of the 
face looking at one of the placeholders. 500 ms later the target – either a dot (localization task) or a 
letter (discrimination task) – was presented centerd inside one of the placeholders. The spatial speci-
ficity of gaze cueing was assessed by a two-way repeat d-measures ANOVA of the RTs, with the fac-
tors validity (valid, invalid) and position (top, center, bottom), as well as by an ANOVA of the cueing 
effects (i.e., ∆RTinvalid-valid), with the factor cue-target distance (0°, 60°). 
 
Results 
Misses (localization: 1.89%; discrimination: 0.39%), incorrect responses (localization: 1.54%; discrim-
ination: 4.74%) and outliers (±2.5 SD from individual participants’ means) were excluded from analy-
sis. Mean RTs for valid, neutral, and invalid trials re presented in Table 4 as a function of target posi-
tion. Results of statistical analyzes for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are presented in Table 2. 
As in the first two experiments, RTs were shorter for valid compared to invalid trials [validity: 
F(1,23)= 16.926, p< .001, η2= .424], and participants were always faster in localizing than in discrimi-
Studies on individual research questions                                                                          64 
 
 
 
nating targets [task: F(1,23)= 130.607, p< .001, η2= .850]. Again, gaze cueing effects were larger in the 
localization than in the discrimination task [task x validity: F(1,23)= 5,920, p= .023, η2= .205], and 
performance in the localization task, but not in the discrimination task, depended on target position 
[task x position: F(2,46)= 9.508, p< .001, η2= .292]. Most importantly, this time, cueing effects were 
modulated by target position, with larger effects for the exact gazed-at position compared to the other 
two positions in the cued hemifield [validity x position: F(2,46)= 9.113, p< .001, η2= .284]. In line with 
this, the gaze-cueing effects within the cued hemifi ld varied as a function of the distance between cue 
and target [distance: F(1,23)= 13.133, p= .001, η2= .363]. Note that although gaze cueing was strong-
est for the exact cued position, there was still facilit tion for the other two positions in the cued hemi-
field. This pattern indicates that, under the conditions of Experiment 3, gaze cues caused a significatly 
stronger facilitation effect for the exact gazed-at position compared to the other two positions in the
cued hemifield.  
 
Table 4: Mean Response Times and Standard Errors (in ms) for localization and discrimination (with placeholders) 
  Localization  Discrimination  
Condition  valid neutral invalid  valid neutral invalid  
500-ms SOA          
     Pos 1  342 (13) 352  (9) 361  (8)  428 (20) 431 (20) 429 (19)  
     Pos 2  320 (17) 343  (8) 348  (9)  428 (16) 424 (19) 433 (16)  
     Pos 3  355 (17) 367 (13) 363 (10)  439 (17) 444 (19) 440 (17)  
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, spatially specific gaze cueing was evident for both types of task 
(dashed lines). Statistically, the task x validity x position interaction [F(2,46)= 1,301, p= .282, η2= .054, 
1-β= .770] and the task x distance interaction [F(1,23)= 2.049, p= .166, η2= .082, 1-β= .936] were non-
significant. And when analyzing the localization and discrimination tasks separately, the critical v lidity 
x position interaction [localization: F(2,46)= 6.054, p= .005, η2= .208; discrimination: F(2,46)= 3.632, 
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p= .034, η2= .136] as well as the effect of cue-target distance [localization: F(1,23)= 8.091, p= .009, 
η2= .260; discrimination: F(1,23)= 8.675, p= .007, η2= .274] were significant for both types of task. 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison between Experiment 2a (without context information, solid line) and Experiment 3 (with context 
information, dashed line). (A) shows results of the localization task, (B) shows results of the discrimination task. With both 
types of task, adding context information in the form of predefined position placeholders changed a general cueing effect for 
the whole cued hemifield into a more specific cueing effect for the exact gazed-at position. 
 
 
Importantly, as depicted in Figure 4, a comparison between Experiment 3 (with placeholders – 
dashed lines) and Experiment 2a (without placeholders – solid lines) revealed the spatial specificity 
effect to be significantly enhanced when context information was presented in the periphery [distance x 
experiment: F(1,40)= 8.262, p= .006, η2= .171], with both the localization and the discrimination task 
[distance x experiment x task: F(1,40)= .515, p= .477, η2= .013, 1-β= .997; distance x experiment (lo-
calization): F(1,40)= 4.206, p= .046, η2= .095; distance x experiment (discrimination): F(1,40)= 6.610, 
p= .014, η2= .142]. This pattern indicates that visual context information changes the general cueing 
effect that is observable under conditions without context information into a specific cueing effect for
the exact cued position, with significantly stronger facilitation for the exact gazed-at position compared 
to the other positions in the cued hemifield. Figure 4 suggests that this change in the spatial specificity 
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of gaze-cueing effects is due to increased facilitation for the exact gazed-at position, coupled with re-
duced facilitation for the uncued positions in the cued hemifield. However, when comparing cueing 
effects for the same positions (exact, other) betwen conditions with and without context information 
(across experiments), separately for the localization and discrimination tasks, only the reduced facilit -
tion for the other positions in the discrimination task turned out to be just significant (t(40)= 2.753, 
p=.036; all other ts < 1.506, ps > .140). 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 examined whether the specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by visual context infor-
mation in the periphery, in particular, whether spatially specific cueing effects are dependent on context 
information, such as objects of interest being avail ble in the field to which the gazer’s attentional fo-
cus could be directed. The assumption that cueing effects are modulated by context information is con-
sistent with previous findings on the spatial specificity of non-social symbolic cues: While Hughes and 
Zimba (1985, 1987) found general cueing effects for larger regions of the visual field (i.e., hemifields 
or quadrants) when no context was provided, spatially specific cueing effects were observed when tar-
gets were presented at predefined placeholder locations (e.g., Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Henderson & 
Macquistan, 1993; Shepherd & Müller, 1989). Based on these observations, we hypothesized that the 
manifestation of specific gaze-cueing effects critially depends on the availability of context infor-
mation (i.e., placeholders) in the periphery, which would restrict processing to only a few regions of the 
visual field where task-relevant events are likely to occur. Experiment 3 clearly supported this hypothe-
sis. In contrast to the first two experiments, it revealed an interaction between validity and position: 
gaze-cueing effects were significantly enhanced for the exact gazed-at position compared to the other 
two positions within the cued hemifield.  
This pattern points to an interplay of two components which determine the spatial specificity of 
gaze-cueing effects: (i) a general orienting component that is activated bottom-up by gaze cues, wheth-
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er or not further context information is provided; and (ii) a top-down component that comes into play 
only if contextual information is available, permitting the gaze direction to be linked to specific refe -
ence objects. While the bottom-up component results in a general gaze-cueing effect for the whole 
gaze-cued hemifield, the top-down component appears to induce a facilitation effect which is spatially 
specific to the exact gazed-at position.  
One possible challenge to this interpretation of the data is that when placeholder structures are 
available in the periphery, participants are more lik ly to make a saccade in response to the gaze cues,
which could potentially generate a pattern of spatially specific cueing effects. In order to validate that 
participants did heed the instructions to maintain fixation on the central fixation cross throughout a tri l, 
we tested six additional participants (age: M=27, range 23-30 years; 5 female; right-handed) in an eye-
tracking experiment, using the same displays, with potential target positions in the periphery marked by 
placeholders, as in Experiment 3. Only the discrimination task was tested, based on the assumption that 
the likelihood of making eye movements to the cued (or the target) location would be highest when 
task performance requires greater perceptual resolution. However, even under these conditions, fixa-
tions remained on the central cross (i.e., within a tolerance area of ±1.5°) in 94.6% of all trials. Of the 
remaining 5.4% of the trials, only 0.2% of the eye movements went to the target (with a tolerance area
of ±1.5°), indicating that participants followed the instructions and did not execute saccades towards 
the current target location. For those trials on which participants maintained central fixation during the 
whole trial, the results were comparable to Experimnt 3 (first 12 participants): RTs were overall short-
er for targets appearing in the cued hemifield rather an the uncued hemifield (442 vs. 447 ms) [validi-
ty: F(1,16)= 4.485, p= .05, η2= .219], as well as for targets presented on the horizontal meridian com-
pared to targets in the upper and lower field quadrants (437 ms vs. 448 ms) [position: F(2,32)=19.260, 
p< .001, η2= .546]. Importantly, gaze-cueing effects were larger for the exact gazed-at position com-
pared to the other positions in the cued hemifield (12 ms vs. 1 ms) [validity x position: F(2,32)= 8.780, 
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p= .001, η2= .354]. Most importantly, the pattern of results did not differ between the control experi-
ment and Experiment 3 (discrimination task): the interactions experiment x validity [F(1,16)= .143, 
p= .710, η2= .009, 1-β= .712], experiment x position [F(2,32)=2.038, p= .147, η2= .105, 1-β= .625], 
and experiment x validity x position [F(2,32)=2.326, p= .114, η2= .127, 1-β= .625] were all non-
significant. This makes it unlikely that the spatially specific gaze-cueing effects observed in Experi-
ment 3 can be attributed to systematic saccades to potential target positions marked by placeholders. 
 
2.1.4. General Discussion 
The goal of the current study was to investigate the spatial allocation of attention induced by nonpre-
dictive gaze cues. Experiments 1 and 2 examined how gaze-cueing effects are distributed in an unclut-
tered visual field, dependent on the type of task, the number of possible target positions (set size), and 
on whether attention is oriented covertly or overtly. Experiment 3 then examined the influence of con-
text information, in the form of peripheral position placeholders, on visuo-spatial orienting in response 
to gaze cues. The results revealed the spatial specificity of gaze cueing to be critically dependent o the 
availability of context information: Nonspecific gaze-cueing effects were found consistently when there 
were no placeholder objects in the periphery to which the gaze cues could refer; and this general cueing 
effect was independent of the type of task to be performed (localization, discrimination), the set size, 
and whether attention had to be shifted covertly or overtly. In contrast, when reference objects were 
provided in the periphery, gaze cues induced a cueing ffect specific to the exact gazed-at position. 
The current results help integrate different theoris of spatial attention with regard to their valid-
ity for gaze cueing. On the one hand, they confirm the assumptions of general-region theories of atten-
tion, such as the meridian-boundary model (Hughes & Zimba, 1985, 1987) – by showing that gaze cues 
give rise to spatially nonspecific, hemifield cueing effects when no further information about potential 
reference objects in the periphery is provided. On the other hand, they are also consistent with specific-
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location theories of attention, such as the zoom-lens model (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985) or the gradient model 
(Downing & Pinker, 1985) – by showing that attentioal resources can be allocated to specific, narrow 
regions of the visual field when objects are presented in the periphery that can serve as reference points 
for the other’s gaze direction. 
The present findings argue in favor of the idea that gaze direction cues can initiate both a gen-
eral and a specific component of attentional orienting, dependent on the availability of context infor-
mation in the visual scene: If no further information is provided, only a general directional orienting 
component is activated (bottom-up), yielding a global cueing effect for the whole gaze-cued hemifield. 
By contrast, if context information is available, a spatially specific component (top-down) comes into 
play, inducing a facilitation effect for the exact gazed-at position. However, it is not entirely clear from 
the presented data whether the modulation of the spatial specificity of gaze-cueing effects is due to a 
trade-off relationship between the top-down and bottom-up components, or whether the top-down 
component is simply additive to the bottom-up component. Whatever the precise relationship between 
the two orienting components, the specific component s ems to critically depend on the availability of 
context information and is, thus, likely to result from the combination of two separate sources of infor-
mation: the linking of context information provided in the visual field with directional information 
from the gazer’s eyes.  
The proposal that visual information from the eye region and the periphery are integrated when 
processing gaze direction is in line with Lobmaier et al. (2006). They showed that objects in the visual 
field can capture perceived gaze direction of an interaction partner, causing systematic biases in est-
mating where the other is looking. Arguably, rather than being achieved directly (in bottom-up manner), 
this linkage may involve complex, higher-level processes of cross-referencing central gaze direction 
with peripheral structures, which may then exert a top-down-like effect on the allocation of attention. 
However, this does not rule out that the computations involved are highly automatized and that, once it 
Studies on individual research questions                                                                          70 
 
 
 
is established which peripheral object is referred to by the gaze cue, this object becomes an effective 
attractor for the allocation of attention.  
The idea that gaze direction can induce both a general and a specific cueing effect, the latter de-
pendent on the availability of peripheral context information, is also consistent with Gibson, Thompson, 
Davis, and Biggs (2011). They showed that the extent to which attention is oriented to specific loca-
tions in response to symbolic cues depends on the exp ctancies observers have about the direction and 
distance of the upcoming target: while directional information is provided by the cue itself, distance 
information is either derived from experience (e.g., learning that targets always appear at the same ec-
centricity) or provided by position placeholders (see also Shepherd & Müller, 1989). However, in the 
present study, simply presenting targets consistently at he same distance from fixation did not give ris  
to spatially specific cueing effects (Experiments 1 and 2); rather, specific effects were dependent on the 
presence of position placeholders (Experiment 3), suggesting that reference objects are critical for the 
exact interpretation of gaze direction.  
This notion would also be consistent with joint-atten ion theories, according to which attending 
to the attentional focus of others is an important prerequisite for sharing information in social interac-
tions (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Scaife & Bruner, 1975). Of importance with respect to the present 
findings, it has been shown that joint attention caonly be established when objects are placed in the 
visual field, with which the other’s gaze can be aligned (Butterworth & Jarrett, 1991; Moore & Corkum, 
1995). In line with this, our findings show that the presence of objects in the visual field is also esen-
tial for inducing spatially specific gaze-cueing effects in adults. 
The evidence available to date suggests that what has been established in the present study with 
regard to the spatial specificity of gaze cueing may also apply to non-social symbolic (e.g., arrow) cues 
in general: symbolic cueing towards an uncluttered visual field produces spatially non-specific cueing 
effects (Hughes & Zimba, 1985, 1987), whereas the cueing effects are spatially specific when possible 
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target locations are predefined by placeholders (Eriksen & Yeh, 1985; Henderson & Macquistan, 1993; 
Shepherd & Müller, 1989). Nevertheless, given that ese studies were quite different with regard to the 
stimulus arrangements and tasks used (the only commonality being the use of central arrow cues), the 
generality issue would need to be examined in further, systematic experiments adapting the designs of 
the present study. However, even if gaze cueing turned out to be a specific instance of symbolic cueing 
as concerns the role of visual context for the spatial specificity of the cueing effects, it would remain 
that gaze direction induces cueing effects faster and in a more reflexive manner compared to arrow 
cues (Friesen et al., 2004). Also, gaze-cueing effects may well be particularly reliant on the availability 
of external objects. Further work would be required to elucidate the exact mechanisms that relate the 
central information from the cues with peripheral context information, and whether their dynamics is 
the same with social as with non-social symbolic cues. 
In summary, the present results reveal a degree of fl xibility in the gaze-cueing system that al-
lows for the integration of multiple sources of information to guide attention: when information about 
possible reference objects in the visual field is lacking, attention is allocated to a broader area, whereas 
attention shifts are specific to the cued location when a relation between gaze direction and objects of 
interest can be established. This context-dependent flexibility is adaptive, in that it allows for rapid de-
tection of relevant objects in a constantly changing social environment.  
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2.2.1. Abstract 
For interacting with other people, information about the physical surrounding has to be integrated with
information about the social interaction partner. Processing social information is usually guided by a 
bottom-up mechanism that is reflexively triggered by stimulus-related information in the social scene, 
combined with a top-down mechanism activated by task-related context information. The present study 
investigated whether these components interact during attentional orienting to changes in gaze direction. 
In particular, we examined whether the spatial specificity of gaze cueing is modulated by expectations 
about the reliability of gaze behavior that were induced either by experience with the gaze behavior or 
by instruction. Spatially specific cueing effects were observed for highly predictive cueing conditions, 
and importantly, also when participants believed that nonpredictive gaze cues were highly predictive. 
Analogously, cueing effects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were observed for nonpredictive cues and 
when predictive cues were believed to be nonpredictive, specific cueing effects were attenuated. This 
pattern indicates that instruction-induced expectations about gaze behavior modulate social attention, 
even when they contradict information available in the social scene. 
 
Keywords 
Gaze cueing, top-down control, spatial allocation of attention, cue predictivity 
 
2.2.2. Introduction 
For engaging in interactions with other people we ne d to know who we are interacting with, and what 
others are going to do next (Frith & Frith, 2006). Based on this knowledge, which can be acquired 
directly through interacting with people or indirectly by either observing someone interacting with 
another person or by being told about a person, we make inferences about the other’s internal states, 
including intentions, beliefs, and feelings. At the core of this mentalizing process (Frith & Frith, 2003) 
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is that our predictions about others are based not simply on the actual state of the world, but also on our 
assumptions about the others’ internal states. Accordingly, the interpretation of social scenes is thought 
to involve (i) a bottom-up mechanism that is activated by perceptual information in the social scene, 
and (ii) a top-down mechanism that is based on background knowledge we hav  about others, or 
inferences we draw from perceived information, and that interplays with the bottom-up component. To 
allow adequate behavior in social interactions, the human brain developed a system specialized for 
processing social information consisting of medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala and anterior insula (Adolphs, 1999; Brothers, 1990). While 
bottom-up responses to social signals are thought to be evoked in the STS, top-down modulation of 
these responses is assumed to originate from the mPFC (Grezes et al., 2004 a,b; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). 
 One fundamental mechanism employed in the processing of social information is gaze follow-
ing. Gaze direction is very informative, as it indicates another’s focus of interest and encourages the 
observer to shift attention to the same location (fr a review: Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). Gaze-
triggered attention shifts have been investigated using a cueing paradigm (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) 
in which a face is presented centrally that gazes either straight ahead, to the left, or to the right. Reac-
tions to targets appearing in the gazed-at hemifield are typically faster than those to targets in the oppo-
site hemifield (e.g., Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999; Wiese, Zwickel & Müller, in 
press). 
 Gaze direction has traditionally been thought to be sp cial with regard to guiding attention. In 
contrast to other central cues (Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980; Ristic & Kingstone, 2006), gaze 
triggers shifts of attention to peripheral locations when being nonpredictive (Friesen & Kingstone, 
1998; Langton & Bruce, 1999; cf. Vecera & Rizzo, 2006) or even counterpredictive with respect to the 
target location (Friesen, Ristic & Kingstone, 2004) – a pattern that is consistent with a reflexive mech-
anism. 
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 However, the view that gaze cues provide particularly powerful attentional orienting signals 
(reflecting their social relevance) has recently been challenged by evidence showing that not only gaze, 
but also other overlearned symbolic (e.g., arrow) cues are capable of inducing shifts of attention when 
being nonpredictive (Hommel et al., 2001; Ristic, Friesen, & Kingstone, 2002; Tipples, 2002; cf. Frie-
sen, Ristic & Kingstone, 2004). Furthermore, orienting of attention in response to gaze direction can be 
top-down controlled if appropriate context information is available (Nummenmaa & Hietanen, 2009; 
Teufel et al., 2009; Wiese et al., in press). In particular, pre-existing assumptions concerning the ob-
served stimulus have been shown to influence gaze cueing (Deaner, Shepherd, & Platt, 2007; Ristic & 
Kingstone, 2005; Teufel et al., 2010; Wiese, Wykowska et al., 2012; cf. Bayliss & Tipper, 2006). For 
example, when humans believe that the observed gaze behavior is intentional, cueing effects are larger 
compared to when the gazer is believed to display onl  mechanistic behavior (Wiese, Wykowska et al., 
2012). Similarly, when the gazer represents a stereo ypical member of a group that the observer be-
longs to (e.g., political party), the observer is more likely to follow his/her gaze direction (Liuzza et al., 
2011). 
 Taken together, these findings suggest that gaze cues, in addition to a bottom-up component of 
attentional orienting, evoke a top-down mechanism, which is dependent on whether or not task-relevant 
context information is available. In support of this dual-component model, Wiese et al. (in press) have 
shown that when targets were presented in an unstructured visual field, cueing was not specific to the
exact gazed-at position, but facilitated all positins within the cued hemifield to an equal degree. How-
ever, when additional context information was provided in the form of peripheral position placeholders, 
cueing effects were strongest for the exact gazed-at loc tion. The authors took this pattern to indicate 
that bottom-up and top-down mechanisms are co-active in gaze cueing: while the bottom-up (reflexive) 
component causes a general directional bias for the whole cued hemifield, the top-down component 
triggers facilitation specific to the particular gazed-at position.  
Studies on individual research questions                                                                          81 
 
 
 
 The present study was designed to investigate whether gaze-induced attentional orienting can be 
top-down modulated by participants’ expectations about observed gaze behavior. Expectations were 
induced by either actual predictivity of gaze behavior (i.e., likelihood with which targets appeared at 
gazed-at locations) or instructed predictivity (independent of the actual predictivity). In Experiment 1, 
actual (i.e., experienced) predictivity tallied with nstructed (i.e., believed) predictivity, whereas in Ex-
periment 2 it did not. Based on the two-component model of Wiese et al. (in press), we expected that in 
Experiment 1, the predictivity with which gaze direction indicates target position would influence the
specificity of gaze cueing as follows: nonpredictive gaze behavior would only activate the bottom-up 
component, resulting in equal-size gaze-cueing effects for the whole hemifield; predictive gaze behav-
ior, by contrast, would additionally invoke the top-down component giving rise to facilitation for the 
exact gazed-at position. In Experiment 2, we examined whether believed predictivity would interact 
with experienced predictivity, that is: would nonspecific gaze cueing triggered by nonpredictive cues 
be spatially more specific when the cue was believed to be predictive (Experiment 2), relative to when 
it was believed to be nonpredictive (Experiment 1); analogously, would specific gaze cueing induced 
by predictive cues be less specific when the gaze-cue was believed to be nonpredictive (Experiment 2) 
compared to when it was believed to be predictive (Experiment 1)? 
 
2.2.3. Experiments 
Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, gaze cues either predicted the targe  location with a high likelihood (80%), or they 
were nonpredictive (≈ 17%). Participants were explicitly informed about these probabilities. There 
were three semi-circularly arranged target positions in each hemifield (Figure 1A). Importantly, these 
positions were not marked by placeholders (see Wiese et al., in press, for the effects of nonpredictive 
gaze cues without versus with placeholder information). Participants had to make a speeded localiza-
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tion (left vs. right hemifield) response to the target. We expected predictive gaze cues to produce the 
strongest gaze-cueing effect for the exact gazed-at posi ion, whereas nonpredictive cues would generate 
equal effects for all target positions within the cued hemifield. 
 
 
Figure 1. Stimulus and target positions (A) and sequence of events within a trial (B). 
 
 
 
Methods and Materials 
 
Participants 
 
Twelve volunteers (8 women; mean age: 25 years, range: 20–30 years; all right-handed, with normal or 
corrected-to-normal visual acuity; all having given written informed consent) participated in the exper-
iment either for course credit or payment (8€/h). Testing time was two hours, split into two sessions. 
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 17” Graphics Series G90fB CRT monitor with the refresh rate of 85 Hz. 
Reaction time (RT) measures were based on standard keyboard responses. The experiment was con-
trolled by Experiment Builder (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). Participants were seated 57 cm 
away from the monitor, centered with respect to display and keyboard. 
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Stimuli 
 
Schematic faces, constructed in line with Friesen and Kingstone (1998), were presented in the center of 
the display as black drawings against a white background. The round face outline circumscribed an 
area of 6.8° of visual angle and contained two circles representing the eyes, a smaller circle symboliz-
ing the nose, and a straight line representing the mouth. The eyes subtended 1.0° and were positioned 
on the horizontal midline, at a distance of ±1.0° from the vertical midline. The nose subtended 0.2°, 
was located 0.9° below the eyes, and served as fixation point. The mouth was 2.2° in length and cen-
tered 1.3° below the nose. Black filled circles, subtending 0.5°, appeared within the eyes, representing 
the pupils. Gaze cues were implemented by moving the pupils sideways into one of six different direc-
tions: pupils were either shifted left- or rightwards on the central horizontal axis or rotated up- or 
downwards relative to the midline by an angle of 60°, until they touched the outline eye circles. The 
target stimulus was a gray dot 0.5° in diameter. Tagets could appear at one of six positions equally 
distributed on an imaginary circle with a radius of 6.0° around the fixation point within the central f ce 
(Figure 1A). The angular distance between adjacent targets was 60°.  
 
Design 
Each session of the experiment consisted of 740 trials, with a block of 20 practice trials preceding 20 
experimental blocks of 36 trials each. Gaze direction (left, right), gaze position (top, center, bottom), 
target side (left, right), and target position (top, center, bottom) were presented pseudo-randomly. Cue 
predictivity was blocked: one testing session was devoted to nonpredictive and the other to predictive 
cues, with session order counterbalanced across partici nts. In the nonpredictive condition, targets 
appeared at each of the six target positions with the same likelihood (≈17%); by contrast, in the predic-
tive condition, targets appeared with a likelihood of 80% at the exact gazed-at position and a likelihood 
of 4% each at one of the other five positions.  
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Procedure 
 
Figure 1B illustrates the sequence of events on a trial. Trials started with the onset of a central fixat on 
cross. 400 ms later, a face with blank eyes was preent d. After a random interval of 700–1000 ms, 
pupils appeared within the eyes looking at one of the six target positions (Figure 1A). Following the 
cue, a target dot appeared at one of the six target posi ions at a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 500
ms. Schematic face, pupils, and target remained on the screen until a response was given or 1200 ms 
had elapsed. Participants were asked to determine, as fast and accurately as possible, whether targets 
were presented on the left or right side of the screen, pressing the “D”- or “K”-key with their left or 
right index finger for a target on the left or right side, respectively. The inter-trial-interval (ITI) was 
680 ms.  
 Participants were veridically informed about the prdictivity of the gaze cues: Instruction 1 
informed that gaze direction was not predictive of the location of the upcoming target; Instruction 2 
informed that the target would appear with a high lkelihood at the gazed-at position.  
 
Analysis 
 
The specificity of gaze cueing was assessed in a repeat d-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
the gaze-cueing effects, with the factors gaze position (top, center, bottom), target position (top, center, 
bottom), and predictivity (low, high).1 Cueing effects were calculated as the RT-difference between a 
validly cued position (gaze direction and target side matched) and the respective invalidly cued position 
(gaze direction and target side did not match) on the same horizontal axis. For instance, cueing effects 
for the top-position (60° in the upper quadrant) on the left side were calculated as the RT difference 
between trials on which this position was validly cued (i.e., gaze directed to the left) compared to when 
this position was invalidly cued (i.e., gaze directed o the right). For the ANOVA, cueing effects were 
collapsed across the two hemifields. Specific cueing effects would manifest as a significant interaction 
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between gaze position and target position, with stronger cueing effects for the gazed-at position than 
for the other positions in the same hemifield. By contrast, nonspecific gaze cueing would yield equal 
facilitation for all positions in the cued hemifield (i.e., main effect of validity1, in the absence of a gaze 
position x target position interaction on the gaze-cu ing effects). If predictivity influenced the specifici-
ty of gaze cueing, the interaction among predictivity, gaze position, and target position should be sig-
nificant, with the interaction between gaze position and target position being significant only for pre-
dictive cues.  
 
Results 
 
Anticipations (defined as responses with latency < 100 ms, 1.29%), misses (defined as responses with 
latency > 1200 ms, 3.69%), and incorrect responses (1.49%) were excluded from analysis. Figure 2 
presents the cueing effects for predictive and nonpredictive trials as a function of gaze position and 
target position. Mean RTs and Standard Errors for valid and invalid trials are reported in the SI-section 
(see Table S1); and results of the ANOVA with the factors validity, gaze position, target position, and 
predictivity are summarized in Tables S2 and S3. The results of the ANOVA on the gaze-cueing effects 
are reported below. 
 The ANOVA of the cueing effects revealed the gaze-cu ing effects to be overall larger with 
predictive cues (∆RT = 61 ms) than with nonpredictive cues (∆RT = 11 ms) [predictivity: F(1,11)= 
44.716, p< .001, η2= .803]. Moreover, the spatial distribution of the gaze-cueing effects was dependent 
on the relation of the gazed position to the actual target position in the cued hemifield [gaze positin x 
target position: F(1,11)= 44.716, p< .001, η2= .803]. Importantly, however, the spatial distribut on of 
cueing effects differed significantly between predictive and nonpredictive cues [predictivity x gaze 
position x target position: F(4,44)= 15.265, p< .001, η2= .581]. All other effects were non-significant 
(all Fs < 2.543, all ps > .101). 
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Figure 2. Gaze-cueing effects as function of gaze and target posi ion for (A) high actual and instructed predictivity; for (B) 
low actual and instructed predictivity. Depicted error bars represent standard errors of the mean adjusted to the within-
participants design (Cousineau, 2005).  
 
To statistically test whether the spatially specific component manifested only with predictive, 
but not with nonpredictive, cues, the cueing effects were examined in follow-up ANOVAs with only 
the factors gaze position (top, center, bottom) and target position (top, center, bottom), conducted sepa-
rately for each of the predictivity conditions. With nonpredictive cues, the cueing effects were of com-
parable size for all target positions in the cued hmifield [gaze position x target position: F(4,44)= 
1.078, p= .379, η2= .088]; see Table S3 for the main effect of validity. By contrast, with predictive 
cues, the size of the gaze-cueing effect depended on the congruency of the gazed-at and the target posi-
tion [gaze position x target position: F(4,44)= 18.309, p< .001, η2= .625]. All other effects were non-
significant (all Fs < 1.973, all ps > .163). 
To examine the deployment of attention with respect to particular positions in the gaze-cued 
hemifield for the predictive condition, cueing effects were compared between the exact gazed-at posi-
tion and the other two locations (averaged together) in the cued hemifield; this comparison confirmed 
the gaze-cueing effects to be significantly larger for the exact cued position than for the other two loca-
tions (∆GCexact-other= 61 ms, t(11)= 6.111, p< .001, two-tailed).
2  
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 investigated whether attentional orienting is influenced by explicit information about the 
predictivity of gaze behavior. The results showed that for predictive cues, gaze cueing was significantly 
stronger for targets that appeared at the exact gazed- t position, relative to targets at one of the other 
two positions in the cued hemifield. Nonpredictive cues, by contrast, generated significant gaze-cueing 
effects (see Table S3) that were equally strong for all target positions within the cued hemifield.  
 The finding that predictivity influences both the size and spatial distribution of gaze-cueing ef-
fects raises an interesting question, namely: is the observed pattern mediated by instruction-induced 
expectations, or does it emerge as a result of acquired experience with cues of various degrees of pre-
dictivity? The results of Experiment 1 cannot answer this question, as the experienced (=actual) and 
believed (=instructed) predictivity were always congruent. In order to disentangle the effects of experi-
ence versus belief, instructed and actual predictivity must be varied orthogonally: With highly predic-
tive cues, participants would be told that the gaze cu  is nonpredictive; with nonpredictive cues, by 
contrast, participants would be told that the cue is highly predictive.  
 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, the effects of actual and believed predictivity were contrasted. Participants received 
either Instruction 1: they were told that the cue was highly predictive, when it actually was nonpredic-
tive (actual predictivity: 17%; instructed predictivity: 80%); or Instruction 2: they were told that the 
cue was nonpredictive, when it actually was highly predictive (actual predictivity: 80%, instructed pre-
dictivity: 17%). The order of instruction was counterbalanced across participants. In order to examine 
the influence of experienced vs. believed predictivity on gaze cues, we compared conditions with the 
same actual but different instructed predictivities between experiments in a mixed four-way ANOVA on 
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cueing effects with the within-participant factors gaze position (top, center, bottom), target position 
(top, center, bottom), and actual predictivity (high, low), and the between-participant factor experiment 
(Exp.1: experience congruent with instruction, Exp.2: experience incongruent with instruction).   
 
Method 
Methods in Experiment 2 were the same as in Experiment 1, with the only exception of congruency 
between actual and instructed predictivity (congruent in Experiment 1, incongruent in Experiment 2).  
 
Participants 
Twelve new volunteers (10 women; mean age: 25 years, r nge: 20–28 years; all right-handed, all with 
normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity; all having given written informed consent) participated in 
Experiment 2, either for course credit or payment (8€/h).  
 
Results and Discussion 
Anticipations (0.82 %), misses (0.09 %), and incorrect responses (3.86%) were excluded from analysis.  
Mean RTs and Standard Errors for valid and invalid trials are reported in the SI-section (see Table S4). 
ANOVA-effects of interest are reported below; complete results are summarized in Table S5.  
 The ANOVA of the cueing effects revealed the actual cue predictivity to influence the alloca-
tion of spatial attention induced by gaze cues (seeFigure 3): cues with high actual predictivity gave rise 
to larger cueing effects than nonpredictive cues [actual predictivity: F(1,22)= 64.975, p< .001, η2= 
.803]. Moreover, highly predictive cues generated cueing effects specific to the gazed-at position [actu-
al predictivity x gaze position x target position: F(4,88)= 15.130, p< .001, η2= .407], with significant 
differences between the exact cued versus the otherpositions: all ts> 2.295, ps< .031, two-tailed).  
 
Studies on individual research questions                                                                          89 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Gaze-cueing effects as function of gaze and target position for (A) high actual predictivity and low instructed 
predictivity; for (B) low actual predictivity and high instructed predictivity. Depicted error bars represent corrected 
standard errors of the mean adjusted to within-participants design (Cousineau, 2005).  
 
 
 Crucially, this pattern was modulated by believed predictivity [experiment x actual predictivity 
x gaze position x target position: F(4,88)= 5.419, p= .001, η2= .198], that is: the allocation of spatial 
attention in response to the experienced (i.e., actual) cue predictivity was top-down modulated by ex-
pectations based on the believed (i.e., instructed) cue predictivity – see Figure 4. 
 In subsequent analyses, the spatial specificity of gaze cueing and its modulation by instructed 
predictivity were analyzed for each actual predictiv ty condition separately. Nonpredictive cues gener-
ated spatially nonspecific cueing effects when participants believed that the cue was not predictive 
(Exp.1), whereas the same cues produced specific effe ts when participants believed the cues were pre-
dictive (Exp.2) [experiment x gaze position x target position: F(4,88)= 5.649, p< .001, η2= .204]. 
Planned comparisons revealed the cueing effects to be significantly larger for the exact gazed-at posi-
tion than for the other positions within the cued hemifield when participants were told that the cues are 
predictive (Exp.2, ∆GCcued-other= 17 ms), compared to being told that they are nonpredictive (Exp.1, 
∆GCcued-other= 3 ms); [t(21)= 3.478, p= .002, two-tailed]; see Figure 4A.
2 Similarly, believed predic-
tivity modulated the spatial specificity of gaze cueing for predictive cues [experiment x gaze position x 
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target position : F(4,88)= 2.583, p= .043, η2= .105]: the spatially specific component was signif cantly 
stronger for cues believed to be predictive (Exp.1, ∆GCcued-other= 61 ms) compared to cues believed to 
be nonpredictive (Exp.2, ∆GCcued-other= 32 ms), [t(21)= -2.216, p= .037, two-tailed]; see Figure 4B.
2 
Complete results are reported in Table S6. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Comparison between Experiments. Gaze-cueing effects as function of target position (exact gazed-at position 
vs. other positions in cued hemifield), believed predictivity (high: solid line, low: dashed line) and actual predictivity (high: 
left side, low: right side). Note that the bigger the difference (the steeper th  depicted line) between gaze-cueing effects for 
the exact and the other positions in the cued hemifi ld, the more specific the allocation of attention t  the gazed-at position. 
Depicted error bars represent corrected standard errors adjusted to within-subject designs (see Cousineau, 2005). 
 
  
2.2.4. General Discussion 
The goal of the present study was to investigate whther fundamental mechanisms of social cognition 
such as orienting of attention in response to gaze direction are influenced by context information about 
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the predictivity of gaze behavior. Information about predictivity was provided either explicitly by in-
struction, or could have been inferred from actual gaze behavior. Actual predictivity either did (Exp.1) 
or did not match instructed predictivity (Exp.2). When actual and instructed predictivity matched, spe-
cific cueing effects for the gazed-at location were xpected in the predictive condition; and cueing ef-
fects for the whole gazed-at hemifield were expected in the nonpredictive condition. When actual and 
instructed predictivity did not match, believed predictivity was presumed to modulate the spatial alloca-
tion of gaze-cueing effects evoked by actual predictivity.  
This pattern of results was predicated on Wiese et al. (in press), who showed that a general 
gaze-cueing effect for the whole gazed-at hemifield could be complemented by a cueing effect specific 
for the gazed-at position, though only in conditions i  which peripheral position placeholders were pre-
sented that could be referred to by the central gaze. This pattern led the authors to propose a two-
component model of gaze cueing, according to which spatially specific gaze-cueing effects are mediat-
ed by a context-dependent top-down component that is in egrated with a bottom-up component produc-
ing a general directional bias towards the gaze-cued hemifield. 
 The present findings provide further support for this view, however, with context referring not 
to external, visual information, but to the internal (instructed / experienced) reliability of the cue infor-
mation: with predictive cues, RT benefits were signif cantly larger for targets that appeared at the exact 
gazed-at position relative to targets at the other wo positions within the cued hemifield; nonpredictive 
cues, by contrast, gave rise to facilitation effects of equivalent magnitude for all positions within the 
cued hemifield. Importantly, the effects of experienc d predictivity were modulated by expected pre-
dictivity: that is, nonpredictive cues believed to be predictive caused cueing effects specific to the 
gazed-at position, compared to when nonpredictive cues were veridically instructed to be nonpredictive 
(Figure 4, left). In contrast, specific gaze-cueing effects caused by actually predictive cues were signif-
icantly reduced when the cue was believed to be nonpredictive (Figure 4, right).  
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Thus, the present results extend previous findings by howing that gaze-cueing effects may not 
only be up-, but also down-regulated depending on the context information that is provided about the 
predictivity of the cues: a specific cueing effect caused by actually predictive cues is reduced in its spa-
tial specificity when participants believe that thecue is nonpredictive; by the same token, spatially non-
specific gaze-cueing effects induced by actually nonpredictive cues yield increased spatial specificity 
when participants are told that the cue is predictive (Figures 2, 3, and 4). This is consistent with the
view that top-down modulation of the spatial distribut on of gaze cueing effects can be induced by var-
ious types of context information: visual information provided in the scene (e.g., placeholders) or pure-
ly verbal information (provided by instruction) about observed behavior. 
 The observation that explicit knowledge about who we are interacting with does influence basic 
attentional processes involved in social interactions is consistent with Frith and Frith (2006) and Teufel 
et al. (2010), who have suggested that bottom-up orienting to gaze direction can be top-down con-
trolled by contextual information about the gazer. Our results are also in line with empirical evidenc 
showing that background information based on familiarity with the gazer (gender effect for women 
only: Deaner et al., 2007) or stereotypical information about the gazer (member of a political party: 
Liuzza et al., 2011) modulate the size of gaze-cueing ffects. Only Bayliss and Tipper (2006) reported 
findings that might be interpreted as being at variance with the present results: they did not observe a 
modulation of gaze-cueing effects by cue predictivity. In their paradigm, different faces (randomized 
across trials) indicated the target location with different validities, and the association of facial identity 
with cue predictivity had to be learned over the course of the experiment.3 The lack of a predictivity-
related modulation of gaze cueing in their study might have been due to the fact that information about 
the predictivity of gaze behavior was coupled with facial identity. Critically, Hoffman and Haxby 
(2000) have shown that the interpretation of gaze dir ction and facial identity are subserved by differ-
ent neural networks and that these components are integrated only at later stages of information pro-
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cessing. Given that spatial cueing produces relativly fast-acting effects on attentional orienting, it is 
likely that cueing studies fail to disclose effects of slower-acting facial identity information on the re-
sponse to gaze cues.   
 In summary, our findings show that early operations f spatial attention are highly penetrable by 
cognitive processes related to social context. The involvement of a context-modulated mechanism in 
gaze cueing is very plausible, as gaze-triggered mechanisms of attention are specifically sensitive to the 
social relevance of the environment within which they operate: the bottom-up component assures a 
general preparedness for social signals conveyed by other people, while the top-down mechanism al-
lows a flexible adaptation to the social context of a scene. The present findings reveal that in integra -
ing context information within social attention mechanisms, humans tend to incorporate what they are 
told about others into their own experience and observation. 
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Footnotes 
1. Note that we also ran an ANOVA on mean RTs with the factors validity (valid, invalid), gaze 
position (top, center, bottom), target position (top, center, bottom), and predictivity (low, high), 
in order to examine whether the basic cueing effects were significant. Mean RTs, standard er-
rors, and ANOVA results are reported in Tables S1 and S2 in the Supplementary Materials sec-
tions. Results of post-hoc ANOVAs on RTs with the factors validity (valid, invalid), gaze posi-
tion (top, center, bottom), target position (top, center, bottom) for each predictivity separately 
are reported in Table S3. 
2. All t-tests were Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons. 
3. In our paradigm, facial identity was not varied throughout the experiment (the same schematic 
face was used in all conditions) and cue predictivity was blocked. Further, participants were 
provided with explicit information about the observd gaze behavior via instruction. Our results 
indicate that although knowledge acquired through experience with given gaze behavior influ-
ences the interpretation of social scenes, explicit knowledge is essential to modulate early atten-
tional processes involved in gaze cueing.  
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2.2.6. Supplementary Materials 
 
Table S1. Mean Response Times and Standard Errors (in ms) for actual and instructed predictivity high vs. low (Exp. 1). 
 
  actual and instructed predictivity high  actual and instructed predictivity low 
  Gaze top  Gaze central Gaze bottom  Gaze top Gaze central Gaze bottom 
         
Target top valid 279 (10) 339 (24) 378 (16)  327 (13) 328 (14) 335 (13) 
 invalid 381 (10) 378 (21) 398 (10)  333 (12) 341 (12) 341 (12) 
Target central valid 306 (11) 261 (15) 320 (13)  310 ( 2) 304 (10) 312 (12) 
 invalid 378 (12) 354 (17) 365 (16)  318 (11) 319 (0) 323 (11) 
Target bottom valid 355 (12) 325 (24) 273 (10)  324 (12) 323 (12) 314 (13) 
 invalid 368 (19) 380 (21) 382 (10)  333 (12) 333 (12) 328 (12) 
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Table S2. F-and p-values for the four-way ANOVA on RTs with the factors: validity, gaze position, target position and 
predictivity (actual and instructed predictivity congruent, Exp.1). 
 
    F-value p-value effect size  η2 
      
validity    F(1,11)= 109.437 p< .001 η2= .909 
target position    F(2,22)= 49.954 p< .001 η2= .820 
gaze position    F(2,22)= 1.090 p= .354 η2= .090 
predictivity    F(1,11)= 1.057 p= .326 η2= .088 
validity x target position    F(2,22)= 2.543 p= .101 η2= .188 
validity x gaze position    F(2,22)=  .526 p= .598 η2= .046 
validity x predictivity    F(1,11)= 44.716 p< .001 η2= .803 
gaze position x target position    F(4,44)= 14.766 p< .001 η2= .573 
gaze position x predictivity    F(2,22)=  .778  p= .472 η2= .066 
target position x predictivity    F(2,22)= 1.247 p= .307 η2= .102 
validity x gaze pos x target pos    F(4,44)= 18.716 p< .001 η2= .630 
validity x gaze pos x predictivity    F(2,22)=  .647 p= .533 η2= .056 
validity x target pos x predictivity    F(2,22)= 1.268 p= .301 η2= .103 
gaze pos x target pos x predictivity    F(4,44)= 8.560 p< .001 η2= .438 
validity x gaze pos x target pos x predictivity    F(4,44)= 15.265 p< .001 η2= .581 
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Table S3. F-values and p-values for the post-hoc ANOVAs on RTs with the factors: validity, gaze position, and target 
position for each actual predictivity condition separately (Exp.1). 
  actual and instructed predictivity high  actual and instructed predictivity low 
  F-value p-value effect size  η2  F-value p-value effect size  η2 
  
       
validity  F(1,11)= 79.447 p< .001 η2= .878  F(1,11)= 19.413 p= .001 η2= .638 
target position   F(2,22)= 20.016 p< .001 η2= .645  F(2,22)= 32.301 p< .001 η2= .746 
gaze position   F(2,22)=  .948 p= .403 η2= .079  F(2,22)=  .518 p= .603 η2= .045 
 
 
   
 
   
validity x target position  F(2,22)=  1.973 p= .163 η2= .152  F(2,22)= 1.126 p= .342 η2= .093 
validity x gaze position  F(2,22)=  .346 p= .711 η2= .031  F(2,22)= 1.864 p= .179 η2= .145 
target position x gaze position  F(4,44)= 12.276 p< .001 η2= .527  F(4,44)= 5.470 p= .001 η2= .332 
 
 
   
 
   
validity x gaze pos x target pos  F(4,44)= 18.309 p< .001 η2= .625  F(4,44)= 1.078 p= .379 η2= .089 
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Table S4. Mean Response Times and Standard Errors (in ms) for actual predictivity low/believed predictivity high vs. 
actual predictivity high/believed predictivity low (Exp. 2).aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
a 
  actual pred. low/ believed pred. high  actual pred. high/ believed pred. low 
  Gaze top  Gaze central Gaze bottom  Gaze top Gaze central Gaze bottom 
         
Target top valid 280 (13) 321 (20) 338 (19)  315 (14) 330 (14) 339 (13) 
 invalid 358 (11) 361 (13) 381 (15)  345 (12) 347 (13) 345 (12) 
Target central valid 292 (15) 275 (12) 301 (18)  311 ( 3) 306 (14) 312 (11) 
 invalid 357 (12) 358 (10) 363 (11)  333 (13) 331 (10) 333 (10) 
Target bottom valid 337 (22) 312 (19) 273 (13)  337 (13) 332 (14) 309 (12) 
 invalid 360 (12) 361 (11) 349 (10)  342 (12) 340 (11) 342 (10) 
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Table S5. F-values and p-values for the four-way ANOVA on gaze-cueing effects with the factors: gaze position, target 
position, actual predictivity and experiment (instructed predictivity, Exp. 2). 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa 
   F-value p-value effect size  η2 
      
actual predictivity   F(1,22)= 64.975 p< .001 η2= .747 
target position    F(2,44)= 7.581 p= .001 η2= .256 
gaze position    F(2,44)=  .092 p= .913 η2= .004 
experiment    F(1,22)=  .222 p= .642 η2= .010 
 
  
  
 
actual pred x experiment   F(1,22)= 1.146 p= .296 η2= .049 
actual pred x gaze position    F(2,44)=  .047 p= .954 η2= .002 
actual pred x target position   F(2,44)= 3.715 p= .032 η2= .144 
experiment x gaze position    F(2,44)=  .612 p= .547 η2= .027 
experiment x target position   F(2,44)= 1.278  p= .289 η2= .055 
gaze position x target position   F(4,88)= 29.955 p< .001 η2= .577 
 
  
  
 
actual pred x gaze pos x target pos    F(4,88)= 15.130 p< .001 η2= .407 
experiment x gaze pos x target pos    F(4,88)=  .634 p= .639 η2= .028 
actual pred x experiment x gaze pos   F(2,44)=  .766 p= .471 η2= .034 
actual pred x experiment x target pos    F(2,44)=  .097 p= .908 η2= .004 
 
  
  
 
actual pred x experiment x target pos x gaze pos     F(4,88)= 5.419 p= .001 η2= .198 
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Table S6. F-values and p-values for the post-hoc ANOVAs on gaze-cueing effects with the factors: gaze position, target 
position, and experiment (instructed predictivity) for each actual predictivity condition separately (Exp.2). 
 
  actual predictivity high  actual predictivity low 
  F-value p-value effect size  η2  F-value p-value effect size  η2 
         
experiment  F(1,22)=  .080 p= .780 η2= .004  F(1,22)= 7.051 p= .014 η2= .243 
target position   F(2,44)= 6.291 p= .004 η2= .222  F(2,44)= 2.968 p= .062 η2= .119 
gaze position   F(2,44)=  .024 p= .976 η2= .001  F(2,44)=  .401 p= .672 η2= .018 
 
 
   
 
   
experiment x target position  F(2,44)=  .595 p= .556 η2= .026  F(2,44)= 2.153 p= .128 η2= .089 
experiment x gaze position  F(2,44)=  .469 p= .629 η2= .021  F(2,44)= 2.152 p= .128 η2= .089 
target position x gaze position  F(4,88)= 24.200 p< .001 η2= .524  F(4,88)= 11.728 p< .001 η2= .348 
 
 
   
 
   
experiment x gaze pos x target pos  F(4,88)= 2.583 p= .043 η2= .105  F(4,88)= 5.649 p< .001 η2= .204 
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2.3.1. Abstract 
The ability to understand and predict others’ behavior is essential for successful interactions. When 
making predictions about what other humans will do, we treat them as intentional systems and adopt 
the intentional stance, i.e., refer to their mental states such as desires and intentions. In the present ex-
periments we investigated whether the m re belief that the observed agent is an intentional system in-
fluences basic social attention mechanisms. We present d pictures of a human and a robot face in a 
gaze cueing paradigm, and manipulated the likelihood f adopting the intentional stance by instruction: 
in some conditions, participants were told that they w re observing a human or a robot, in others, that 
they were observing a human-like mannequin or a robot whose eyes were controlled by a human. In 
conditions in which participants were made to believe they were observing human behavior (ntention-
al stance likely) gaze cueing effects were significantly larger as compared to conditions when adopting 
the intentional stance was less likely. This effect was independent of whether a human or a robot face 
was presented. Therefore, we conclude that adopting the intentional stance when observing others’ be-
havior fundamentally influences basic mechanisms of social attention. The present results provide 
striking evidence that high-level cognitive processes, such as beliefs, modulate bottom-up mechanisms 
of attentional selection in a top-down manner. 
 
Keywords 
Gaze Cueing, Intentional Stance, Social Attention, Theory of Mind, Human-Robot-Interaction 
 
2.3.2. Introduction 
Can we design machines that think? This old question has not yet been settled, despite the progress in 
the fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive science. For us humans, however, equally important 
questions are: would we be inclined to treat thinking artificial systems equally to other humans, and 
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would we be ready to engage in social interactions with non-human agents that have minds? Alan Tu-
ring postulated that observed behavior is the only source of information based on which we ascribe 
minds to others (Turing, 1950). Accordingly, for us to engage in social interactions, it would be critical 
that we perceive other agents as thinking, whether or not they actually have a mind. 
 In this paper, we ask a fundamental question, namely: would the mere belief that an agent has a 
mind be sufficient to engage in interactions with him/ er in a social way, compared to if he/she was 
believed to be just a machine. The belief that an agent has a mind might lead us to adopt the int ntional 
stance (Dennett, 2003) towards him/her, which involves “treating the object whose behavior you want 
to predict as a rational gent with beliefs and desires and other mental states” (Dennett, 2003, p. 372). 
Dennett argues that the intentional stance is the best predictive strategy, given that the system whose 
behavior we want to predict is truly intentional. Throughout our lifelong experience with other humans, 
we have learned that humans are truly intentional systems in this sense – and, therefore, adopting the 
intentional stance towards human agents should be more successful in predicting their behavior as 
compared to adopting other strategies (e.g., the design or the physical stance).  
 Importantly, adopting the intentional stance towards other agents might not only be a successful 
predictive strategy, but also play a decisive role f r one’s own readiness to engage in social interac-
tions. For instance, if I believe that you are pointing to a location with the intention of showing me 
something, I will be likely to direct my attention there; but I will be unlikely to attend to where a lever 
of a broken machine is pointing, as I will not interpret the lever’s behavior as conveying communica-
tive content (Grice, 1975; Tomasello, 2010). The prsent study was designed to investigate the funda-
mental issue of whether a belief concerning the minds of others has an impact on basic mechanisms 
underlying social cognition.  
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Understanding others’ behavior in social interactions   
On the neuronal level, interpreting others’ intentio s is supported by a system consisting of medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC), superior temporal sulcus (STS), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), amygdala and an-
terior insula (Adolphs, 1999; Brothers, 1990; Frith & Frith, 2006). Furthermore, activation in the ante-
rior paracingulate cortex has been reported to be related specifically to the adoption of the intentional 
stance (Gallagher, Jack, Roepstorff & Frith, 2002). At the cognitive level of description, Baron-Cohen 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995) has postulated that higher-level processes of mental-state attribution (Theory of 
Mind, ToM) are informed by low-level perceptual mechanisms: the Intentionality Detector (ID) and the 
Eye-Direction Detector (EDD). 
 Although the interpretation of social scenes involves low-level perceptual processes, it is un-
likely that information is fed forward uni-directionally to higher-level processes of mental-state attribu-
tion, as everyday interactions require mechanisms that modulate perceptual information according to its 
social relevance. For these reasons, Teufel et al. (Teufel, Alexis, Todd, Lawrence-Owen, Clayton et al.,
2009; Teufel, Fletcher & Davis, 2010a; Teufel, Alexis, Clayton & Davis, 2010b) proposed that low-
level processes not only inform higher-level processes but are themselves modulated by the latter, that 
is: specifying particular mental states requires the integration of bottom-up information provided by the 
stimulus and top-down information reflecting various context variables. In support of this view, Teufel 
and colleagues (2009) reported that adaptation to gaze direction depended on whether participants be-
lieved that the observed person could actually or could not see through a pair of goggles.  
 
Reading out others’ mental states based on gaze direction  
Gaze direction provides the basis for making inferences about the other’s focus of interest, and encour-
ages the observer to shift attention to the corresponding location (for review: Frischen, Bayliss & Tip-
per, 2007). Attention shifts triggered by gaze direct on are typically investigated using a gaze-cueing 
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paradigm (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998), in which a schematic face is presented centrally on the screen 
that gazes either straight ahead or to the left or right. Targets appearing in the gaze-cued hemifield are 
detected, localized, and discriminated more rapidly compared to targets in the uncued hemifield. 
 Orienting attention in response to perceived gaze direction has traditionally been regarded as a 
reflexive, bottom-up process involved in making inferences about the other’s mental states (Num-
menmaa & Calder, 2009). In line with this view, children as young as three months have been found to 
attend more quickly to peripheral objects that are gazed at by a human face compared to objects not 
directly gazed at (Hood, Willen & Driver, 1998). More ver, adult participants have been found to re-
flexively orient attention in the direction of another’s gaze even when gaze cues are counterpredictive 
of the target location (Driver, Davis, Ricciardelli, Kidd, Maxwell et al., 1999), whereas they voluntarily 
orient away from counterpredictive arrows (Friesen, Ristic & Kingstone, 2004) or extended tongues 
(Downing, Dodds & Bray, 2004). 
 However, although gaze-cueing has been shown to berigg red in a bottom-up fashion, a grow-
ing body of evidence suggests that attending to where others gaze is not purely reflexive, but can rather 
be modulated by higher-level cognitive processes. For instance, Ristic and Kingstone (2005) presented 
participants with an ambiguous stimulus that could be perceived as either a car with wheels or a face 
with a hat, and manipulated their beliefs by instruction; the stimulus was found to cue participants’ 
attention only when they believed that they were looking at a face, rather than at a car. Similarly, Ka-
wai (2011) found that schematic faces caused gaze-cueing effects only when participants believed that 
a potential target was visible to the gazer, but not when it was occluded.  
 
Aim of study 
The present study was designed to address a more fundamental issue, namely, whether adopting the 
intentional stance based on a mere belief concerning the observed agent would affect basic mechanisms 
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of social attention. In classical studies examining the processes involved in inferring others’ mental 
states (Leslie & Frith, 1988; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), participants are typically observing intentional 
agents and asked to provide a description of the agents’ behavior making use of mentalistic vocabulary. 
Similarly, in the studies of Teufel and colleagues (2009, 2010a, 2010b), participants have always been 
observing intentional agents exhibiting particular mental states (such as being either able or unable to 
see through a pair of goggles). However, inferring particular mental states from observed behavior 
presupposes that the agent is construed as an intentio al system that is capable of having intentions. 
Given this, based on the previous studies on that topic, one cannot decide whether basic mechanisms of 
social perception and attention were influenced by adopting the intentional stance p r se, rather than by 
processes of reasoning about particular mental states of others. For resolving this fundamental issue, it 
is important to examine whether the likelihood of adopting the intentional stance per se (i.e., assuming 
that the observed agent has mental states) has an effect on one’s own social cognition. 
 Thus, critically, we distinguish between processes of mentalizing about others’ internal states 
and adopting the intentional stance. The former involves an active process of reasoning about mental 
states that underlie particular behavior, whereas the latter is, fundamentally, a result of activating a set 
of pre-existing representations of what it means to be “a human”, which contains – amongst others – 
properties like having a mind or being capable of having intentions. By contrast, a representation of a 
mechanistic device (such as a robot) is probably devoi  of mind-related characteristics. Thus, when 
predicting and/or explaining behavior of observed systems, humans either adopt the intentional stance 
or use other predictive strategies (such as the design or physical stances), dependent on the activated 
representations. In sum, adopting the intentional stance is based on a decision as to whether or not an 
observed agent is capable of having intentions; mentalizing, by contrast, is concerned with reasoning 
about what specific intentions are underlying behavior displayed by an agent that has already been 
classified as having a mind.   
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2.3.3. Experiments 
In three experiments, we investigated whether social attention is modulated by the likelihood of adopt-
ing the intentional stance. To this end, we used two different types of gazers to orient participants’ at-
tention in a gaze-cueing paradigm: either a human face or a robot face (see Figure 1A). The likelihood 
of adopting the intentional stance was manipulated by instruction rather than by the appearance of the 
gazer (see Gallagher et al., 2002). In Experiment 1, participants were instructed (Instruction 1) that 
they would observe either a human (i tentional stance likely) or a robot (intentional stance unlikely). In 
Experiment 2, Instruction 2 informed participants that they were observing a human or a robot whose 
gaze behavior was controlled by a human (intentional stance likely in both cases), while in Instruction 
3 participants were told they would be observing a human-like mannequin or a robot (intentional 
stance unlikely in either case). In both experiments, participants had to perform a target discrimination 
task. To ensure that variations of gaze-cueing effects could not be attributed to physical differences 
between stimuli, the same stimuli were used for all experimental groups. On the intentional-stance hy-
pothesis, we expected to find stronger gaze-cueing ffects for stimuli representing intentional agents 
(Experiment. 1: human; Experiment 2, Instruction 2: human and robot) relative to stimuli representing 
agents who were less likely to be treated as intentional systems (Experiment 1: robot; Experiment 2, 
Instruction 3: human and robot). Please note that our paradigm did not involve actual social interaction. 
That is, participants observed photographs representing either intentional or non-intentional agents. 
Yet, we believe that it is still possible to adopt the intentional stance towards virtual humans. For ex-
ample, when one watches a movie, one predicts behavior of characters depicted in that movie by adopt-
ing the intentional stance, even though one is not actually interacting with the characters. At the same 
time one might not adopt the intentional stance to a virtual robot due to pre-existing representations f 
what a robot is. 
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 Experiment 3 examined whether the effects in question are generalizable to tasks with different 
attentional demands. The pattern of results revealed in Experiments 1 and 2 was replicated in Experi-
ment 3 (localization task), which is reported in the supporting information (SI) section. Please see also 
Figure S1 and Table S1. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
24 participants participated in Experiment 1 (15 women; mean age: 25 years (M=25.25, range: 19-32), 
two left-handed). In Experiment 2, 48 participants were randomly assigned to two groups with differ-
ent instructions: Instruction 2 (human – human controlled robot): 16 women; mean age: 23 years (M= 
23.17, range: 18-30) and Instruction 3 (human-like mannequin, robot): 18 women; mean age:23 years 
(M=22.58, range: 18-30). Participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity. Testing 
time was about 40 minutes. One participant had to be excluded from Experiment 1 because of signifi-
cantly increased error rates compared to other participants (M=16.7% compared to M=4.7%); one par-
ticipant was excluded from Experiment 2 (Instruction 2) because the participant did not complete the 
experiment.  
 
Ethics Statement 
The experiments were conducted at the Department of Experimental Psychology at the LMU Munich, 
where all experimental procedures with purely behavior l data collection (e.g., RTs and error rates) of 
healthy adult participants, that do not include invasi e or potentially dangerous methods are approved 
by the ethics committee of the Department of Psychology, LMU Munich, in accordance with the Code 
of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data were stored and analyzed 
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anonymously. Participants gave their informed consent and were either paid or received course credit 
for participating.  
 
Apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 17-in. Graphics Series G90fB monitor with the refresh rate set at 85 Hz. 
RT measures were based on standard keyboard respons. Participants were seated approximately 57 
cm from the monitor, and the experimenter ensured that participants were centered with respect to the 
monitor. The experiment was controlled by Experiment Builder (SR Research Ltd., Ontario, Canada). 
 
Stimuli 
In the human condition, digitized photos of a female f ce (F 07) were used as stimuli, chosen from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database (Lundqvist, Flykt & Öhman, 1998). We have received 
written informed consent (as outlined in the PloS cnsent form) from Karolinska Institute (Department 
of Clinical Neuroscience, Section Psychology) to use the photograph (F 07) for experimental investiga-
tion and illustration of the stimuli in publications. In the robot condition, photos of a humanoid robot 
(EDDIE; developed by TU Munich) were used. Stimuli were 6.4° wide and 10.0° high, depicted on a 
white background and presented in full frontal orientation with eyes positioned on the central horizon-
tal axis of the screen (Figure 1A). For left- and rightward gaze, irises and pupils in the eyes were shift-
ed with PhotoshopTM
  
and deviated 0.4° from direct gaze. The target stimulus was a black capital letter 
(F or T), measuring 0.8° in width and 1.3° in height. Targets appeared on the horizontal axis, located 
6.0° from the center of the screen. 
 
Procedure 
Figure 1B illustrates the sequence of events in the present experiments. The beginning of every trial 
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was signaled by a fixation cross at the center of the screen. 1000 ms later, a face with straight gazeap-
peared on the screen while the fixation cross remained n its position. After a random time interval of 
700 to 1000 ms, gaze either remained straight or was shifted left- or rightwards. Following the gaze cue 
with a SOA of 500 ms, the target letter appeared either on the left or the right side of the screen. SOA 
was measured as the interval between the onset of the gaze shift to the onset of the target. Face and 
target remained on the screen until a response was given or after 1200 ms had elapsed. The inter-trial
interval (ITI) was 680 ms. 
 
 
Figure 1. Stimuli and trial sequence: Pictures for the Robot and Human Gazer are shown in (A). The sequence of events 
within a trial is shown in (B). The human face (F 07) is taken from the Karolinska Directed Emotional F ces (KDEF) 
database (Lundqvist et al., 1998). We have received written informed consent (as outlined in the PLoS c nsent form) from 
Karolinska Institute (Department of Clinical Neuroscience, Section Psychology) to use the photograph for experimental 
investigations and illustration of the stimuli in publications. The picture of the robot face is made by LSR (TU Munich) and 
depicts the research robot EDDIE (made by LSR, TU Munich). 
 
 At the beginning of each session, participants were told to fix their gaze on a centrally presented 
cross. They were also instructed that after the fixation cross a photo of either a human or a robot would 
appear in the center of the screen but that they should still keep their eyes fixated on the fixation cross. 
Further, participants were advised that after its initial presentation the face gaze could remain straight 
or shifted left- or rightwards, subsequently followed by a target letter. Participants were asked to re-
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spond to target identity as quickly and as accurately as possible. For half of the participants F was as-
signed to the “D” key and T to the “K” key on the kyboard, for the other half of the participants stimu-
lus-response mapping was reversed. The key labels were covered with a sticker to prevent letter inter-
ference effects. All instructions were given in written form and the experimenter was not informed 
about the purposes of this experiment. 
 Each session of the experiment was composed of 500 trials, with a block of 20 practice trials 
preceding 10 experimental blocks of 48 trials each. Gaze direction (straight, left, right), target side (left, 
right), target identity (F, T) and cue identity (human, robot) were selected pseudo-randomly and every 
combination appeared with equal frequency. Gaze direction was manipulated orthogonal to target posi-
tion: that is, in one third of the trials, gaze was directed to the side on which the target appeared (valid), 
in another third of the trials to the other side (invalid) and in another third of the trials, the face was 
gazing straight ahead (neutral).  
 
Analysis 
Gaze-cueing effects were examined by comparing valid vs. invalid trials, i.e., in terms of costs-plus-
benefits (invalid-valid) rather than benefits (neutral-valid) and costs (invalid-neutral) with respect to he 
neutral condition. This was done because the latter condition may not provide an adequate baseline 
measure for the separate assessment of cueing effects (Jonides & Mack, 1984). In fact, in all conditions 
of the present study, neutral trials were found to elicit longer RTs than valid and invalid trials – for two 
likely reasons: (i) straight-ahead gaze might have a holding effect on attention (George & Conty, 2008), 
making it difficult for the target onset to disengage attention and summon an orienting response (in line 
with Senju & Hasegawa, 2011); (ii) with straight-ahe d gaze being maintained in the neutral condition, 
there was no similar temporal warning-signal effect to that induced by the gaze shift in valid and inva-
lid conditions. In this regard, gaze cueing paradigms with naturalistic faces differ from those with 
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schematic faces (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998): in the latt r, trials typically start with face-like stimuli in 
which the eyes contain no pupils; pupils appear only later, so that also straight-ahead gaze involves a 
visual change that can serve as a temporal warning sig al. This is not done with naturalistic faces (Bay-
liss & Tipper, 2006), as empty eyes without pupils are thought to be emotionally disturbing, potentially 
interfering with attentional orienting. 
 
Results 
Experiment 1 
Missed (0.69%), and incorrect responses (3.69%), as well as RTs deviating by more than ±2.5 SD from 
individual participants’ means were removed prior to analyses. The statistical analyses focused on the 
conditions of interest: mean RTs on valid versus invalid trials as a function of cue type (human vs. ro-
bot). Results of statistical analyses for all trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are presented in Table 1, 
along with Mean RTs and Standard Errors. Figure 2 depicts the corresponding gaze-cueing effects 
(∆RTinvalid-valid) for both types of cue; for the results of Experiment 1, see the top row in Table 1 and the 
left-hand side of Figure 2.  
 
Table 1. Mean RTs and SEM (in ms) as a function of cue validity and instruction, for human and robot cues. 
     Human    Robot   Statistics 
  Valid  Invalid Neutral  Valid Invalid Neutral  Cue type x Validity 
           
   Instruction 1  447 (10) 461 (11) 479 (10)  451 (11) 456 (12) 481 (11)  F(2,44)= 3.7, p< .05 
   Instruction 2  454 (12) 469 (13) 482 (12)  453 (12) 467 (12) 484 (12)  F(2,44)= 0.1, p> 0.8 
   Instruction 3  451 (11) 455 (12) 474 (12)  450 (11) 454 (11) 
 
477 (13)  F(2,46)= 0.4, p> 0.6 
  
 A two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) of mean RTs with the factors cue 
validity (valid, invalid) and cue-type (human, robot) revealed the main effect of validity [F(1,22)= 
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22.131, p< .001, ηp
2= .501] to be significant: valid trials yielded faster responses than invalid trials 
(449 ms vs. 458 ms). Importantly, the interaction between validity and cue-type was significant 
[F(1,22)= 14.113, p< .002, ηp
2=.391]: under Instruction 1, gaze-cueing effects were twice as strong for 
the human (∆RT= 14 ms, [t(22)= -5.954, p< .001]) as for the robot (∆RT= 5 ms, [t(22)= -2.211, p<.04]), 
though reliable in both conditions. The main effect of cue-type (454 ms for the human vs. 453 ms for 
the robot) was not significant [F(1,22)= .017 p> .8, ηp
2= .001]. 
 
Figure 2. Size of gaze-cueing effects as function of Cue Type and Instruction. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean adjusted to within-subject designs (see Cousineau, 2005). * p < .05, ** p< .01.  
 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to further investigate the influence of adopting the intentional stance on 
gaze-cueing, independently of the physical characteistics of the stimuli. To realize this, stimuli were 
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kept the same across conditions, while instruction was manipulated: Instruction 2 – human versus ro-
bot controlled by human (intentional stance likely) and Instruction 3 – human-like mannequin versus 
robot (intentional stance unlikely). The setup was comparable to Experiment 1, with one exception: in 
order to investigate the temporal dynamics of attentional orienting in response to gaze cues, the stimu-
lus onset asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target presentation was varied: SOA was either short 
(250 ms) or long (600 ms).  
Missed (0.44%) and incorrect responses (4.20%) as well as outliers (±2.5 SD from individual 
participants’ means) were excluded from analysis. For the results of Experiment 2, see the middle (In-
struction 2) and bottom (Instruction 3) rows in Table 1 and the middle (Instruction 2) and right-hand 
sides (Instruction 3) of Figure 2. Mean RTs were examined in a mixed-design ANOVA with the be-
tween-subject factor instruction (Instruction 2, Instruction 3) and the within-subjects factors SOA (250 
ms, 600 ms), validity (valid, invalid), and cue-type (human, robot). Results of statistical analyses for all 
trial types (neutral, valid, invalid) are summarized in Table 1. As SOA did not interact with any effects 
of interest, all Fs < 1.3, ps > .2, data were collapsed over this factor. 
 Again, there was a main effect of validity [F(1,45)= 33.790, p< .001, ηp
2 = .429], with shorter 
RTs for valid relative to invalid trials (452 ms vs. 461 ms), and no main effect of cue type (457 ms for 
the human vs. 456 ms for the robot, [F(1,45)= .641, p> .4, ηp
2 = .014]). Most importantly, the interac-
tion between validity and instruction was significant [F(1,45)= 11.087, p< .003, ηp
2 = .02]: gaze-cueing 
effects were larger when adopting the intentional stance was likely (∆RT =14 ms for the human and ∆RT 
=15 ms for the robot) compared to when this was unlikely (∆RT = 4 ms for the human and for the ro-
bot). Note that this effect was independent of cue-typ , as evidenced by a non-significant interaction 
between instruction, validity, and cue-type [F(1,45)= .012, p> .9, ηp
2< .001]. No other effect reached 
significance [F< .02, p> .8].  
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Comparisons across Experiments 
To compare gaze-cueing effects among all three instructions and cue-types, post-hoc t-tests (Bonferro-
ni-corrected for multiple comparisons) were conducted. Comparisons confirmed that the size of the 
gaze-cueing effect was not influenced by the cue-typ  as such (human vs. robot), but only by the likeli-
hood of adopting the intentional stance towards the cu  provider. In more detail, gaze-cueing effects 
did not differ between human and robot in conditions in which participants believed they observed ei-
ther human behavior (Experiment 1, human: ∆RT =14 ms, vs. Experiment 2, Instruction 2,robot: ∆RT 
=15 ms; [t(44)= -.094, p> .9]) or non-human behavior (Experiment 1, robot:  ∆RT = 5 ms, vs. Experi-
ment 2, Instruction 3, human:  ∆RT = 4 ms; [t(45)= .328, p> .7]). But the same cue-type elicited cueing 
effects of different sizes depending on whether or not the intentional stance was likely to be adopted 
towards the cue provider (Experiment 1, human:  ∆RT = 14 ms, vs. Experiment 2, Instruction 3, hu-
man: ∆RT = 4 ms [t(45)= 2.727, p< .01]; Experiment 2, Instruction 2, robot:  ∆RT = 15 ms, vs. Experi-
ment 1, robot: ∆RT = 5 ms; [t(44)= 2.644, p< .02]).  
 
2.3.4. General Discussion 
The present study investigated whether the mere belief that the observed stimulus is representing an 
agent with a mind influences basic social attention mechanisms, as measured by gaze-cueing effects. 
Rather than solely manipulating perceptual aspects of the cue provider (Admoni, Bank, Tan, Toneva & 
Scassellati, 2011; Bayliss & Tipper, 2006; Quadflieg, Mason & Macrae, 2004), we varied participants’ 
beliefs about the gazer through instruction (while ke ping the stimuli constant). We hypothesized that
gaze-cueing would be increased when adopting the intent onal stance was likely, whatever the identity 
of the gazer. 
 Our findings clearly support this hypothesis: while both human and robot induced attention 
shifts to gazed-at positions, cueing effects were twice as large when adopting the intentional stance 
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towards the gazer was likely, as compared to when tis was unlikely. In particular, gaze-cueing effects 
were significantly smaller for the robot than for the human when no explicit instruction was provided. 
Importantly, however, the same stimuli elicited gaze-cueing effects to varying degrees when different 
beliefs were induced: the human face condition yielded reduced cueing effects (comparable to the robot 
condition) when it was believed to represent a mannequin, while the robot face elicited enhanced cue-
ing effects (comparable to the human condition) when it was believed to be controlled by a human. The 
results of Experiment 3 show that this pattern is robust, generalizing to other tasks with very different 
attentional demands, such as target localization (Psner & Cohen, 1984). 
 This pattern of results shows that basic social attention mechanisms are modulated by the ob-
servers’ beliefs, induced solely by instruction, about whether or not the cue provider represents an in-
tentional system. That is, social attention mechanisms are modulated fundamentally by the observer 
adopting the intentional stance towards others, rathe  than simply by attributing particular mental states 
(Kawai, 2011; Teufel et al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b). 
 
Reflexive behavior under the control of beliefs 
The present results provide evidence that attentional rienting in response to gaze direction is not pure-
ly reflexive, but prone to top-down modulation induced by higher-level cognitive processes. That is, 
gaze direction triggers social attention mechanisms based on a combination of two components: a bot-
tom-up component that reflexively directs attention t  where others are looking, and a top-down com-
ponent that incorporates social context information relating to the observed scene into attentional guid-
ance. In the present study, the bottom-up component produced a weak attentional bias towards stimuli 
at the gazed-at location, whether or not participants construed the cue provider as an intentional agent 
(in line with: Admoni et al., 2011; Quadflieg et al., 2004). The top-down component came into play in 
conditions in which adopting the intentional stance towards the cue provider was likely. Thus, atten-
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tional mechanisms involved in low-level processes of social perception not only influence, but are 
themselves influenced by beliefs humans hold about s cial stimuli they observe (in line with: Teufel et 
al., 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Interactions between lower- and higher-level processes are also supported by 
neuroimaging evidence: while the STS appears to trigge  bottom-up responses to social signals, top-
down control of these responses is thought to originate from the mPFC, adapting the system to the so-
cial context of the scene (Grezes, Frith & Passingham, 2004a, 2004b; Saxe & Wexler, 2005). 
 In this context, it is important to distinguish betw en i) reflexive vs. top-down modulated shifts 
of attention on the side of the observer; and ii) reflexive vs. intentional shifts of gaze on the side of the 
gazer. As discussed, the present data show that attentional shifts on the side of the observer are due to a 
reflexive mechanism that can be modulated by top-down component. At the same time, one needs to 
note that the gaze shifts on the side of the gazer can also be either reflexive (due to attentional orienting 
to a salient event in the periphery) or intentional, i.e., carrying social communicative content (the gazer 
shifts his/her gaze to the periphery in order to communicate a certain intention to the observer). The
manipulation in the present study was concerned rathe  with the latter, as there was no salient event in 
the periphery that the gazer could reflexively shift gaze to. Therefore, we discuss the results in the con-
text of intentional gaze behavior on the side of the gazer. 
 
Humans do not engage in social interactions with just any agent 
The finding that social attention processes are modulated by adopting the intentional stance when ob-
serving others’ behavior raises a fundamental question: why does the belief that another agent is an 
intentional system influence the way we allocate atntional resources? Clearly, an attentional system 
that is sensitive to social context information is highly advantageous from an evolutionary perspectiv: 
it permits adaptation to the social relevance of the scenario in which an interaction takes place. Allocat-
ing attention to where another person is attending serves the purpose of establishing shared intentional-
Studies on individual research questions                                                                          120 
 
 
 
ity (Tomasello, 2010), which enables us to engage in collaborative activities by sharing goals, inten-
tions, knowledge, and beliefs with others. The present results suggest that humans opt to engage in 
shared intentionality only with those who are believed to have intentions and are expected to display 
predictable, goal-oriented behavior. Given this, humans might be reluctant to adopt the intentional 
stance when observing a robot as compared to other humans. Importantly, what is crucial for adopting 
the intentional stance and, as a result, for readiness to engage in social interactions is not whether the 
observed agent actually has mental states, but whether the agent is bel eved to have mental states. 
Interestingly in this context, there have been several r ports (Abell, Happé & Frith, 2000; Cas-
telli, Happé, Frith & Frith, 2000; Heider & Simmel, 1944; Klein, Zwickel, Prinz & Frith, 2009; Zwick-
el, 2009) that humans tend to provide mentalistic descriptions of the behavior of simple geometrical 
figures in dynamic motion scenarios. However, participants in those studies may not have actually 
adopted the intentional stance towards the observed stimuli, but only described behavior using mental-
istic vocabulary – similarly to when one says “my computer did not want to start”. Alternatively, partic-
ipants may have adopted the intentional stance by treating the geometric figures as representations of 
intentional agents – in a similar way to the present study where the robot was instructed to be con-
trolled by a human. Hence, the novelty of our study is that through instruction manipulation, we trig-
gered the activation of preexisting representations f the observed agents: the representation of a hu-
man as being an intentional agent, versus that of a r bot being a mechanistic, non-intentional object. 
These representations in turn modulated the degree to which social attention mechanisms were em-
ployed. 
Consequently, if humans tend not to adopt the intentional stance towards robots, they would as-
cribe less social relevance to its behavior compared to that displayed by humans. Hence, the present 
findings are not only of theoretical interest, but are also of significance to applied domains in which 
artificial systems are to be involved in interactions with humans (e.g., social robotics). If attributon of 
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mental states is a crucial factor for enabling efficient social interactions, social robotics might need to 
address the issue of humans being hesitant to adopt the intentional stance towards a robot.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The present findings indicate that a mere belief that the observed agent represents a human triggers th  
concept of an intentional agent, and encourages adopting the intentional stance – in contrast to when 
the observed agent is believed to represent a mechanistic system (e.g., a robot). Consequently, social 
attention mechanisms are more readily employed when t  intentional stance is adopted. This seems 
plausible, especially given that two types of intentio s are communicated through gaze behavior that 
leads to directing others’ attention (Tomasello, 2010): referential – what is the object of attention; and 
social – why do I direct your attention to this object? If an observer believes that the latter component 
is missing and is not convinced that the observed agent is capable of communicating social intentions, 
he/she might allocate attention to a lesser degree to the gazed-at object. On this basis, we propose that 
adopting the intentional stance plays a pivotal role in basic attention mechanisms involved in social 
interactions. For us humans to recruit these mechanisms, it seems not to matter whether the observed 
agents can actually think – but rather whether we believe they do! 
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2.3.6. Supplementary Materials 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 was conducted to examine whether the patt rn of results revealed in Experiments 1 and 2 
(discrimination task) would generalize to other types of task that make different demands on attentional 
processing resources. To this end, we selected a speeded target localization task, as this type of task is 
typically used in gaze cueing studies (Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) and known to be sensitive to picking 
up small cueing effects.  
 
Method and Materials 
Experiment 3 was methodologically the same as Experiments 1 and 2 (instruction was varied between 
participants, while SOA, cue type, and cue validity were varied within participants), except for the task 
participants had to perform: participants were asked to localize the target as fast as possible by pressing 
the “D” key for targets presented on the left side and the “K” key for targets on the right side. 
 
Participants, Apparatus, Stimuli, Design and Procedur  
72 volunteers participated in Experiment 3, they were randomly assigned to three experimental groups 
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with 24 participants each: Group 1 (20 women; mean age: 25 years (M=25.00, range: 19-31); two left-
handed) received Instruction 1 (human, robot); Group 2 (19 women; mean age: 25 years (M=24.79, 
range: 21-36); two left-handed) received Instruction 2 (human, human-controlled robot); and Group 3 
(16 women; mean age: 25 years (M=24.71, range: 20-32); two left-handed) received Instruction 3 (hu-
man-like mannequin, robot). None of the participants has taken part in either Experiment 1 or Experi-
ment 2. One participant from Group 1 (Instruction 1) was excluded from analysis because of signifi-
cantly increased error rates compared to other participants (M= 11.46% compared to M=1.38%). 
 
Ethics Statement 
The experiments were conducted at the Department of Experimental Psychology at the LMU Munich, 
where all experimental procedures with purely behavior l data collection (e.g., RTs and error rates) of 
healthy adult participants, that do not include invasi e or potentially dangerous methods are approved 
by the ethics committee of the Department of Psychology, LMU Munich, in accordance with the Code 
of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of Helsinki). Data were stored and analyzed 
anonymously. Participants gave their informed consent and were either paid or received course credit 
for participating.  
 
Table S1. Mean RTs and SEM (in ms) as a function of cue validity and instruction, for human and robot cues 
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Results 
Missed responses (0.34%), incorrect responses (1.04%), and outliers (±2.5 SD from individual partici-
pants’ means) were excluded from analysis. Mean RTs and Standard Errors for neutral, valid, and inva-
lid trials are presented in Table S1 as a function of validity, cue type, and instruction. Figure S1 depicts 
gaze-cueing effects as a function of cue type and instruction. As SOA did not interact with validity 
[F(1,68)= .197, p> .6, ηp
2= .003], and did not have an influence on the interaction between instruction 
and validity [F(2,68)= .058, p> .9, ηp
2= .002] or the interaction between validity, cue type and instruc-
tion [F(2,68)= .304, p> .7, ηp
2= .009], data were collapsed over this factor for subsequent analyses. 
 
Figure S1. Size of gaze-cueing effects as function of Cue Type and Instruction. Error bars represent standard errors of the 
mean adjusted to within-subject designs (see Cousineau, 2005). * p< .05, ** p< .01. 
 As can be seen from Figure S1 (and Table S1), Experiment 3 closely replicated the results of 
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Experiments 1 and 2. In more detail, valid cues yielded overall faster mean RTs than invalid cues 
[F(1,68)= 67.471, p< .001, ηp
2= .498]. When no further instruction was given (I struction 1), the robot 
condition elicited smaller cueing effects than the human condition [F(1,22)= 9.821, p< .006, ηp
2= .309]. 
However, when both were believed to represent human behavior (Instruction 2), gaze-cueing effects 
for the human and robot condition were of similar magnitude [F(1,23)= .296, p> .5, ηp
2= .013] and 
comparable to that in the human condition with no further instruction [t(45)= -.478, p= .635, two-
tailed]. Similarly, when both agents were believed to represent non-human behavior (Instruction 3), 
the gaze cueing effects were also comparable in size [F(1,23)= .076, p> .7, ηp
2= .003] and even smaller 
compared to the robot condition with no further instruction [t(45)= 2.271, p< .03, two-tailed]. This 
overall pattern of results mirrors the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, showing that the essential effects 
are independent of the type of task. 
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2.4. Study 4 
Beliefs about the minds of others influence our own mi d! An EEG study on the modulation of 
sensory gain control by higher-order cognition. 
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2.4.1. Abstract 
Sensory gain control allows for improved processing of attended stimuli relative to ignored stimuli and 
has been examined by manipulating spatial attention (Hillyard et al., 1998). Furthermore, amplification 
of sensory processing has also been found with featur -based attention (Zhang & Luck, 2009). This is 
the first study, however, to examine the impact of higher-order social cognition on sensory gain control. 
With the use of a paradigm in which attention was guided to a location by the gaze of a centrally 
presented face, we manipulated participants’ beliefs about the gazer: gaze behavior was believed to 
result either from operations of a mind or from a mchine. In Experiment 1, beliefs were manipulated 
by cue identity (human or robot), whereas in Experim nt 2, cue identity (robot) remained identical 
across conditions, and beliefs were manipulated solely via instruction, which was irrelevant to the task. 
ERP results and behavior showed that participants’ attention was guided by gaze only when gaze was 
believed to be controlled by a human. Specifically, the P1 was more enhanced for validly cued versus 
invalidly cued trials only when participants believed that the gaze behavior was the result of a mind, 
rather than of a machine. This shows that sensory gain control can be influenced by higher-order (task-
irrelevant) beliefs about the observed scene. We propose an interdisciplinary model of social attentio: 
the Intentional Stance Model (ISM), which conceptualizes social cognition’s influence on the sensory 
gain control within the predictive-coding framework (Friston, 2005). 
 
2.4.2. Introduction 
Directing attention to a location improves the processing of stimuli presented at that location. A neural 
mechanism underlying this phenomenon has been identified as sensory gain control (Hillyard et al., 
1998; Mangun et al., 1993), which increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) for stimuli at attended, 
relative to other, locations (Hawkins et al., 1990; Müller & Findlay, 1987). Sensory gain control has 
been examined using a variety of methods: single-unit neurophysiology (Luck et al. 1997), neuro-
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imaging (Corbetta et al., 1990), and psychophysics (Lu & Dosher, 1998), with all studies providing 
converging evidence for the notion that attention influences sensory processing by amplifying stimulus-
related neuronal signals. Based on the event-related potential (ERP) technique of scalp-recorded EEG, 
the P1-N1 complex at posterior-occipital electrode sit s has been identified as the ERP index of the 
sensory gain control. For example, Mangun and colleagu s (1993) observed that when spatial attention 
was deployed to a location, stimuli subsequently presented there elicited more enhanced P1 and N1 
components relative to stimuli at other locations. The sensory gain mechanism has been studied 
extensively with a variety of procedures designed to modulate spatial attention: exogenous cues (Luck 
et al., 1994), central cueing (Eimer, 1994; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991); sustained attention (Mangun et 
al., 1993), or with the use of more naturalistic cues, such as faces with directional gaze (Schuller & 
Rossion, 2001). Sensory amplification has also been observed with feature-based attention (Corbetta, 
1990; Zhang & Luck, 2009; though see Hillyard et al., 1998, for an interpretation of feature-based 
attention effects in terms of sustained bias). However, the actual sources of attentional control over 
sensory processing and the question of whether sensory gain is sensitive to task-irrelevant higher-order 
cognitive processes remain to be examined. 
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether or not task-irrelevant beliefs about the 
observed scene can modulate sensory gain control. In ur paradigm, attention was guided to a location 
by the gaze direction of a centrally presented face, nd we manipulated beliefs regarding whether the 
face’s gaze behavior resulted from the operations of a mind or of a machine. Crucially, these beliefs 
were irrelevant to the task, and were manipulated either by cue identity (Experiment 1: presenting a 
human or robot face) or solely by instruction, with cue identity remaining identical across conditions 
(Experiment 2: presenting only a robot face but informing participants that its gaze behavior was either 
human-controlled or pre-programmed). We reasoned that attentional control over sensory gain would 
be enhanced when the gaze behavior was believed to r sult from the operations of a mind, rather than a 
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machine, as attending to locations gazed-at by an intentional agent is adaptive from the social and 
evolutionary perspective (Tomasello, 2010). 
Given this, the present study is the first to examine the social source of attentional control over 
the sensory gain mechanism, and whether sensory gain can be governed not just by intrinsically visual 
factors (e.g., spatial or feature-based selection), but also by higher-order cognitive processes, such as 
beliefs about the observed scene. 
 
2.4.3. Experiments 
Materials and Methods 
Stimuli and apparatus 
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch computer screen with a 100-Hz refresh rate, placed at a distance of 
80 cm from the observer. In the human-face condition of Experiment 1, a digitized photo, 5.7° × 5.7° of 
visual angle in size, of the face of the same femal individual, chosen from the Karolinska Directed 
Emotional Faces (KDEF, Lundqvist et al., 1998) datab se, was used in the human condition. In the 
robot-face condition of Experiments 1 and 2, a photo of an anthropomorphic robot (EDDIE, LSR, TU 
München), of the same size as the human face, was presented. See Figure 1 for example stimuli.  
Both human and robot faces were presented frontally without changes in head orientation. To 
produce gaze direction cues, irises and pupils within the eyes were shifted (using PhotoshopTM) left- or 
rightwards to deviate by 0.2° from straight-ahead gze, in both the human and the robot condition. 
Stimuli were presented centrally on a white background, with eyes positioned on the central horizontal 
axis of the screen. The midpoints of the human and robot faces were positioned 0.2° and, respectively, 
1.1° below the central horizontal axis; this slight difference in positioning with respect to the y-axis 
ensured that the peripheral target letters were always presented at the same level as the eyes of the hu-
man or robot face on the central horizontal axis. 
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Figure 1. The human face (left) and the robot face (right) used in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, only the robot face (left) 
was presented. 
 
The target stimulus was a black capital letter (F or T), 0.2° × 0.2° in size, which was presented 
on the central horizontal axis at an eccentricity of 5.7° with respect to the screen center (Figure 2). Tar-
get positions (left or right) were determined pseudo-randomly such that targets appeared with equal 
frequency at either of the two positions. 
Gaze direction was not predictive of target position, that is: in Experiment 1, on target-present 
trials (80% in total), gaze was directed either to the side on which the target appeared (valid trials, 33% 
of target present trials) or to the other side (invalid trials, 33% of target-present trials), or it remained 
gazing straight-ahead, with targets equally likely appearing on either side (neutral trials, 33% of target-
present trials). The neutral condition was introduced in order to examine for possible differential effects 
related to physical dissimilarities between the human and robot conditions. In Experiment 2, neutral 
trials were not included in the design. That is, the face could gaze to only the left or the right (50% tri-
als with each direction, in target-present trials), with the target presented either on the right or on the 
left side of the screen. In both experiments, 20% of all trials were catch trials (no target presented). 
These target-absent trials were introduced to permit subtraction of the EEG signal on target-absent tri-
als from that on target-present trials, so as to eliminate ERP potentials elicited by the cue, which over-
lapped with potentials related to the target. 
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Participants 
Sixteen volunteers took part in the Experiment 1 (5 women; mean age: 24 years; age range 20 to 30 
years; all right-handed; and all with normal or corrected-to-normal vision; none of the observers had 
taken part in an experiment with such a paradigm before), and twenty-eight volunteers in the Experi-
ment 2 (19 women; mean age: 24.4 years; age range 19 to 34 years; 7 left-handed; and all with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision; none of the observers had taken part in Experiment 1 or any other exper-
iment with such a paradigm); they received an honorarium for their participation. The experiments 
were conducted with the full understanding and written consent of each participant. In Experiment 1, 
the data of two participants had to be discarded due to technical problems during recording of the EEG 
data. 
 
Procedure  
Participants were seated in a dimly lit chamber with a keyboard under their hands. A trial started with a 
fixation point (2 pixels) presented for 850 ms. Subsequently, a face with gaze directed straight-ahead 
(in the direction of the observer) appeared on the scr en for 850 ms, while the fixation dot remained 
visible (in-between the eyebrows of the face). The straight-ahead gazing face was followed by a gaze 
shift (cue) to the left or the right (valid and invalid trials), or the gaze remained straight (neutral tri ls) 
for another 600 ms. Next, the target letter was preented on either the left or the right side of the screen, 
at a fixed stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 600 ms relative to the onset of the gaze cue. Following 
this event, the face and target remained on the screen for another 30 ms only, in order to minimize ey
movements in the critical time window. Participants were then asked to respond as quickly and accu-
rately as possible to the identity of the target letter (F or T) using the ‘o’ or, respectively, ‘i’ key on a 
standard keyboard (all other letters were removed and the o/i letters were covered with green/blue 
stickers), with response assignment (o=F/i=T vs. o=T/i=F) counterbalanced across participants. The 
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keys were to be pressed with the index finger of the left and the right hand, respectively. The display 
was blank for the duration of response. Upon respone, another trial started with the presentation of the 
fixation dot in the screen center. On target-absent trials, no response was required and the trial contin-
ued (blank screen) for another 800 ms. For an illustration of the trial sequence, see Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2. A trial sequence. Participants first fixated on a fix tion dot for 850 ms. Subsequently, a robot or human face (Ex-
periment 1) or always a robot face (Experiment 2) gazing straight-ahead was presented for another 850 ms. Next, the gaze 
direction changed to either the left or the right for another 600 ms, which was then followed by target pr sentation (30 ms) 
either at the gazed-at location (valid-cue trial) or the opposite location (invalid-cue trials). Participants were then asked to 
respond to target identity, with a blank screen presented until the response. On catch trials, the display with a face gazing to 
the left/right was presented for another 30 ms. 
 
Experiment 1 consisted of 900 trials and all conditions were randomly mixed within 10 blocks 
of 90 trials each. In Experiment 2, there were altoge her 960 trials, split into 2 sessions with two differ-
ent instructions (on the same day, with a 15-30 minbreak in between). Each of the participants re-
ceived both instructions (Instruction 1: human-contr lled, Instruction 2: pre-programmed), with order 
counterbalanced across participants. 
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EEG recording 
EEG was recorded with Ag-AgCl electrodes from 64 electrodes of an active electrode system (Acti-
Cap, Brain Products, GmbH, Munich, Germany). Horizontal and vertical EOG were recorded bipolar 
from the outer canthi of the eyes and from above and below the observer’s left eye, respectively. All 
electrodes were referenced to Cz and re-referenced offline to the average of all electrodes. Electrode 
impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. Sampling rate was 500 Hz, with an online high cut-off filter of 125 
Hz. 
 
Data analysis 
We hypothesized that the directional gaze shift would g ide attention to the gazed-at location. Hence, 
we expected validity effects (superior performance, and enhanced amplitudes of the P1-N1 ERP com-
plex, for valid- vs. invalid-cue trials). Moreover, we expected the validity effects to be modulated by 
cue type (Experiment 1) and instruction (Experiment 2) – the rationale being that gaze following makes 
more sense if the gaze potentially conveys communicative content, relative to when it only reflects 
mechanistic behavior. In sum, the main factors of interest for all our analyses were: validity (valid vs.
invalid) and cue-type (human vs. robot: Experiment 1) or, respectively, instruction (human-controlled 
vs. pre-programmed: Experiment 2). The analyses focused on valid and invalid trials, as neutral trials 
of Experiment 1 did not constitute a proper baseline – owing to the fact that in gaze cueing paradigms 
with naturalistic stimuli, neutral, straight-ahead gaze towards the observer is special due to producing 
an arousal effect and/or having a holding effect on attention, making it difficult to disengage attentio  
(the central, straight-ahead gazing face) and shiftit to peripheral targets (George & Conty, 2008; Senju 
& Hasegawa, 2005; Wiese, Wykowska et al., 2012). Neutral trials were only analysed with respect to a 
main effect of cue type in Experiment 1, in order to examine for differential effects related to physical 
dissimilarities of the cue stimuli.  
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EEG data 
The data were averaged over a 700-ms epoch including a 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline, with epochs 
time-locked to target onset. Trials with eye movements and blinks on any recording channel (indicated 
by any absolute voltage difference in a segment exceeding 80 µV or voltage steps between two sam-
pling points exceeding 50 µV) were excluded from analyses. Additionally, channels with other arte-
facts were separately excluded if amplitude exceeded ±80 µV or any voltage was lower than 0.10 µV 
for a 100-ms interval. Only trials with correct responses were analyzed. One participant in Experiment 
1 and three participants in Experiment 2 were excluded from analyses due to extensive eye blinks, and 
one participant was excluded due to abnormal alpha activity (Experiment 2). 
 
Target-locked early sensory effects (P1, N1) 
Analyses were conducted on correct target-present trials with ERPs time-locked to target onset. The 
two types of target (F and T) as well as the side of presentation (left and right) were averaged together. 
Target-absent (catch) trials were subtracted from target-present trials, to eliminate overlapping poten-
tials related to gaze cue onset and, thus, extract the potentials related to the targets. The subtraction was 
conducted on epoched data, separately for each type of cue (human vs. robot), each gaze direction (left
vs. right), time-locked to target onset. For the ERP data, too, the analyses focused on the comparison 
between valid and invalid trials. The EEG signal was averaged for the two validity conditions (valid vs.
invalid) and the two types of cue (human vs. robot). Mean amplitudes in the typical time window of the
P1 component (100–140 ms, i.e., ±20 ms from the latency of the grand average peak amplitude (120 
ms) in the 100–150-ms time window in the human valid condition, in which P1 was most pronounced; 
regarded as the typical P1 time window, in line with Luck, 2005) in Experiments 1 and 2; as well as in 
the subsequent N1 component (150–190 ms in Experiment 1 and 170–210 ms in Experiment 2; i.e., 
±20 ms from the latency of the grand average peak amplitude in the 140–200-ms time window in the 
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robot valid condition, in which N1 was most pronounced) for the lateral posterior-occipital electrodes 
(O1, O2, PO7, PO8) were subjected to ANOVAs with the factors electrode (O1, O2, PO7, PO8), cue 
type (human vs. robot), and cue validity (valid vs. invalid). Where appropriate, statistics were corrected 
according to Greenhouse-Geisser for potential nonsphericity.  
 
Behavioral data 
Prior to the reaction time (RT) analysis, trials with response errors or RTs faster than 150 ms and long-
er 1200 ms were excluded. Median RTs and mean errorrates were computed for each participant. The 
statistical analyses focused on the comparison between valid and invalid trials. Individual median RTs 
and mean error rates were submitted to a 2×2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the factors cue type 
(human vs. robot, Experiment 1) instruction (human-controlled, pre-programmed, Experiment 2) and
cue validity (valid, invalid). The same participants whose EEG data were analysed were subjected to 
behavioral analyses.  
 
Results 
Experiment 1 
P1. The 2×2×4 ANOVA with the factors cue validity (valid vs. invalid), cue type (human vs. robot), 
and electrode (O1, O2, PO7, PO8) for the mean amplitudes in the P1 time window (100–140 ms) re-
vealed the cue type x cue validity interaction to be significant, F (1, 12) = 6.596, p = .025, ηp2 = .355, 
with a more positive P1 amplitude for valid trials (M = 1.13 µV, SEM = .48) than for invalid trials (M = 
.88 µV, SEM = .43) in the human face condition; in the robot face condition, by contrast, his pattern 
tended to be reversed: the P1 amplitude was slightly less positive for valid trials (M = .21 µV, SEM = 
.47) relative to invalid trials (M = .73 µV, SEM = .39); see Figure 3. This interaction was stable cross 
all four electrode sites (three-way interaction with electrode: p = .31). The main effect of cue type was 
not significant, F (1, 12) = 1.04, p = .35. Subsequent analyses conducted separately for the human and 
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robot faces showed that in the human-face condition, he validity effect interacted with electrode site, F 
(1.6, 19.5) = 5.598, p = .016, ηp2 = .318, with a significant validity effect for the right electrodes (O2, 
PO8), F (1, 12) = 6.545, p = .025, ηp2 = .35, and a non-significant effect for the left electrodes (O1 and 
PO7), p = .79. The robot face condition, by contrast, did not yield any significant effects or interactions 
of interest (validity effect: p = .08; validity × electrode interaction: p = .42)1.  
 
N1. An analogous analysis for the later time window (150–190 ms) of the N1 ERP component revealed 
a main effect of cue validity, F (1, 12) = 8.032, p = .015, ηp2 = .401, with valid trials eliciting a more 
negative mean amplitude (M = -2.33 µV, SEM = .5) compared to invalid trials (M = -1.7 µV, SEM = 
.58). This effect was not influenced by the type of cue, p = .79, or by electrode site, p = .24; Figure 3. 
 
Behavior 
Error rates. The 2×2 ANOVA with the factors of cue type (human vs. robot face) and validity (valid 
vs. invalid) revealed a significant interaction betw en cue type and validity, F (1, 12) = 5.902, p = .032, 
ηp2 = .33, with the validity effect being more pronounced for human faces (∆ER= 2 %) than for robot 
faces (∆ER= -0.4%). Planned comparisons showed that for the human-face condition, error rates were 
significantly lower for valid trials (M = 3.8 %, SEM = .8) relative to invalid trials (M = 5.7%, SEM = 
.9), t (12) = 2.44, p = .031, two-tailed; by contrast, there was no difference between these two types of 
trial in the robot-face condition (valid: M = 5.2%; invalid: 4.8%, p = .706).  
 
RTs. An analogous analysis on the median RTs revealed no significant main effects or interactions. 
Numerically, RTs were slightly faster on valid trials (M = 404 ms, SEM = 11) compared to invalid tri-
                                                 
1 Note that visual inspection of the grand-averaged ERP waveforms suggested a differential effect in a time window 
preceding that of the P1 component, on the negative defl ction of the waveform; see Figure 3. However, statistical 
analysis on this time window (60–100 ms) failed to yield any significant effects, in particular, the  interaction of cue and 
validity was nonsignificant, F = .009, p = .926 (cue type,  F = 1.609, p = .229, and validity,  F = .031, p = .862). 
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als (M = 410 ms, SEM = 10), main effect of validity: F (1, 12) = 3.46, p = .088, ηp2 = .224, and the dif-
ference was numerically larger for the human faces (RTvalid = 405 ms; RTinvalid = 411 ms) than for the 
robot faces (RTvalid = 404 ms; RTinvalid = 408 ms), though not reliable statistically (cue type × cue validi-
ty interaction: F (1, 12) = .421, p = .529). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Left: Grand average ERP waveforms time-locked to the target onset for the pool of O1/O2/PO7/PO8 electrodes as 
a function of cue validity (solid lines: valid trials; dashed lines: invalid trials) and type of cue provider (red: human faces, 
green: robot faces), in Experiment 1. The two types of targets (F and T) as well as left/right sides of visual field were aver-
aged together. The displayed ERPs are the subtracted waveforms (target present–target absent) and filtered with a 30-Hz 
high cut-off filter (Butterworth zero phase, 24 dB/Oct) for illustration purposes. Right: Topographical maps of voltage dis-
tribution for the time interval 100–140 ms, presented from posterior view; the human condition is depicted in the upper 
panel, the robot condition in the lower panel. Mean amplitudes are presented on the left for valid trials, and on the right for 
invalid trials. 
 
Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES). When both behavioral measures (RTs and accuracy) were combined 
into a single dependent variable, namely: “Inverse Efficiency Scores (IES)” (see Bruyer & Brysbaert, 
2011; Townsend & Ashby, 1978; Townsend & Ashby, 1983), by dividing individual median RTs by 
individual accuracy scores (percentages of correct esponses), a 2×  ANOVA with the factors cue type 
(human vs. robot face) and validity (valid vs. invalid) revealed a marginally significant interaction be-
tween cue type and validity, F (1, 12) = 4.536, p = .055, ηp2 = .274, with the validity effect being more 
pronounced for human faces (∆RT= 15 ms) than for robot faces (∆RT= 3 ms). Planned comparisons 
showed that for the human-face condition, the cue validity effect was significant, t (12) = 2.739, p = 
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.018, two-tailed; by contrast, there was no significant effect in the robot-face condition t (12) = .507, p 
= .621. 
 
Neutral trials (gaze-straight ahead). In order to examine whether physical dissimilarity between hu-
man and robot cues as such has an influence on the amplitude of the early sensory P1 component, we 
compared the neutral-trial P1 mean amplitude between robot and human faces. A 4×2 ANOVA with 
the factors electrode (O1, O2, PO7, PO8) and cue type (robot vs. human) revealed no main effect of 
cue type, F (1, 12) = .131, p =.723, and no interaction with electrode, F (2, 24) = .671, p = .521. The 
behavioral data, too, showed no indication of differential processing on neutral trials between robot and
human faces: t (12) = .422, p = .68 for the error rates, and t (12) = .628, p = .542 for the median RTs; 
see Table 1 for the mean RTs, error rates, and P1 amplitude in the neutral condition. 
 
Table 1. Mean RTs, error rates and mean amplitude of the P1 component (100-140 ms time window) for the neutral cue 
condition (gaze straight-ahead) as a function of type of cue provider (human vs. robot). 
 
 Median RTs  Mean error rates  Mean P1 amplitude 
Human 425 ms  4.10%  1.123 µV 
Robot 427 ms  3.80%  1.204 µV 
 
 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 was designed to eliminate the possibility that physical differences between the two types 
of cue providers were responsible for the pattern of effects observed in Experiment 1, rather than dif-
ferences in mind-attribution. This alternative explanation is unlikely, given that: (i) a comparison of the 
human versus the robot condition did not reveal any significant P1 effects; (ii) valid trials were com-
pared with invalid trials within each of the two cue type conditions (robot, human) rather than across 
conditions; and (iii) a main effect of cue type was observed neither in the P1 nor in the N1 time win-
dow, indicating that the amplitudes of those components were not influenced by the type of stimulus as 
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such. Nevertheless, it is important to clearly show that the modulation of the sensory gain control is due 
solely to the higher-order belief that the gaze behaviour was the result of the operations of a mind, ra-
ther than of a machine. Thus, we needed to isolate this top-down modulation to rule out the alternative 
explanation of the P1 effect. To do this, we used only ne, physically identical cue provider across all 
conditions while manipulating participants’ beliefs via instruction. Specifically, participants were pre-
sented with the same robot face (gazing to the left or the right; see Figure 1 right) across all conditions; 
crucially, in one experimental session, they were told that the robot’s gaze behavior was pre-
programmed (Instruction 1), and in the other session, they were told that the eyes of the robot were 
controlled by a human (Instruction 2).  
 
P1. The 2×2×4 ANOVA on the mean amplitudes in the P1 time window (100–140 ms) with the factors 
cue validity (valid, invalid), instruction (human-controlled, pre-programmed), and electrode (O1, O2, 
PO7, PO8) revealed a significant interaction of validity and instruction, F (1, 23) = 5.566, p = .027, ηp2 
= .195, with a more positive P1 amplitude for valid trials (M = 1.45 µV, SEM = .28) than for invalid 
trials (M = 1.247 µV, SEM = .29) in the human-controlled condition, and a slightly less positive ampli-
tude for valid trials (M = 1.45 µV, SEM = .4) versus invalid trials (M = 1.526 µV, SEM = .39) in the 
pre-programmed condition (Figure 4). This interaction was stable across all four electrode sites (three-
way interaction with electrode: F(1, 23) = .434, p= .694). Subsequent analyses conducted separately for 
the human-controlled and pre-programmed instructions revealed the validity effect to be significant in 
the human-controlled condition, t (23) = 1.794, p =.043, one-tailed, but not in the pre-programmed 
condition t (23) = .652, p = .26, one tailed. 
 
N1. An analogous analysis on the mean amplitudes in the N1 time window (170–210 ms) revealed no 
main effect of validity, F (1, 23) = .099, p = .756, and no significant interaction of validity and instruc-
tion, F (1, 23) = 1.021, p = .323. 
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Figure 4. Left: Grand average ERP waveforms time-locked to target onset for the pool of O1/O2/PO7/PO8 electrodes, as a
function of cue validity (solid lines: valid trials; dashed lines: invalid trials) and instruction (red: human-controlled, green: 
pre-programmed), in Experiment 2. The two types of targets (F and T) as well as left/right sides of visual field were aver-
aged together. The displayed ERPs are the subtracted waveforms (target present-target absent) and filtered with a 30-Hz 
high-cutoff filter (Butterworth zero phase, 24 dB/Oct) for illustration purposes. Right: Topographical maps of voltage distri-
bution for the time interval 100–140 ms, presented from posterior view; the human-controlled condition is depicted in the 
upper panel, the pre-programmed condition in the lower panel. Mean amplitudes are presented on the left for valid trials and 
on the right for invalid trials. 
 
Behavior. A 2×2 ANOVA on median RTs with the factors instruction (human-controlled, pre-
programmed) and cue validity (valid, invalid) yielded a significant interaction between instruction and 
cue validity, F (1, 23) = 4.269, p = .05, ηp2 = .157. Planned comparisons revealed that in the human-
controlled condition, validly cued targets elicited significantly shorter RTs (M = 406 ms, SEM = 9.5), 
compared to invalidly cued targets (M = 409 ms, SEM = 10.6), t(23) = 1.805, p = .042, one-tailed); in 
the pre-programmed condition, by contrast, the validity effect was not significant, t = .785, p = .22, 
one-tailed, with slightly longer RTs for valid trials (M = 410 ms, SEM = 10) relative to invalid trials (M 
= 409 ms, SEM = 10.6). An analogous analysis of the error rates revealed no significant effects or in-
teractions, all Fs< 2, ps> .2. Numerically, the error pattern reinforced the RT and ERP data: valid trials 
yielded slightly fewer errors (M = 6.1% in the human-controlled condition and 6.7% in the pre-
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programmed condition) than invalid trials (M = 6.6% in the human-controlled condition and 7.1% in 
the pre-programmed condition). 
 
2.4.4. General Discussion 
The purpose of the present study was to examine whether sensory gain control can be modulated by 
higher-order cognitive processes, such as beliefs about the observed scene. In our paradigm, attention 
was guided by gaze, and beliefs about the observed gazer were manipulated either by the identity of the 
face (Experiment 1) or solely by instruction, with the gazer’s identity remaining identical across condi-
tions (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that attentional control over the sensory processing (the sensory 
gain control) would be enhanced when observers believed that gaze (which guided their attention to a 
location) was controlled by a mind, rather than a machine. Our reasoning followed Tomasello’s (2010) 
distinction between two types of intention communicated through gaze: referential and social. The first 
concerns the object of attention, the second why attention is directed to this object. The idea is that gaze 
behavior is often only informative when it originates from a mind, because mental states not only cause 
gaze behavior, but they also give meaning (the “why”) to it. Therefore, if an observer believes that an 
agent with a mind is directing gaze to a location, the observer may expect something relevant for com-
munication at that location, and thus allocates their attention there as well. By contrast, if the observer 
believes that a machine is directing “eyes” to a location, the observer may not allocate their attention 
there because the machine’s gaze behavior lacks communicative content, for it is not attributable to the 
operations of a mind.  
 Our data supported this hypothesis, showing that the a tentional control over sensory processing 
can be modulated by higher-order beliefs about the observed scene. In two experiments, the target-
locked P1 was more enhanced for the valid-cue trails elative to invalid-cue trials, but only when the 
gazer’s behavior was believed to result from operations of a mind. This ERP effect was paralleled by 
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the behavioral data: target-related performance was better on valid-cue, relative to invalid-cue, trials 
when participants believed the gazer had a mind and was not a machine. The ERP and behavioral data 
are particularly intriguing because participants’ beliefs about the gazer were completely irrelevant to 
the discrimination task they performed. 
Interestingly, the N1 validity effect was not modulated by cue type in Experiment 1, and no va-
lidity or instruction effect on the N1 was observed in Experiment 2. The P1 and N1 components have 
previously been proposed to reflect different modes of control over sensory gain: the P1 has been ar-
gued to reflect a suppression mechanism for ignored locations, whereas the N1 indexes enhanced and 
discriminative processing of stimuli at the attended locations (Hillyard et al., 1998; Luck & Hillyard, 
1995; Mangun & Hillyard, 1991). Given this, the differential effects between the P1 and N1 component 
suggest that when target stimuli are presented very briefly, higher-level cognitive processes influenc 
only the earlier, suppression-related mechanism to increase the SNR, but not the later, discriminative 
processes at the attended locations.  
In sum, this is the first study to show that sensory gain control can have a social source and that 
higher-order, task-irrelevant beliefs about the observed scene can influence early sensory processing by 
modulating stimulus-related neuronal activity, dependent on whether the stimulus location has been 
signaled by a meaningful social cue (gaze direction of an agent with a mind) or not (gaze direction of a 
machine). 
 
Theoretical considerations 
The present findings can be interpreted in the context of the idea that humans adopt various “stances” 
in order to predict and understand behavior of various systems with which they interact: the physical 
stance, the design stance, or the int ntional stance (Dennett, 2003). Based on experience, humans know 
which stance works best for which system. For example, when explaining the workings of a machine, it 
is best to adopt the Design Stance (DS) and understand its behavior with reference to how it is designed 
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to behave. In contrast, when explaining other humans’ behavior, the most efficient strategy is to engage 
in mentalizing (Frith & Frith, 1999): predicting and understanding behavior with reference to particular 
mental states (e.g., beliefs, desires, intentions).  
However, we argue that before one can engage in mentalizi g processes (i.e., refer to any 
particular mental state), one needs to assume that the entity whose behavior one is explaining is 
actually capable of having mental states. Restated, one needs to adopt the Intentional Stance (IS) 
towards the observed entity by assuming that the entity is an intentional system (a system with a mind). 
Our findings show that attentional control over sensory processing (sensory gain control) is exerted 
depending on whether or not one adopts the Intentional Stance towards an observed entity.  
To account for the findings, we propose the Intentional Stance Model (ISM) of social attention 
(Figure 5). The basic idea is that the brain uses probabilistic (generative) models to make predictions 
about the world’s causal structure, which are tested against sensory data to update the brain’s beliefs 
about this structure (Friston, 2005; 2010). According to the ISM, when the brain adopts the IS (which 
most likely occurs in the anterior paracingulate cortex, cf. Gallagher et al., 2002), a generative model 
M(x,Ψ) is activated which predicts the likelihood p(Ψ|x) that the observed behavior x of an entity is 
caused by an intentional system (Ψ), rather than another system (e.g., Φ). Here, Ψ and Φ are drawn 
from a set of representations ϑ⊃{Φ,Ψ,Γ,...}, where Φ = mechanistic system, Ψ = intentional system, 
etc. This likelihood is computed by combining the likelihood p(x|Ψ) of receiving a sensory input x 
given that the entity is a Ψ, and the prior probability p(Ψ) of adopting IS towards this system. The 
likelihood of interpreting an observed behavior as intentional is therefore given by Equation 1: p(Ψ|x) 
∝ p(x|Ψ)p(Ψ).  
If the predictions of the generative model M(x,Ψ) (i.e., adopting the IS) are correct (i.e., low or 
no error), the brain can begin to construct specific models mi(x, ψi) about specific mental states (ψ1, ψ2, 
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ψ3) in order to mentalize about particular instances of behavior displayed by the entity. However, if the 
model’s predictions yield a high error, the brain activates a different model, such as D(x, Φ). Here, D(x, 
Φ) corresponds to adopting the Design stance (DS). Following the same logic, when the predictions of 
the generative model D(x, Φ) are correct, other specific models di(x, φi) referring to mechanistic states 
(φ1, φ2, φ3) are constructed in order to explain particular instances of behavior. Thus, the same behavior 
(e.g., A gazes at an apple) can be explained with reference to either specific mental states (A wants to 
eat the apple: ψ1) if predictions of M(x,Ψ) are correct (e.g., eye behavior generally socially meaningful), 
or to specific mechanistic states (A’s machinery shifts the camera lens around: φ1) if the predictions of 
M(x,Ψ) yield a high error (e.g., eye behavior does not carry social meaning).  
Previous research has shown that mentalizing influeces perceptual processing (Teufel et al., 
2010a). For example, the magnitude of gaze-guided att ntional effects has been found to be modulated 
depending on whether observers believed that the gaz r could see through a pair of goggles (Teufel et 
al., 2010b). Teufel and colleagues (2010a) proposed th  so-called perceptual mentalizing model (PMM) 
to account for these mentalizing-dependent effects. According to PMM, when observers perform a gaze 
cueing task, brain areas implicated in mentalizing, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), generate signals which modulate neural activity in social perception 
areas, such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS). The STS in turn interacts with the parietal attentio  
mechanisms of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) in order to shift attention in the direction of the gaze by 
increasing the commitment of neural resources to the gazed-at location.  
One major limitation of the PMM, however, is that it does not account for the impact of 
adopting the Intentional Stance on sensory processing. As described above, mentalizing logically and 
functionally presupposes adopting the Intentional St nce, because the brain must first assume that the 
observed entity is actually capable of having mental states before it can infer mental states underlying 
particular behaviors. 
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Figure 5. The Intentional Stance Model (ISM) of social attenio . A visual stimulus (the robot face, bottom) is processed in 
the visual pathway from the lowest-level (early visual areas box) to higher-level areas (e.g., STS). The Attentional network 
(IPS) is involved in orienting attention to the stimulus (the F) that is cued by the gaze. One of the cor claims of ISM is that 
mentalizing is dependent on the Intentional Stance (IS), because it logically and functionally presupposes the adoption of 
the IS. When the brain adopts the IS (which most likely occurs in the anterior paracingulate cortex, Gallagher et al., 2002), a 
generative model M(x,Ψ) is activated which predicts the likelihood p(Ψ|x) that the observed behavior x of an entity (e.g., 
robot gazing left or right) is caused by an intentio al system (Ψ). Conversely, the Design Stance (DS) predicts that behavior 
x is caused by a mechanistic system (Φ). Mentalizing, which constructs specific models m(x,ψi) of specific mental states, 
only occurs once the brain activates M(x,Ψ).The IS and DS predictions feed-back into the pariet l attentional mechanisms, 
subsequently modulating the sensory gain control in the extrastriate visual areas (right). When observing an entity’s gaze 
behavior while adopting the IS, this higher-order blief modulates the sensory gain control in the extrastriate areas, 
increasing the priority of an item cued by the gaze (represented by a higher peak of neural activity on the right; the other 
peak depicts an invalidly cued object). This additional prioritization does not occur when the brain adopts the DS. Thus, 
beliefs about the mind of others influence one’s own mind. LGN = lateral geniculate nucleus, V1 = primary visual cortex, 
STS = superior temporal sulcus, IPS = intraparietal sulcus, mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex, TPJ = temporo-parietal 
junction. Processes of social cognition and perception that are the focus of this paper and are essential for the core claims of 
the ISM are highlighted in black and color, while gray boxes represent other processes of social perception/cognition that 
are not in the focus of this paper. 
 
 
The Intentional Stance Model of social attention presented here accounts for this limitation, 
because specific generative models of specific mental states (ψi) are constructed only when the IS is 
adopted. If so, it follows that the Intentional Stance is functionally independent and presupposed by 
mentalizing. Finally, unlike the PMM, the ISM specifies the neuro-cognitive machinery by which 
adopting the Intentional Stance and mentalizing exert their top-down influences on social attention. 
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When the IS predictions feedback to lower levels of the processing hierarchy, it modulates the sensory 
gain control. Accordingly, the IS modulations seem to reach as low as the extrastriate visual areas, 
where stimulus coding is modulated by the sensory gain mechanism (Hillyard et al., 1998). 
To conclude, the present study showed that a general perceptual selection mechanism – sensory 
gain control – is governed not just by intrinsically visual factors, such as spatial or feature-based selec-
tion, but is sensitive to higher-order task-irrelevant beliefs about others. This implies that beliefs about 
the minds of others influence our own mind. 
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3.1. Synopsis of results 
The goal of the presented PhD-project was to conduct a comprehensive series of experiments that in-
vestigate whether and how context information influences basic mechanisms of social attention. We 
showed that gaze-cueing effects were modulated by social context information in all experiments. In 
particular, we provided evidence that visual (placeholders), verbal (instructions) and empirical (experi-
ence) context information affected the size and the spatial distribution of gaze-cueing effects. Our find-
ings suggest that the context-sensitive modulation of gaze cueing originates from top-down influences 
on the early P1 ERP-component, which is reflecting a sensory gain control mechanism suppressing the 
processing of stimuli at unattended locations. We take this pattern to indicate that bottom-up and top-
down mechanisms interact to induce gaze-cueing effects and exert a combined influence on the alloca-
tion of spatial attention following gaze cues.  
 
3.1.1. Context information modulates the spatial allocation of social attention 
In the first two series of experiments, we investigated whether the allocation of attentional resources 
following changes in gaze direction is influenced by the context in which the gaze cues are presented: 
Social context was either provided in form of refernce objects (i.e., placeholders) in the periphery to 
which gaze direction could be linked (Study 1) or by supplying information about the predictivity with 
which gaze direction indicated target position (Study 2). In both cases, we expected to find general 
cueing effects for the whole cued hemifield when no context information was provided and gaze-
cueing effects specific to the exact gazed-at position when context information was available.  
In Study 2, we additionally investigated how information about experienced (i.e., actual) and 
expected (i.e., believed) cue-predictivity is integrated in order to guide attention to the most likely tar-
get position: When experienced and expected cue-predictivity matched, we expected to observe specif-
ic cueing effects for the exact gazed-at location in the predictive condition, and nonspecific cueing ef-
fects for the whole cued hemifield in the nonpredictive condition. When experienced and expected pre-
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dictivity did not match, we presumed the allocation pattern of cueing effects induced by experienced 
predictivity to be modulated corresponding to what would have been expected based on the believed 
predictivity of the gaze cues. 
 Our results showed that the allocation of spatial ttention following gaze cues can be modulated 
by both sources of social context information: the pr sence of reference objects in the periphery and the 
predictivity of the cues. In Study 1, we found nonspecific cueing effects if there were no objects in the 
periphery to which gaze direction could refer. This general cueing effect was independent of set size,
task type and of whether attention was shifted covertly or overtly. However, if reference objects were 
present in the periphery, gaze induced an additional cueing effect specific to the gazed-at position. In 
Study 2, we showed that the reliability of observed gaze behavior modulated the spatial specificity of 
gaze cueing: with predictive cues, cueing effects were significantly larger for targets that appeared at 
the exact gazed-at position relative to targets at he other two positions; nonpredictive cues, by contrast, 
gave rise to facilitation effects of equivalent magnitude for all positions in the cued hemifield. Most 
importantly, the effect of the experienced (i.e., actu l) predictivity was modulated by the expected (i.e., 
instructed) predictivity, that is: nonpredictive cues believed to be predictive caused additional cueing 
effects specific to the gazed-at positions, compared to nonpredictive cues believed to be nonpredictive 
(which caused general cueing effects for the whole emifield). In contrast, specific gaze-cueing effects 
caused by actually predictive cues were significantly reduced when the cue was believed to be nonpre-
dictive, compared to when it was believed to be predictive.  
Based on the results of the first two studies, it appears that attentional orienting to gaze always 
induces a general cueing effect for the whole cued hemifield in a bottom-up manner. When social con-
text information is provided, a cueing effect is observed that is specific to the gazed-at position acting 
over and above the general cueing effect by causing a top-down modulation of the stimulus-triggered 
allocation of attentional resources. However, based on Study 2, it seems that a specific component may 
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not simply be added to a general cueing effect, but can rather be up- and down-regulated depending on 
the beliefs participants have about the observed scne: the spatial specificity of cueing effects is re-
duced, if participants believe that gaze direction d es not inform about the most likely target positin, 
whereas it is enhanced in cases when participants believed that gaze direction is guiding them to the 
most likely target position. Hence, the first two studies extend previous findings by showing that a top-
down modulation of orienting to gaze direction can be invoked by various types of context information, 
namely visual information provided in the social scene (placeholders), verbal information (instruction) 
about observed behavior and empirical information deducible from experience with observed gaze be-
havior.  
Findings from Study 1 and 2 allow the integration of different theories of spatial attention with 
regard to their validity for social attention mechanisms. On the one hand, they are in line with the as-
sumptions of the general-region theories of attention, such as the meridian-boundary model (Hughes & 
Zimba, 1985, 1987), by showing that changes in gaze direction cause spatially nonspecific cueing ef-
fects under conditions when no context information is provided. On the other hand, the results also con-
firm the predictions of the specific-location theori s of attention, such as the zoom-lens model (Eriksen 
& Yeh, 1985) or the gradient model (e.g., Downing & Pinker, 1985) – by showing that attentional re-
sources can be allocated to specific regions of the visual field when the observed scene is embedded 
within a social context created, for instance, by presenting reference objects in the periphery or by 
providing information about the gazer that allows intentionality to be attributed to observed gaze be-
havior.  
a 
3.1.2. Readiness to engage in social interactions depends on attributing the mind to others  
In Study 3 and 4, we investigated whether the b lief that the observed stimulus is representing an agent 
with a mind has an influence on the readiness to engage in social interactions with that agent. The de-
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gree of attentional engagement was measured as the size of the gaze-cueing effects that were induced 
by the observed agent (human or robot). Importantly, rather than manipulating perceptual aspects of the 
cue provider, we varied participants’ beliefs through instruction (while keeping the physical appearance 
of the stimuli constant). We hypothesized that gaze-cu ing effects would be increased when attributing 
the mind towards the gazer was likely and that this effect would be independent of the gazer’s identity 
(i.e., physical appearance). 
 The results of Study 3 support the intentionality hypothesis: while both the human and the robot 
face induced attention shifts to the gazed-at position, cueing effects were twice as large when attrib-
uting the mind to the gazer was likely (i.e., when eye movements were believed to be caused by a hu-
man) compared to when it was unlikely (i.e., when eye movements were believed to be mechanistic). 
Importantly, the same stimulus elicited cueing effects to varying degrees depending on which belief has 
been induced by instruction: the human face yielded reduced cueing effects (comparable to the robot 
face) when it was believed to represent a mannequin, while the robot face elicited enhanced gaze-
cueing effects (comparable to the human face) when it was believed to be controlled by a human. This 
pattern has been shown consistently in all experiments and generalized from quite complex discrimina-
tion tasks to other tasks with different attentional demands (i.e., target localization).   
 In Study 4, the EEG/ERP-method was used to identify the neural correlates underlying the top-
down modulation of gaze-cueing effects by attributing the mind towards the gazer. We showed that 
attribution of intentionality imposes a modulatory effect on early components of perceptual processing, 
such as the sensory gain control mechanism. This mechanism improves perceptual coding by increas-
ing the signal-to-noise ratio by enhancing the processing of stimuli presented at attended locations 
and/or suppressing processing at other, interfering locations. In particular, we found larger gaze-cueing 
effects for intentional relative to mechanistic agents, indicating that attribution of the mind to observed 
agents modulates social attention mechanisms already at the very early stages of perceptual processing.  
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 Taken together, these findings indicate that changes in gaze direction believed to be mechanistic 
are followed to a lesser degree than eye movements b lieved to be intentional. In line with the first two 
studies, the bottom-up component involved in gaze cueing produced a general attentional bias towards 
stimuli in the cued hemifield, whether or not participants construed the gazer as intentional agent (in 
line with Bayliss et al., 2006; Quadflieg et al., 2004). However, the top-down component came into 
play only in conditions in which attributing the mind to the gazer was likely. Thus, attentional mecha-
nisms involved in low-level processes of social attention not only influence, but are themselves influ-
enced by beliefs about observed social agents (in line with Frith & Frith, 2006; Teufel et al., 2009, 
2010).  
 The assumption of gaze-cueing effects being caused by interactions between bottom-up and top-
down processes is further supported by evidence from neuroimaging studies showing that while the 
STS triggers bottom-up responses to social signals, the top-down control of these responses originates 
from the mPFC, thereby adapting the system to the social context of the scene (Grezes et al., 2004 a,b; 
Saxe et al., 2005). A modulation of gaze cueing via attribution of intentionality to observed behavior is 
very plausible, as attending to where another agent attends is beneficial only if gaze direction carries 
informative content. However, changes in gaze direction are informative only if they reflect the inten-
tions/goals of another agent or are generally resulting from actions of the mind, and thus help predict-
ing and interpreting behavior in a meaningful way and preparing appropriate action responses. 
 Why does the belief that an observed agent is an intentional system influence how we allocate 
attentional resources? Being sensitive to context information when attending to the behavior of others 
is highly advantageous as it permits adaptation to the social relevance of the scenario in which an inter-
action takes place. Furthermore, allocating attention o where another person is attending serves the 
purpose of establishing shared intentionality (Tomasello, 2010), and enables us to engage in activities 
with others by sharing goals, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs. Our findings suggest that humans tend
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to engage in shared intentionality only with those who are believed to have intentions and are expected 
to display predictable behavior. Given this, it seems that what is crucial for attributing the mind and for 
engaging in social interactions is not whether the observed agent actually has mental states, but whether 
the agent is believed to have mental states. 
 
3.2. Context effects on spatial attention – an integrative two-component model of gaze cueing 
The present findings argue in favor of the idea that gaze cues can initiate both a general and a specific 
component of attentional orienting, dependent on the availability of context information: If no context 
information is provided, only a general directional orienting effect is induced (bottom-up) that causes a 
global, but small cueing effect for the whole gaze-cu d hemifield. By contrast, if context information is 
available, a spatially specific component is evoked that induces a facilitation effect for the exact gazed-
at position and/or suppression for the other (uncued) positions in the cued hemifield. However, based 
on the available data, it is not entirely clear whether the context-dependent modulation of gaze cueing 
is caused by an interaction of top-down and bottom-up components or is rather due to a top-down ef-
fect that is purely additive to the general bottom-up effect. 
Whatever the exact relationship between bottom-up and top-down components is, one can clear-
ly conclude that specific gaze-cueing effects can be o served under conditions with context information, 
but only a general cueing effect for the cued hemifield without context information. The specific orient-
ing component, however, is likely to result from the combination of two separate sources of infor-
mation: the linking of social context information with directional information deduced from the gazer’s 
eyes. Interestingly, our results show that this linking is independent of the modality in which context is 
provided: visual, verbal and empirical information have all been shown to influence the size and/or 
specificity of gaze cueing. 
 Based on these findings, we postulate an integrative two-component model of social attention 
that combines the influences of the bottom-up and top-down components (Figure GD1): The bottom-
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up component induces an orientation of attention to the gaze-cued hemifield, and is carried out by a 
network consisting of visual areas (i.e., V1), STS and IPS (Nummenmaa & Calder, 2009, for review). 
The top-down modulation of the signal that has been g erated bottom-up is exerted via connections 
with the mPFC (e.g, Grezes et al., 2004 a,b; Saxe et al., 2005) and the anterior cingulate (Gallagher et 
al., 2002) which weight attentional deployment to specific locations in the cued hemifield according to 
the social relevance of the cue. Due to this weightin , attentional resources are allocated in a way th t 
objects/events that are relevant for the social interaction are prioritized. 
 Our conclusions are in line with previous postulates in the literature. That is, the proposal that 
visual information from the eye region and the perihery are integrated when processing gaze direction 
is in line with findings of Lobmaier and colleagues (2006), who have shown that objects in the visual 
field can cause systematic biases in estimating where the other is looking. The observation that explicit 
knowledge about our interaction partners does influe ce basic social attention processes is consistent 
with Frith and Frith (2006) and Teufel and colleagues (2010), who have suggested that bottom-up ori-
enting to gaze direction can be top-down controlled by context information about the gazer. Our results 
are also in line with empirical evidence showing that familiarity with the gazer (gender effect for wom-
en only: Deaner et al., 2007) and stereotypical information about the gazer (member of a political party: 
Liuzza et al., 2011) modulate the size of gaze-cueing ffects. 
 Taken together, findings presented in this PhD-thesis reveal a degree of flexibility in the gaze-
cueing system that allows for the integration of multiple sources of information to guide attention: 
whenever context information about the social relevance of the scene is missing, attention is directed to 
a broader area, whereas attention shifts are specific to the cued location when a relation between gaze 
direction and context information can be established. This context-dependent flexibility is adaptive, in 
that it facilitates detection of relevant social information (e.g., objects of interest) in a constantly chang-
ing environment. 
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Figure GD1. Bottom-up orienting to gaze cues is carried out by a network consisting of visual areas (i.e., V1), 
STS and IPS (in blue), which causes a standard gaze-cueing effect for targe s presented in the cued hemifield. 
The top-down modulation of bottom-up signals is exerted via connections with the mPFC (in orange). The top-
down mechanism weights the deployment of attentional resources to specific locations in the cued hemifi ld 
according to the social relevance of the cue, resulting in stronger gaze-cueing effects in conditions when social 
context information is provided.   
 
3.3. Conclusions 
Over the course of evolution, social signals such as ead and body orientation, pointing gestures and in 
particular gaze direction have acquired a special meaning in peer-to-peer communication, as they tend 
to indicate the location of important objects or events in the environment (Emery, 2000). In order to 
interpret gaze direction in a meaningful way, however, one needs more information about the context in 
which eye movements are performed/observed: who is the gazer, where is the gaze direction referring 
to, how is the gazer feeling about the attended object/event and why is the gazer interested in what he 
or she is looking at? The more information we have bout the social context of the scene, the better we 
are able to make predictions about what the gazer is planning to do next, which in turn provides the 
basis for preparing appropriate action responses when being engaged in interactions with him/her.  
 In support of this notion, the present findings provide evidence that the readiness to engage in 
social interactions and the efficiency with which intentions and action goals of others can be inferred is 
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significantly modified by the availability of context information. That is, the degree to which attentio  
is allocated to the gazed-at object/event critically depends on whether or not observed behavior can be 
explained in a meaningful way. For instance, while on  is hesitant to follow the gaze of a mechanistic 
system or gaze that is directed towards empty space, one is more willing to do so, if an agent capable of 
having intentions is gazing at objects/events in the periphery. We showed that the modulatory effect of 
context information on how we process social information is a very profound mechanism that exerts its 
influence already on early sensory processing components, such as P1. Thus, on the basis of the present 
findings, we propose that social attention mechanisms are not only influencing higher-order cognitive 
processes (i.e., mentalizing), but are also influenced by beliefs we hold about the observed gazer.  
 
3.4. Future Directions 
The findings presented in this PhD-work have several implications for further research. First, given that 
gaze direction is not the only cue used to communicate information about internal and external states in 
social interactions, it would be interesting to investigate whether the context variables discussed above 
also have an influence on the interpretation of other social signals that provide spatial information. If an 
interaction between directional information conveyed by the cue and context information about what is 
observed were specific to social scenarios, top-down modulation of attentional orienting should also be 
found for other social cues (i.e., pointing); in contrast, cues that transmit nonsocial information (i.e., 
arrows) should not interact with contextual information. Such dissociation between the functionality of 
social and nonsocial cues would support the assumption that the human brain is specifically sensitive o 
the processing of social information resulting in deeper processing of the context in which the observed 
scene takes place.  
 Second, future studies would need to identify furthe  contextual factors that influence the spatial 
allocation of attention following gaze cues. One factor that may have an impact on the spatial specifici-
ty of gaze-cueing effects is the facial expression accompanying observed eye movements. In particular, 
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facial expressions that indicate potential danger in the environment (fear, anger) or potential sources of 
joy (happiness, surprise) might induce highly specific attention shifts, whereas faces with a neutral ex-
pression might give rise to spatially nonspecific shift . Identifying further context factors would thus 
help understanding the mechanisms that underlie social-attention processes, while also supporting the 
notion that gaze is special with regard to cueing spatial attention. 
Third, the present findings are not only of theoretical interest, but are also of significance to ap-
plied domains in which artificial systems are involved in interactions with humans (e.g., social robot-
ics). The problem is that, if humans tend not to attribute the mind towards robots, they would ascribe 
less social relevance to the robot’s behavior compared to that displayed by humans. However, since 
attribution of mental states is a crucial factor forenabling efficient social interactions, social robotics 
needs to address the reluctance of humans to attribute the mind to robots by equipping robots with the 
capability of showing intentional behavior. A first step in that direction would be to provide robots with 
a model that can be used by the robot to interpret gaze direction of human interaction partners and to 
display meaningful (i.e., action-congruent) gaze behavior itself.   
 Fourth, the presented research has implications for developing training applications for clinical 
populations, in particular for people with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). It has been shown that these 
patients have reduced abilities to parse socially re evant information in the environment (Baron-Cohen, 
1995; Dawson et al., 1998; Klin et al., 2002) and exhibit reduced mentalizing skills: that is, they have 
difficulties inferring mental states from observed behavior (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). 
However, as the presented research suggests that atending to gaze direction and being able to infer 
mental states reciprocally impact each other in healt y individuals, the question arises of how these 
capabilities are causally linked in patients with ASD: that is, are both abilities equally impaired or is 
rather the inability to mentalize causing impairments i  following eye gaze? If attending to others’ gaze 
direction was possible in ASD-patients under certain circumstances, remaining gaze processing skills 
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could be used in order to increase the functionality of the whole mentalizing network. Based on the 
assumption that people with ASD do not follow human gaze because they are unable to explain the 
observed behavior in a meaningful (i.e., intentional) way, one would admittedly predict that they would 
be able to follow the gaze of a mechanistic system (i.e., robot), whose behavior does not have to be 
explained by attributing intentionality, but can rather be understood based on analytical reasoning usi  
systematic rules (i.e., in a mechanistic way). Thus, given that people diagnosed with ASD have intact 
systemizing skills (Baron-Cohen, 2002), it is reasonable to assume that they would follow the gaze of a 
robot and that their orientation to robot gaze could be used to train them to link observed changes in 
gaze direction to making predictions about behavior.  
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